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
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THE CLERGY REVIEW

EDITORIAL

IN sending out this first number of THE CLERGY REVIEW to our brethren in the priesthood we wish to make it quite clear that it is no part of our intention merely to add one more to the many reviews and magazines which from one angle or another already appeal to the Clergy. We feel, and our letter-box shows that many feel with us, that there is need for a Review which shall be devoted exclusively to the professional interests of the English-speaking Clergy all over the world.

We are, in the first instance, seminary priests writing for seminary priests. The REVIEW comes directly from the English seminaries whose Rectors form its Editorial Board. It appears with episcopal blessings from the hierarchy of Great Britain and Ireland. But it is to priests as priests that we address ourselves, and we have secured the collaboration of representative writers from the Religious Orders whose sympathy with our project has been manifested in the warmest and most generous manner. Among our promised contributors we reckon, too, a number of distinguished lay writers who will always understand that their articles are to be devoted to the specific interests of clerical readers.

We hope by this undertaking to draw from sources hitherto untapped, to find either in the Seminaries or on the Mission, clergy who have been mute, not from lack of erudition, but from lack of opportunity and stimulus, and to engage these to write from their experience for the benefit of their brethren.

We shall try to achieve a high standard in our articles. That does not mean that they will be unduly specialised,

but that aiming at the needs of the parochial clergy they shall be conceived with insight and executed with distinction. Conspicuous in our columns will be articles on Moral Theology which will be of help in the practical work of the mission and will be useful, too, in the solution of Conference Cases.

Much thought has been given to the Homiletic Section of the REVIEW. It was the unanimous opinion of the Editorial Board that we should best serve the interest of the clergy not by printing formal sermons but by producing matter that should obviously be adaptable for the Sunday sermon. For the first year we shall have exegetical notes on the epistles or gospels, or both, of the current month. We have decided on this plan as the one most likely to meet the wishes of the majority of our readers. We hope that by the end of the year we shall have received from them by way of criticism or suggestion an indication of how best to supply the matter in future.

Our reviews of books are intended to be a real guide to the clergy as to the advisability of reading or purchasing books of a sufficiently serious character to merit notice.

Notes on Recent Work must vary in character according to the subject under review. Science notices obviously cannot be addressed to experts, while theological notices can. In every instance it will be the intention of our contributors to produce such a *résumé* of recent work as will suffice to keep our readers in touch with the progress of the science in question.

Owing to the particular circumstances which have favoured the inception of this undertaking, we have been enabled to produce a large review at a more modest price than anything of its kind on the market. Its success will depend under God on its popularity among the clergy. We shall do our best to deserve that popularity, and while we beg God's blessing on the work, we hope that our brethren will take such an interest in our enterprise as will justify its continuance for years to come.

E. MYERS.

T. E. FLYNN.

RATIONALIZING THE GODS

By THE MOST REVEREND RICHARD DOWNEY,
D.D., Ph.D., LL.D., Archbishop of Liverpool.

IN these days when speculative theology is largely neglected outside the Catholic Church, when metaphysics are at a discount and the inner light of experience has proved to be a will-o'-the-wisp, we are bidden by the Enlightened to betake ourselves to the study of comparative religion as to the only sure way to the understanding of the genesis and significance of all spiritual phenomena. The rationalist anthropologist, especially if he has dabbled in psychoanalysis, is ready to demonstrate how man with his rationalisations and sublimations, his introversions and extroversions, his phobias and libidos, in the course of the proliferating ages, has evolved out of his own inner consciousness and in his own image a god, whereas, in the memorable and tremendous words of Betsey Prig, "there's no sich a person."

The methods employed to produce this result are as fascinating as they are fallacious, and the celerity and ingenuity with which new anthropological theories are substituted for old ones, before your very eyes, so to speak, might well excite the envy of the expert conjuror. These theories, new and old, separately and mixed, filter down to the masses in the picturesque inaccuracies of the "scientific" popularisers who dispense culture in monthly parts, or in *Outlines*, or in chatty little articles in the Sunday Press. The result is that nearly everybody gets a tinge of rationalism in his light literature.

A good start is a great help in a race, and it must not be forgotten that for a long time rationalists had practically a monopoly in the study of comparative religion. They proclaimed it a science, laid down its principles, and explained away the belief in the existence of God entirely to their own satisfaction. It will be some time yet before fact catches up to fiction.

Nowadays it is amongst the cultured classes that rationalists search for living witnesses to disbelief, but in the old days they claimed spiritual kinship with the primitive savages. For with the aid of the new science, had they not discovered whole tribes of aborigines who had no religion and knew no God—natural born agnostics? Clearly then, primitive man had no religion, and God was invented thousands of years later by cunning

priests for their own advantage. This theory gained favour rapidly because it fitted in so beautifully with the general evolutionary principle, that is to say, with the particular general evolutionary principle which was accepted in those days. There were difficulties of course. Why, for instance, there were priests before there were gods, and what precisely priests did before there was any religion, were amongst the problems which clamoured in vain for elucidation. But time is a great solver of problems. With the passing of the years the godless tribes also passed, and kept on passing till they passed out of existence, thereby solving the riddle of the anomalous priests.

But the godless tribes certainly had their day. Time was when the Andaman Islanders were a great consolation to the leaders of rationalist thought. Reams upon reams were written about the "godless Andamanese," and more would have been written, had not an educated Englishman, who had lived amongst the islanders for eleven years and really understood their language, put an end to the nonsense by testifying that the Andamanese not only had a religion, but a profoundly philosophical religion with a distressingly elaborate mythology.¹ Frankly, the Andamanese were a disappointment, but they were soon succeeded as exhibits by the Australian Blacks, with no less a person than Huxley as sponsor for their agnosticism. On what precise grounds we know not, but he stoutly declared that amongst these natives "no cult can properly be said to exist." However, they fared no better than the Andamanese, and were speedily dismissed from the highbrow company to which, strictly speaking, they ought never to have been admitted. This came about through the influence of Howitt, a distinguished ethnologist who, unlike Huxley, had studied the Australian tribes at first hand. As an authority on these tribes he is second to none, and this is what he wrote: "I venture to assert that it can no longer be maintained that the Australians have no belief which can be called religious, that is, in the sense of beliefs which govern tribal and individual morality under a supernatural sanction."² That was the end of the Australian Blacks as human documents of atheism.

¹ *The Making of Religion*, by Andrew Lang, p. 194.

² *Journal of the Anthropol. Institute*, 1885.

Next came the Indians, all the way from Guiana, presented by Mr. Im Thurn as the original genuine congenital atheists who "know no god." As in the case of the Andamanese and the Australians, it turned out that the impiety of the Indians was much over-rated. It took some time to penetrate the *disciplina arcani* which prevented the Indians from manifesting their sacred mysteries to the prying eyes of the unsympathetic foreigner, but at long last it became clear that the natives of Guiana were as profoundly religious as the rest of primitive mankind, if not indeed more so since they boasted a Valhalla and an Olympus of their own, and worshipped the Supreme Spirit under the titles of "Our Maker" and "Our Father." There was no help for it, they were ignominiously dismissed from the ranks of rationalism. But the search for godless tribes went on, and goes on, despite the testimony of such eminent authorities as Max Müller, Ratzel, de Quatrefages, Tiele, Waitz, Gerland, and Peschel, all of whom are agreed that there are no races of men without religious belief and practice. Professor Tylor astutely remarks that the case of godless tribes is similar to that of the tribes who are said to exist without language or without fire, for, says the Professor, "as a matter of fact the tribes are not found."³

It was most annoying of these untutored savages to have gods, and something had to be done about it. Something was done. It was observed that there was a great similarity, a remarkable family likeness, between the gods of different tribes. It was concluded, therefore, that the different tribes had borrowed from each other and ultimately from some common source. But what common source? Surely from the prejudicial teaching of Christian missionaries and possibly also from the disciples of Islam, both of whom were held to have borrowed from the ancient mythologies.

This theory of loan-gods held the field for some considerable time. It was fascinating fun to identify Isis with Venus, and Venus with Ceres, and Ceres with Rhamnasia, and Rhamnasia with the Kaitish Atnatu. There were no rules, so anybody could play. However, impartial investigators pointed out that what was wanted was evidence, not of similarity amongst the gods, but of *borrowing* on the part of the tribes. Thus Professor Rhys

³ *Primitive Culture*, vol. I, p. 368.

Davids insisted that "the comparative method will be of worse than no service if we imagine that likeness is any proof of direct relationship, that similarity of ideas in different countries shows that either one or the other was necessarily a borrower. . . . It would, of course, be going too far to deny that coincidences of belief are occasionally produced by actual contact of mind with mind; but it is no more necessary to assume that they always are so, than to assume that chalk cliffs, if there be such, in China, are produced by chalk cliffs in the Downs of Suffolk. They have no connection one with another, except that both are the result of similar causes. Yet this manner of reasoning is constantly found, not only through the whole range of the literature of the subject from classical times downwards, but even in the works of the present day."⁴ So also the renowned M. Cumont writes: "Resemblances do not necessarily imply imitation. Similarities of ideas or practices ought to be explained, without any reference to borrowing, by community of origin."⁵

The evidence of missionaries was, of course, always suspect, though the missionaries abroad, unlike the rationalists at home, at least knew the language of the people about whom they gave evidence. Furthermore, these missionaries, as men of God, generally succeeded in winning the confidence of the natives amongst whom they laboured, and of learning from them the hidden things of the spiritual life which were never revealed to the profane. But quite apart from missionary evidence it was easily established that there were many tribes who had never fallen under the influence either of Christianity or of Islam, and yet had gods in abundance, and rites and ceremonies and all the appurtenances of religion.

What about these tribes? Well, said the rationalists, after all they are poor polytheists without any real concept of God as the Creator and Father. And here again the rationalists were wrong for, oddly enough, even primitive savages sometimes display a lack of consistency in reasoning which would reflect credit on a modern higher education. Since the tribes were polytheists,

⁴ *The Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by some points in the history of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 3, 4.

⁵ *Les Religions Orientales*, p. 13.

logically they had no right to be monotheists, that is to say, they had no right to acknowledge and worship one Supreme Omnipotent Being. Nevertheless they did. M. Albert Réville, the great authority on native Amerind religions, writing of the numerous gods of Mexico and Peru, says: "Each one of these deities received in his turn epithets which seem to attribute omnipotence to him and to make him the sole creator."⁶ Nor is there anything in this peculiar to the religions of Mexico and Peru. "This is the case," continues Réville, "in all polytheistic systems, whether in Greece, Persia, and India, or in Mexico and Peru. It only proves that where man worships, he never limits the homage he renders to the object of his adoration; but if he is a polytheist he has no scruple in attributing the same omnipotence to each of his gods in turn. It is much the same with the worthy curés in our rural districts, whose sermons systematically exalt the saint of the day, whoever he may be, to the chief place in paradise."⁷ The one fact that emerges clear is that the natives of Mexico and Peru had a concept of an Omnipotent Creator, whom they sought to worship. It must not be forgotten that, as Dr. Jevons has pointed out, polytheism equally with monotheism, springs from the idea of God. "And if monotheism displaces polytheism, it does so because it is found by experience to be the more faithful interpretation of that idea of God which even the polytheist has in his soul."⁸ The polytheist, notwithstanding the diversity of deities in his Pantheon, many of them, by the way, mere culture-heroes, may yet believe in an All-Father, a Creative Being, whose origin stretches far away beyond the ken of man, into the realm of the everlasting.

It could be denied no longer that there were tribal gods which had not been borrowed, which were in fact as indigenous to the soil as the natives themselves. The urgent need now was for a plausible theory which would account for these gods on a purely rationalistic basis. Promptly ponderous papers were written on the evolution of the idea of God, it being taken for granted that even the savage's idea of God must have evolved from some terrestrial concept. Various evolutionary theories

⁶ *Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, by Albert Réville, p. 248.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

⁸ *The Idea of God in Early Religions*, by F. B. Jevons, p. 156.

were put forward, the earlier ones for the most part resting on the hypothesis of animism.

We may define animism in the words of Mr. Lewis Spence as "the bestowal of a soul (Lat. *anima*) upon all objects."⁹ It is supposed that the savage regards everything in the universe as being constructed on similar lines to himself, and consequently endowed with powers of thought, of speech, of passion, of love and hatred. He attributes the whole gamut of human emotions to the sun and to the moon, to the winds and to the waves, to the trees and to the flowers, to the rocks and to the caves, just as much as to the animals who serve or attack him; for all the knowledge possessed by savages, says Gomme, "is that based on their own material senses, and therefore when they apply that knowledge to subjects outside their own personality they deal with them in terms of their own personality."¹⁰ But in what rationalistic manner did the untutored savage come to realise that he himself had a soul of a spiritual character? According to Tylor the savage logically inferred it from "two groups of biological problems present to the mind of man: (1) What is it makes the difference between a living body and a dead one, what causes waking, sleep, trance, disease and death? (2) What are these human shapes which appear in dreams and visions?"¹¹

Observe that the primitive savage is supposed to have attained to the abstract notion of spirit chiefly by way of introspection, and then, with a passion for uniformity, to have bestowed spirits on everything in nature. Furthermore, it is pointed out, that there is a hierarchy amongst these spirits, and that consequently the savage has only to continue his thoughts on evolutionary lines to produce one Supreme Spirit, the great All-Father, the final figment of man's imagination.

Surely any impartial investigator must feel that the abstract reasoning involved in animism is beyond the intellectual powers of simple savages. As Professor Jastrow says: "Animism, as a theory of belief, assumes a quality of reasoning which transcends the horizon of primitive man."¹² As a matter of fact, animism is an attempt at a primitive philosophy, an effort to establish

⁹ *An Introduction to Mythology*, p. 17.

¹⁰ *Folklore as an Historical Science*, p. 132.

¹¹ *Primitive Culture*, vol. i., p. 428.

¹² *The Study of Religion*, by Morris Jastrow, p. 182.

some kind of principle of causation. It needs to be borne in mind that primitive savages do not so much attribute a spirit to everything as personify the things around them; and this they do as a rough and ready solution to the cosmological problem which engaged the attention of the earliest Greek philosophers, the problem of change. Whereas the Greeks sought to know whether the ultimate reality was static or dynamic, the savage merely observed that everything in nature is fleeting, transient, with no grip upon existence, and almost as variable as himself. Instead of betaking himself to metaphysics like the Greeks, the savage set out to interpret the universe in an anthropomorphic way. But he worshipped God with barbaric dances long before he philosophised. He felt the need of propitiating the Power upon which all else depended long before he sought to explain the dependence. As Professor Jastrow points out: "Religious manifestations, however, precede the appearance of animism as an explanation of the universe, and hence as a theory of the origin of religion, the latter would be defective."¹³

But even supposing that animism could be shown to be anterior to all religious practice, it would not follow that animism had given rise to religious belief. There is not a shread of evidence for the so-called evolution of theism from animism; on the contrary, there are the gravest possible objections to such a theory. "If man was without religion before the animistic theory presented itself to the mind," says Professor Jastrow, "animism by itself would not have led to the rise of religion. The emotions excited by a strange-looking tree or stone could not have been of such a character as to have kindled the divine spark in man; and however deep the impression made by such phenomena, as storms and lighting, may have been, the mere personification of these powers would not have led to bring into play the religious feelings—hitherto dormant. . . . In seeking, therefore, for the origin of religion, we must look for something which could stir his emotions deeply and permanently; which could arouse thoughts that would henceforth never desert him and would prompt him to certain expressions of his emotions and thoughts, so definite and striking as to become part and parcel of family and tribal tradition. Animism answers none of these conditions. Even

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 182.

the ceremonial to which it gives rise—the propitiation of powerful spirits, or the exorcising of evil ones—would have no chance of becoming permanent institutions without a substratum of belief that passes beyond the bounds of animism itself.”¹⁴

Mr. H. G. Wells, in his *Outline of History*, after very properly remarking that it is not for him to embark on theological discussions, adds: “But it is a part, a necessary and central part, of the history of man to describe the dawn and development of his religious ideas and their influence on his activities.”¹⁵ Unfortunately, Mr. Wells at different times gives different descriptions of that dawn and development. His description in the last edition of the *Outline* is decidedly different from that set forth in earlier editions, and perhaps the explanation is to be found in the Introduction to the definitive edition, where we read, “Pamphlets against the *Outline* by Mr. Gomme and Dr. Downey and an article or so by Mr. Hilaire Belloc have also been useful in this later revision.”¹⁶

In his earlier editions Mr. Wells adopted what he calls the “Old Man” theory as to the making of gods. The theory is simplicity itself: the Old Man of the tribe dies, he is venerated after his death, marvellous tales are told of him, his fame grows in song and story, till finally he is deified. *Sic fit conversio tota*. In his earlier editions Mr. Wells referred his readers to Grant Allen, as though that facile populariser was an original source, for a scientific exposition of the “Old Man” hypothesis. He does not do so in his definitive edition possibly because it had been pointed out to him that Grant Allen had merely democratised Herbert Spencer and had done that so badly as to be thrown over in the Rationalist Press Association’s manual on the non-existence of God.¹⁷ In his definitive edition Mr. Wells still clings to his “Old Man” hypothesis, but with a weakened faith, since he has now heard of, and mentions Sir E. B. Tylor’s animistic theory as well as one or two more recent speculations which appeal to Mr. Wells’s bright imagination as plausible factors in the evolution of gods. Clearly he has learnt something since he first took to instructing the public on the origin of religion. And this is well if only on the

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 183, 184.

¹⁵ *Definitive Edition*, p. 62.

¹⁶ P. 6.

¹⁷ *Some Errors of H. G. Wells*, by Richard Downey, p. 10.

principle that he who drives fat oxen should himself be fat. Alas, his case may be taken as typical of that of other popularisers, especially where anything religious is concerned. They acquire knowledge on the instalment plan of learning whilst earning. In the unlikely event of their running to a tenth edition, they would be moderately well equipped to write a first.

Of the theory which Mr. Wells had the temerity to set before thousands of readers as accounting for the origin of religion on a naturalistic basis, Professor Jastrow, after dismissing Tylor's animistic theory, says: "Still less satisfactory is the theory chiefly associated with Herbert Spencer, which traces religion back to the worship of ancestors under the guise of ghosts as its sole factor. The theory rests on the supposition that the deities worshipped by primitive men are, in reality, the spirits of his ancestors."¹⁸

Now all the available evidence tends to show that ancestor-worship is a luxury which appeals only to comparatively sophisticated minds, to the cultured Chinese, for example or, in a lesser degree, to the Japanese, the Egyptians and the Assyrians. In the decadence of Rome emperors were deified, but no such apotheosis obtained amongst really primitive tribes. Savages extolled and glorified their departed great men, but even these heroes were rigorously excluded from the choice circle of the immortals. It is utterly impossible for the idea of a deathless god to have evolved, in the savage mind, out of the idea of a dead ancestor. The Supreme Being of the savage belonged to a world that knew no death, the ghost of a dead man could not enter there. Ghosts and gods were never confused by the savage mind, however much they may be confused in the minds of rationalists. "Ghosts," says Crawford Howell Toy, "are shadowy doubles of human beings, sometimes nameless, wandering about without definite purpose except to procure food for themselves, uncertain of temper, friendly or unfriendly according to caprice." "The god," on the other hand, "appears to have been at the outset a well-formed anthropomorphic being. His genesis is different from that of the ghost, spirit, ancestor, or totem. These, except the spirit, are all given by experience."¹⁹

¹⁸ *The Study of Religion*, p. 184.

¹⁹ *Introduction to the History of Religion*, by Crawford Howell Toy, p. 266.

It is difficult to understand how anyone acquainted with the facts can dissent from the conclusion reached by Dr. Jevons: "Religion did not originate from ancestor-worship, nor ancestor-worship from religion."²⁰ "Certain Greek families," he tells us, "believed that they were descended from Zeus, and they worshipped Zeus, not as ancestor but as god. The 'deified ancestor' theory, however, would have us believe that there was once a man named Zeus, who had a family, and his descendants thought that he was a god. . . . The fact is that ancestors known to be human were not worshipped as gods, and that ancestors worshipped as gods were not believed to have been human."²¹

The ancestor-worship theory as to the origin of gods is chiefly interesting on account of the extravaganzas of Grant Allen, Huxley, and Spencer. Having agreed that the Jews "invented" monotheism, and then in some mysterious way, not explained, communicated it to all other nations, it was incumbent on the three wise men to produce some evidence of ancestor-worship amongst the Jews. Nothing daunted, Grant Allen stoutly declared that in Jehovah Himself "we may still discern the vague but constant lineaments of an ancestral ghost-deity," and then, remembering something of the Scriptures, he adds very truly, "as in a glass darkly;"²² so darkly, in fact, that Huxley and Spencer were constrained to institute a systematic search of the Scriptures for satisfactory examples of ancestor worship. Huxley, at his wits' end, appeals first of all to "the singular weight attached to the veneration of parents in the Fourth Commandment,"²³ and then, on some esoteric theory of his own, to the Ark of the Covenant which, in Huxley's considered judgment, "may have been a relic of ancestor-worship." However, as a distinguished rationalist once remarked, may-be's are not honey-bees, and Huxley's pronouncement about the Ark is one of those things which his disciples are anxious to forget. In the end the Father of Agnosticism accuses some unscrupulous persons unknown of having suppressed the evidences of ancestor-worship throughout the Bible in the interests of

²⁰ *Introduction to the History of Religion*, by F. B. Jevons, p. 302.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

²² *The Evolution of the Idea of God*, p. 68.

²³ *Science and Hebrew Tradition*, p. 308.

monotheism—presumably on the principle that the end justifies the means. Herbert Spencer gracefully retires from an equally fruitless search with the comforting reflection that “the silence of their [the Jews’] legends is but a negative fact, which may be as misleading as negative facts usually are.” In other words, the Synthetic Philosopher is prepared to bolster up a theory which has not a shred of evidence in its support.

It would seem that Grant Allen, Huxley and Spencer are by no means unworthy successors of an earlier exponent of more or less the same theory, M. Leclerc, who solemnly propounded the view that Greek mythology consisted simply of the diaries of rugged old seafaring men of Ionia. Little did these sea-dogs think in their buccaneering days that in their ungodliness they were carving for themselves niches in the pantheon. Rationalism generally is strong in affirmation, but weak in proof. No proof is offered that there ever has been any evolution of gods properly so-called in the minds of primitive peoples. That sweeping hypothesis is treated as an indubitable fact, and the elaborate explanations of it put forward by different and conflicting schools of rationalist anthropologists are for the most part illustrations of the principle *obscurum per obscurius*. Surely the intelligence with which these anthropologists insist on endowing primitive man, an intelligence sufficient to work out a belief in a beneficent Supreme Being from the personification of inanimate objects, or from ghosts of doubtful character, would have been more than sufficient to enable the savage to realise that “the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”²⁴ The intelligence that could people ghostland with countless shadowy forms of headsmen whose bodies had rotted in the grave, understood something of the nature of the vital principle animating man and of his eternal destiny.

Sir James Frazer assures us that the savage would as soon doubt his own conscious existence as doubt the fact of his survival after death.²⁵ Furthermore, Sir James testifies to the universality of this belief among the savage races of mankind and, raising the question as to the grounds of the belief, he answers that as a matter of his-

²⁴ Rom. i. 20.

²⁵ *The Belief in Immortality*, vol. i., p. 468.

torical fact men seem to have inferred the persistence of their personality after death both from the phenomena of their inner life and from the phenomena of the external world.²⁶ Why then should they not have inferred the existence of God in precisely the same way? Yet Sir James supposes that they first of all inferred a number of gods "who, behind the veil of nature, pull the strings that set the vast machinery in motion," and, in course of time, becoming dissatisfied with polytheism as an expression of the world, gradually discarded it in favour of some unifying principle.

This, of course, is sheer guesswork. The only real knowledge we possess of the psychology of the primitive human mind is derived from the rapidly disappearing savages of modern times, and they all, without exception, believe in some kind of Supreme Being even though they may be at the same time polytheists. The dogmatic assertions of rationalists as to the mental states of really primitive man embody nothing more than prejudiced speculations. The only available material on which a judgment can be formed, the literature of ancient peoples, is certainly not first-hand evidence since the literature was written long after the historic races had emerged from the primitive state. But the modern savage is a human document—and a document in conflict with rationalist theories.

An ever-increasing mass of evidence tends to show that the Supreme Being of savage creeds was not a later development from minor gods, but altogether anterior to them. For instance, Andrew Lang argues: "If the All-Father belief, among savages, were the latest result of human speculation, we should expect it to be the most prominent and powerful. Far from being prominent, it is, in Australia, an esoteric belief, concealed from women, young boys, and uninitiated white men." Again: "Among other peoples, ancestor-worshippers and polytheists, sacrifice and service to ghosts and gods are highly conspicuous, while the Creative Being receives no sacrifice, or but 'stinted sizings,' and, often, is only the shadow of a name. He is therefore not the latest and brightest figure evolved by speculation, but precisely the reverse."²⁷

²⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 217.

²⁷ *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. vi., Art: God, Primitive and Savage.

This overshadowing of the Supreme Being, in the popular worship, by lesser gods, ghosts, and spirits, seems to be a distinctive feature of all primitive religions. Thus, Réville, in a chapter on the Deities and Myths of Mexico, says: "We have to observe that, by an inconsistency which again has its analogies in other religions, the cultus of the supreme deity and his consort was pretty much effaced in the popular devotions and practices, by that of divinities who were perhaps less august, and in some cases were even derived from the substance of the supreme deity himself, but in any case seemed to stand nearer to humanity than he did."²⁸

It is not at all clear how facts of this kind are to be reconciled with the theory which holds the Supreme Being to be the final product of evolution. On the contrary, they seem to indicate that the Supreme Being was the original concept of the savage mind, especially as we find it admitted that deities, in course of time, did tend to slip into the background. "Amongst other backward peoples of the earth," says Dr. Jevons, "we find the names of gods surviving, not only with no worship but with no myths attached to them; and the inference plainly is that, as they are still remembered to be gods, they were once objects of worship certainly, and probably once were subjects of mythology."²⁹

But, we are asked, how is it possible for pure monotheism to have degenerated into polytheism? Surely the answer lies before us on the pages of the Old Testament: because of the wickedness of men's hearts. Even the Jews from time to time wandered after strange gods, and those gods had been enthroned by the same human passions which had moved the Jews to abandon Jehovah. Just as a stream is purest at its source and gathers up defilement on its way to the ocean, so in the course of time did belief in the one true God become less pure, and more adulterated with ideas which were of the earth earthy. The natural man, in his hates, his jealousies, his deceits, his thefts, could not expect the help of the God of Righteousness, and so in his perversity he turned to unseen superhuman powers who, he thought, might be cajoled or propitiated into helping in nefarious enterprises, for they were a venal rabble, these lesser gods and

²⁸ *Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, by Albert Réville, p. 47.

²⁹ *The Idea of Gods in Early Religions*, by F. B. Jevons, p. 58.

goddesses. Naturally they were not conceived of as being altogether evil, but they were regarded as being on a decidedly lower moral plane than the Supreme Being. They were perhaps the outcome of a misunderstanding of some of the divine attributes by carnal-minded men. If it be urged further that this degeneration theory does not fit in with the evolutionary concept of the history of mankind, ever on the upward grade by minute steps or by enormous leaps, we can only reply that the evolutionary concept in this case does not fit the facts, and facts are stubborn things.

It would appear then that the evolution of the idea of God, whether from the spirits that ride the storm, or from ghostly ancestors, or from lesser gods, is by no means the established truth proclaimed by rationalists. Careful investigation leads the impartial enquirer to conclude that the idea of God did not evolve at all, but was gathered quite naturally, even by primitive man, from the consideration of the phenomena of nature around him for, as the mythology of the poets has it, the upper links of Nature's chain are fastened to Jupiter's throne.

THE CHURCH, THE BODY OF CHRIST

By THE REV. B. V. MILLER, D.D.

ONE of the signs of the times, in the world of Catholic theology, is the prominence given to the Church considered as the Body of Christ.

Those of my readers who studied their theology under the professors, learned and brilliant men many of them, and from the text-books of the late nineteenth century, will recall that, in the treatise *De Ecclesia* but little attention, comparatively speaking, was given to this aspect of the question. It was not altogether neglected, it could not be passed over, but its treatment was superficial and was limited to a more or less cursory explanation of St. Paul's words on the subject in Corinthians and Ephesians. Moreover, it was looked upon somewhat as a theological sideline; it was not brought into any close connection with the other parts of the treatise; still less was it linked up with any other of the great truths and mysteries of the faith that filled the four years of our college course.

It seems to have been left to the theologians of to-day, I may not say to re-discover, which would be an exaggeration, but at least to re-open this mine of spiritual and theological truths, to dig deep into its hidden riches, and to lay bare its many connections with the whole field of Catholic theology. They have shown us that this concept is not only central to the theology of the Church as such, but also that, whether we are dealing with grace, or the Sacraments, or the Last Things, or even the Incarnation itself, we must come back again and again to this truly cardinal doctrine that the Church is Christ's Body, if we would grasp the full import of the other truths, understand their organic unity, and see theology as a whole. Many books bearing out the truth of this might be mentioned, but I will name only two, namely, Karl Adam's *The Spirit of Catholicism*, truly profound and penetrating, and the Abbé Joseph Anger's *La Doctrine du Corps Mystique de Jésus Christ*, which, addressed to a different and more restricted audience, is more formal and scholastic and, in the best sense of the word, more academic.

It is this truth that I would take as the starting point and subject of a few more or less disjointed reflections. It is certainly by no means easy to express, or even to grasp, all that is meant by the simple statement that the

Church is Christ's Body. If we collect all St. Paul's references to the subject and tabulate them, if we set down all that St. John has to say about the matter—and that is much, though he uses a different figure and form of expression—if we add all that can be found, here and there, in the other sacred writers, we are nowhere near the end of the difficulty; rather, we have only made a beginning. One reason for this is that this doctrine cannot be considered in isolation; it branches out in all directions and has connections on every side. Then again, the truth is mysterious in itself and in its implications, and therefore it has to be clothed and expressed in metaphor, and there is always the danger of misinterpreting the reality which the metaphor is meant to convey.

To begin by clarifying our ideas, it must be noted that there are two senses in which the Church is said to be Christ's Body. Both are found in St. Paul.

Sometimes Christ and the Church are opposed to one another as two distinct entities, the former being the Head and the latter the Body, the two together forming the whole mystical Body of Christ. This form of expression is fairly common, as, for example, "He is the head of the body, the church,"¹ "and not holding the head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God";² "And hath made him head over all the church, which is his body";³ "In him who is the head, Christ, from whom the whole body,"⁴ etc. But often we find that this distinction between Christ and the Church is either altogether absent or else left so far in the background as to be hardly recognisable. Christ and the Church are one thing, or even one person, "for as many as have been baptised in Christ have put on Christ . . . for you are all one in Christ," all with Christ form one body which is Christ,⁵ while the characteristic and ever-recurring expression "in Christ" or "in Christ Jesus," cannot be well understood except as a summary formulation of the same idea. These two senses are, evidently, closely allied, but the second gives a richer meaning to the phrase and corresponds more closely with

¹ Col. i. 18.

² Col. ii. 19.

³ Eph. i. 22-23.

⁴ Eph. iv. 15-16.

⁵ 1 Cor. xii. 12.

St. Paul's whole teaching. The Fathers and St. Thomas are fond of expounding it in this sense and extracting from it the treasures it contains. It is in this way, therefore, that the expression is to be understood in these pages.

As has already been said, it is useless to try to understand this doctrine in isolation. It is central. It rests upon a profound truth that reaches back beyond the Incarnation to the beginning of man's history, the truth presupposed and implied by St. Paul when he says that all men sinned when by one man's act sin entered into the world.⁶ Here we have the basic idea that the whole human race is one family, not only in the natural order, but also in the supernatural, one group or society in the order of grace, contained and centred in Adam. He was not simply an individual man, not merely the ancestor and father of so many millions of men, but he was, in his relationship with God on the supernatural plane, the whole human race, which was represented by him and summed up in him. In him the whole race had been raised to the supernatural level, and in him the whole race was cast down from this high estate of privilege and grace, and became estranged from God. We might put it by saying that God, while marking the fall of every sparrow and numbering the hairs of every man's head, yet laid out His plan of man's destiny as one great whole, looking at mankind in the mass and not at men as individuals. From the first He meant them to be a family subject to the same laws, directed towards the same end, and bound together by the chains of an unbreakable solidarity. And so it was Adam's privilege to keep the whole race on the high level to which it had been lifted, but, as he was unequal to his opportunity, it was by his fault that the whole family fell.

But over against the first Adam, in whom all died, is set Jesus Christ, the second Adam, in whom all are made to live. And here again we have an example of what we may call God's mass-designing. Christ is meant to be the Redeemer and Saviour, not of men individually, but of man in the mass, of the whole race. In the Incarnation He took into personal union with the Godhead not a man, but impersonal human nature; similarly in redemption He ransomed, not so many individual men, but all mankind, the whole of super-personal human

⁶ Rom. v. 12.

nature, and in salvation He takes into Himself, in the union of grace and glory, not men as individuals, but man in the mass. There is this difference, of course, that between the ransom, as paid on Calvary, and the salvation as consummated in heaven, man's freewill comes into play, and men, refusing the gift offered to them, may persist in remaining disunited from Christ. But it remains true that the gift is offered to mankind as a whole, since God wishes all men to be saved, and the price was paid, superabundantly, for the whole race.

So it is that, as Adam embraced and held in himself all men unto loss, Christ embraces and holds in Him unto salvation all who are, or are to be saved. With Him they form one unit, one family, one body, the mystical Body of Christ, of which He is the head and all others the members, each one contributing to the full stature of the body "and the fulness of him who is filled all in all."⁷

Though this is true of all the saved, no matter when they lived or in what manner their salvation be effected, it is true in a special and more perfect way of those who enter into visible and sacramental union with Christ, in the way appointed by Him as the normal way of salvation, that is, in and through the visible Church. He set up this society as the agency by which the covenanted fruits of His redemptive sacrifice should be distributed to mankind, and the normal way by which incorporation with Himself should be effected; and it is, therefore, the Church as the visible extension of Christ, the visible field of the operation of His grace, that is specially designated His Body.

So we come to an important truth that Karl Adam brings out well, and upon which he lays strong emphasis, though, as he rightly remarks, it does not lie on the surface of things. This is that the Church is not just a collection of men who, coming together and forming a society to follow Christ's example and teaching, thereby built up a new thing that did not exist before. If we look at the Church in this way we look at it from the wrong end, and shall form an altogether false idea of what it really is. To find the true beginning of the Church we must go back to the Incarnation itself, for "it became objectively existent when the divine Word united humanity, the unity of all men who needed redemption, with Himself in His divine and human being. The Incar-

⁷ Eph. i. 23.

nation is for Christians the foundation and planting of that new communion we call the Church. The Body of Christ and the Kingdom of God came into being as objective reality at the moment when the Word was made flesh."⁸ Hence it is truer and more exact to say that the Church forms us than to say that we form the Church. We only begin to live our true lives, on the supernatural plane, when we are born of water and the Holy Ghost, that is when the Church begets us and so brings us forth into the world of redeemed humanity. For the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Christ, is the life-giving Spirit, or soul, of the Church, while the water is the sanctified and sanctifying instrument of the Incarnate Word; and so the supernatural man is begotten of two principles which are of the Church and are Christ's; and therefore, instead of being taken into the Church from without, it is truer to say that we are brought forth from within it, and formed by it.

Once this truth is grasped we see that it leads to many most important conclusions. Some of them affect the individual Christian. These we may pass over. Others have a direct bearing on the constitution, character and organisation of the Church itself, and one or two of these we may profitably consider.

One immediate and necessary conclusion is that the Church must be one with that perfect unity that the Catholic faith proclaims to be one of her marks or notes. One Christ implies, of necessity, but one mystical Body of Christ. All Christians will allow that, though too many of them do not see the logical consequences of their admission. Even if we had no record of Our Lord's own words:—"Upon this rock I will build my Church," "There shall be one fold and one shepherd," and the rest, there could yet be no doubt on this point. It is a matter St. Paul loves to dwell upon, coming back to it time after time. He expresses every function and every aspect of the Church in terms of unity. Almost the only point that he does not explicitly state is the unity of government under the headship of St. Peter. But the circumstances of the time, the nature of his writings and the still imperfectly developed organisation of the Church fully account for that. Yet even that is implied.

There can be no division in the Body of Christ, no real separation of part from part. If there were, the metaphor

⁸ *The Spirit of Catholicism*, pp. 35-36.

would be robbed of all its reality. A metaphor may be pressed too far, but it must have some solid basis; and St. Paul uses this one so often, insists upon it so strongly and draws from it so many and such important conclusions that it would be absurd and impossible to allow it to break down in its fundamental element. But the very first thing that must be true of a body, if it can be called a body at all, is that it must be one. Unless the thing has unity, to speak of it as a body is a sheer misuse of words. But that is only the first step, nor would any who claim the name of Christian, refuse, I think, to go with us so far. The parting of the ways comes when we try to determine and define the nature of this unity and to settle exactly in what it consists. Yet for St. Paul it was simple enough and for those who are willing to accept him as their guide, there should be no great difficulty.

Clearly the unity of Christ's mystical Body, the Church, must be what we have to call loosely, for lack of a better word, a moral unity. But that does not take us far. Protestants of all shades seem to find great comfort in fellowship. They love the word and are never tired of it. But if it means, as it often does, just a willingness to work together, sinking minor differences⁹ and a readiness to dwell in the harmony of love, it would not be enough for St. Paul. It must exist, of course, and no one preaches it more insistently than the Apostle; but he makes it clear that it is rather an ultimate effect than a first element, rather a manifestation than a constituent of real and necessary unity. Because we are one body we must live at peace with one another; we must sink our minor differences, the differences between male and female, rich and poor, Jew and Gentile, Greek and barbarian, because we are brethren, and we are brethren because we are members of one body in Jesus Christ. That is the order of His teaching and His thought, and the only possible order of reality; first the inmost binding unity that alone can make one body, then its outward manifestation in act and life. And indeed, if Christ is the way, the truth and life, and if the Holy Ghost, Christ's Spirit and the soul of His Body, is the Spirit of truth, and if the Church is formed and grows from within by generation, as a living body does, rather than from without by accretion, it follows that the supernatural birth of water and the Holy Ghost means that the soul is set

⁹ Another well-loved phrase of vague and varying meaning.

upon the right way and that Christ's life and Christ's truth are given to it. And as Christ's life in the soul is grace and charity, so His truth given to the soul born of the Church is faith. Hence faith¹⁰ is not a necessary condition of supernatural birth, but its effect. A man may have to make an act of faith, and declare himself ready to accept all her teachings before he becomes a member of the Church, but the permanent shaping or moulding of the soul, its *dispositio stabilis*, which we call the habit of faith and which makes it a ready receiver and an active transmitter of every ray of Christ's truth that is thrown upon it, is only given to it as an effect of the new birth in Christ's mystical body. Christ then makes the soul a sharer in His Spirit of truth. But if we really accept the Incarnation, with all that it implies, it is impossible to suppose that Christ's truth, which is nothing else than what He has made known of God's being, life and activity, both in Himself and in His dealings with men, can vary in its different infusions into men's souls. Souls may differ in their degrees of receptivity, but the truth into which they are born and which they share as members of Christ, the Truth, must in every member be identical. "One Lord, one faith, one baptism." Here is the fundamental unity, "One Lord" in whom we are all one body; its first result an inward effect, "One faith"; and its sacramental instrument, "One baptism."

Is it to be wondered at that Catholics, with their strong sense of reality and their deep conviction of the seriousness of religion and the truth of the Scriptures, should find it hard to be patient with the way in which the Anglican bishops treat this matter in their recent Lambeth "Encyclical Letter"? Under a cloud of fine phrases we can see clearly enough the persuasion that real unity of faith is a thing beyond hope of attainment; finally in the last paragraph of the section on the "Anglican Communion" they openly profess that they do not think it necessary: "We must now draw attention to the equally urgent necessity for unity *within* each Church. We appeal to all our brethren to remember that their right to a place in the Church of Christ lies in His call to each of them, in His love that embraces them, and in His Spirit that dwells in them, far more than in the opinions which they profess or the methods which they pursue. It may even be necessary to

¹⁰ I am speaking of the habit as distinguished from the act.

the Church that men in it should hold and expound different opinions, in order that the Church as a whole should have the whole of truth, even as the rays of many colours which the spectrum shows combine to make the light of the sun." I wonder, or rather I know, what St. Paul would have thought of this analogy, if we can suppose him to have had any knowledge of the spectrum; and when he withstood Peter to his face it was all on account of a method which the latter was pursuing.

The unity of the Church, therefore, is an inward thing, springing from and rooted in the indivisible oneness of Jesus Christ, and making His mystical body indivisibly one. It is not a sort of veneer or varnish spread over the outside to hide the rifts and rents within. This represents, not unfairly, the Protestant idea of unity. We cannot even liken it to the cement binding into one whole all the stones of a house, in spite of Our Lord's and St. Paul's metaphor of a building, for a building is a lifeless thing, but a body, Christ's Body, a living organism. And so its primary unity is in the vitalising energy of Christ Himself, and the unity of faith may be compared with the blood that carries the vital force to every part of the living body.

Yet this inward unity must, of necessity, find outward expression, and also, since it is a unity that embraces men and manifests itself through them, it needs a visible or outward safeguard and centre with powers of regulation and authority to enforce all those conditions necessary for the preservation of the inward unity of faith.

The outward expression gives us first of all the unity of worship and profession in sacrifice, sacraments and creeds, and then that universal intercommunion in prayers, good works, sufferings and all the manifestations of brotherly love which St. Paul continually insists upon as the practical consequence of membership in one body. But it goes beyond this and, as its highest manifestation, merges in the unity of government or headship which is, at the same time, the outward and necessary safeguard of the unity of faith.

It is true that St. Paul's elaboration of his metaphor of a body does not explicitly include any mention of this final aspect of unity, of a visible head on earth, for the definite proof of which we have to turn to the well-known Petrine passages in St. Matthew, St. Luke and St. John. But neither does the Apostle exclude it. There is plenty

of room in his theology for St. Peter, whether in his own person as the head of the apostolic college, or in the persons of his successors, the bishops of Rome, until the end of time. In fact it is no distortion of the truth to say that the position and powers of the Pope are logically implied in St. Paul's argument. For, working out his thought along the line of his metaphor of a body, he insists upon the Church's organisation or differentiation of members and functions in unity. The whole twelfth chapter of I Corinthians is given to this theme, to which he comes back in Ephesians iv., and of which the pastoral epistles supply some practical illustrations. It is, of course, only what we should naturally expect. St. Paul does not choose his metaphors at random, or as mere ornaments of rhetoric. If he shows such fondness for this metaphor of a body it is because he sees no better way of expounding the great truth he has to teach; in other words, it is because he sees a true and deep correspondence between the truth and the symbol he uses for its illustration.

But a body that is not organised and differentiated is but a lifeless lump of matter. As soon as life appears there is found also organisation, multiplicity in unity working towards a common end, and the higher we rise in the scale of life, of bodily life at all events, the greater becomes the variety of function, with its accompanying differentiation of organs. At the same time the greater becomes the necessity of one member or organ wherein are concentrated, as in the centre of government, all the powers of direction that govern the exercise of the body's activities. If this is true of material organisms, it is equally true of a moral organism or body such as a college, family, club or nation. Here we have a strong *a priori* argument that it is true also of the religious organisation that is the Body of Christ; so strong an argument, indeed, that it has been well said that, if Jesus Christ had not instituted the Papacy, the Church would have found it necessary to invent it or evolve it. But when we remember that the Church is meant by Christ to express and manifest His unity with the Father, and that it is the projection in time of the unity in Him of all redeemed mankind,¹¹ it is quite clear that it must have a visible organ in which and through which this visible

¹¹ As we have seen to be St. Paul's teaching.

unity is expressed and manifested, directed in the exercise of its activities, and safeguarded against the dangers, inherent in all organisms, of division and destruction. Without, therefore, going outside of St. Paul's theology and using only the elements to be found in his conception of the Church as Christ's Body, we arrive at the idea of an earthly head of the Church, exercising Christ's authority, directing the age-long work of bringing forth, "of water and the Holy Ghost," new members of Jesus Christ, and protecting their inward unity against the perils arising from human waywardness. It is true that this is a deduction from his principles, which he does not himself draw; but that it is a legitimate deduction is made evident when we compare it with Christ's own teaching as recorded by the Evangelists and with the interpretation given to this by history.

It would be easy to draw out the contrast between this Pauline conception of the Church as the one, undivided and indivisible Body of Christ and the vague and muddled ideas of non-Catholics who seem to be unable to rise beyond the thought of a loosely jointed federation of churches willing to recognise each other's orders, exchange pulpits and polite messages, and refrain from open quarrels. Whether it would be a very profitable undertaking I am not sure; but, on the other hand, I feel certain that the more we make use of this theology of the Body of Christ, develop it, link it up with every part of Catholic truth, and put it constantly and vividly before our flocks, so that it becomes a reality in their minds, the easier we shall find it to imbue them with a true sense of their Christian dignity, and so hold them to an active, fruitful life as members of Jesus Christ.

MATRIMONIAL CONSENT AND DIVORCE

By THE REV. E. J. MAHONEY, D.D.

SYNOPSIS.

- i. *Introductory.* The contract is the sacrament.
Consent which excludes the indissolubility of marriage is not a valid matrimonial consent.
Relevant canons.
- ii. *Simple error* concerning the lawfulness of divorce, even when it is a motive of the consent, does not invalidate the contract.
- iii. *A positive act of the will* excluding the indissolubility of marriage can be established more clearly if there is a **CONDITION** to that effect, either
 - (a) in the rite used, or
 - (b) by mutual agreement, or
 - (c) made only by one party.
- iv. *Even when not reduced to a condition or pact*, a positive act of the will, excluding the indissolubility of marriage, suffices to invalidate the contract.
- v. A distinction between *assuming the obligation* and *intending not to observe it* cannot be sustained with regard to the indissolubility of marriage.

I.

THE whole matrimonial doctrine and practice of the Church rests on the principle that the consent of the contracting parties constitutes the Sacrament of marriage. *Matrimonium facit consensus.* The Sacrament is not to be regarded as an adornment to a valid marriage contract, but the two are so closely united that, amongst Christians, one cannot exist without the other, and if there is no valid contract there is no Sacrament; the contract, in the accepted terminology, is the matter and form of the Sacrament. Consent must be externally manifested because a Sacrament is an external sign, and because no two parties can make an agreement unless the will of each is outwardly expressed. But the mere outward form of words does not suffice unless there is a corresponding internal intention.

In every contract, whatever it may be, the contracting parties, in willing the contract, will also everything that

is essential to its substance. When a man undertakes to do certain work in return for a salary, he necessarily intends to perform his part of the bargain. If, at the time of making the contract, his real intention is to join the army forthwith, it is clear that he does not really intend to make a contract with an employer. In willing to make a marriage contract the parties will everything that is essential to it, and such consent is always presumed to be present unless a contrary intention is proved.

A Christian marriage, ratified and consummated, is indissoluble. In an age when many people do not accept this proposition, the question arises whether, in going through the form of marriage, they really intend to make a matrimonial contract, or whether it would be more true to say that they intend a contract of some other kind, an agreement to give marriage a trial, for example, or to live together until something occurred to terminate the union. These are obviously not true Christian matrimonial contracts, and it may sometimes be necessary for the Church publicly to declare these marriages null and void. "Christus Dominus contractum matrimoniale ad dignitatem sacramenti elevans, hunc prorsus indissolubilem voluit, et ista indissolubilitas ita ad essentiam matrimonii Christiani pertinet, ut (quando perfectum sit seu consummatum) vel indissolubile sit vel nullum. Qui ergo matrimonium contrahere sine hac qualitate velint, nihil omnino faciunt, cum impossibile sit velle matrimonium et simul nolle id quod ad essentiam matrimonii pertinet."¹

The issue seems to be the very simple one of applying the natural law on contracts to the contract of marriage. But, in a given concrete case, the issue is very rarely so simple as it seems at first sight to be, and various problems present themselves to the mind. How few of those people, for instance, who do not accept the teaching of the Church on the indissolubility of marriage, really intend, when marrying, to contract a dissoluble union. The mere possibility of divorce probably never crosses their minds. Again, how is an alleged defective intention to be legally established? Is it necessary for *both* parties to have intended a dissoluble contract, or to have made some agreement about it, or to have contracted with an express condition to that effect? The natural law, in all such questions, is interpreted and applied by the posi-

¹ A A S, 1915, VII, p. 451; Ferreres, *Theol. Moralis*, II, §1056.

tive laws and canonical procedure of the Church. It would be idle for anyone, except a professional canonist of practical experience, to hazard any judgement about a concrete case. Canon Law, like any other system of jurisprudence, provides the principles on which judgement is given; individual cases are presented for a judicial verdict and are decided on points of law according to the evidence.

It must be understood, therefore, that in discussing this question, we have in mind no particular nullity decree. Certain causes, in recent years, have attracted the public attention in a manner out of all proportion to their legal interest, solely because of the eminence of the parties concerned and for no other reason. All we shall attempt to do is to outline the principles on which these decisions rest, stating them in the terms used by the Holy See in official instructions and decisions. This may serve the purpose of assisting the clergy to recall their previous studies in the subject, with a view to safeguarding the essentials of Christian marriage, especially in cases where one of the parties is a non-Catholic; with a view also to revalidating what appears to be a *prima facie* case of defective consent.

For the purpose of easy reference the relevant Canons may be conveniently grouped together.

Can. 1013 §2. *Essentiales matrimonii proprietates sunt unitas ac indissolubilitas, quae in matrimonio Christiano peculiarem obtinent firmitatem ratione sacramenti.*

Can. 1081 §1. *Matrimonium facit partium consensus inter personas jure habiles legitime manifestatus; qui nulla humana potestate suppleri valet.*

§2. *Consensus matrimonialis est actus voluntatis quo utraque pars tradit et acceptat jus in corpus perpetuum et exclusivum, in ordine ad actus per se aptos ad proles generationem.*

Can. 1084. *Simplex error circa matrimonii unitatem vel indissolubilitatem aut sacramentalem dignitatem, etsi det causam contractui, non vitiat consensum matrimonialem.*

Can. 1086 §1. *Internus animi consensus semper praesumitur conformis verbis vel signis in celebrando matrimonio adhibit.*

§2. *At si alterutra vel utraque pars positivo voluntatis actu excludat matrimonium ipsum, aut omne jus ad conjugalem actum, vel essentialem aliquam matrimonii proprietatem, invalide contrahit.*

Can. 1092. *Conditio semel apposita et non revocata; . . . 2. Si de futuro contra matrimonii substantiam, illud reddit invalidum.*

II.

Indissolubility being an essential property of marriage must be included in the consent, at least implicitly, *i.e.* as contained within the general intention of contracting a Christian marriage, of which indissolubility is a necessary feature. Consent of this kind can be given even by a person who holds erroneous views about the indissolubility of marriage; for consent is an act of the will, whereas error consists in a false apprehension on the part of the intellect. It is possible for the will to make a perfectly valid consent, even though the intellect erroneously assents to views which are at variance with the true nature of the contract. For we have to regard what a person intended at the time, not what he would have intended had he allowed his erroneous views to modify his consent.²

There are, indeed, other aspects of the marriage contract, in which a simple error suffices to invalidate the consent, on principles drawn either from the natural law of contract or from the positive legislation of the Church. Thus, error concerning the physical identity of the person married, or complete ignorance concerning the primary purpose of marriage (the procreation of children) invalidates the consent, by the natural law, because it is a question of the *object* of the contract.³ The error made by a free person in marrying a slave is a diriment impediment of purely ecclesiastical origin.⁴ But the Church has never held a simple error concerning the *properties* of marriage to affect the validity of the contract, unless it has positively influenced and modified the consent at the time the marriage was contracted. In consenting to the object of a contract a person necessarily consents to its essential features, unless they are positively excluded.

Valid consent in the will and error in the mind can exist together. A non-Catholic, for example, while believing marriage to be dissoluble, can intend to contract an indissoluble union out of regard for the religious principles of the Catholic party. Even apart from this instance, the generality of marriages contracted by non-Catholics, who may hold erroneous views about divorce,

² De Smet, *De Matrimonio*, §529.

³ Cann. 1082, §1; 1083, §1.

⁴ Can. 1083, §2.2.

are perfectly valid, simply because these views have no positive influence on their consent at the time of marriage. Their intention is to contract marriage as instituted by the author of nature or as regulated by the law of Christ, and this general intention is not modified, at the time of the contract, by the theoretical error existing in their minds. "Quod si conjuges versentur in errore theoretico de substantialibus bonis matrimonii, v.g. de indissolubilitate, sed neuter det consensum voluntatis dependenter ab illo errore theoretico, matrimonium est validum."⁵

Can it be said that a simple error of this kind constitutes a defective consent, at least in the case of a person who can assert that he would never have married except with the persuasion that the union could, for certain reasons, be dissolved? This is the error canonically styled "error dans causam contractui," and it is explicitly mentioned in Can. 1084 as being, in itself, insufficient to invalidate the consent. The reason is not far to seek. Any married person who discovers a defect in his partner, which he never suspected, can truly say that he would never have married had he been aware of this defect. Canon 1083, which states that an error concerning a person's qualities "etsi det causam contractui" does not invalidate the consent, except in two special cases, expresses substantially the rule of Can. 1084, which we are discussing now. The element to be examined is not what motivated the consent, but what was really consented to at the time; and this is true of all contracts. "Nuptura igitur, quae timet ne ad infelicem exitum nuptiae pergant, aufugium videns in scrindibilitate contractus, quem dissolubilem putat, atque eo ipso ad matrimonium facilius ineundum inducitur, matrimonium valide contrahit: consensus enim non dependet a causa in suo esse, licet causa, utpote influxum habens in voluntatem, eandem determinans ad actum, aliquo modo et ipsa intendi

⁵ A.S.S., 1915, VII, p. 452. The case CASTELLANE-GOULD, February 8th. 1915, was decided on this principle. The alleged defective consent of Miss Gould was not upheld, at the third hearing of her cause, because her views on divorce were merely views which she held in common with other members of her religious sect; the error did not affect her consent at the time of making the contract. *Ibid.*, p. 303. Cf. *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, 1918, XII, p. 279.

debeat; intenditur nempe ut causa, non ut conditio consensus, seu ut pars constitutiva contractus."⁶

What further element, then, are we to discover in the consent, over and above a simple error existing in the mind, even when that error is the motive inducing a person to contract marriage? There must be a *positive act of the will excluding consent to the indissolubility of the contract at the time it was made*. It is because this element is established in some cases, and not in others, that the official decisions sometimes appear to be contradictory to the casual and inexperienced observer.⁷

III.

There are various ways in which it can be shown that a person's views about divorce have so modified his intention, at the time of the contract, that the consent is altogether vitiated. In the terms of Canon 1086 there must be a positive act of the will which excludes the indissolubility of marriage. This guiding principle is very clearly expressed in an Instruction of the Holy Office, January 24, 1877: "*Quoad ultimum denique dubitandi caput (quod praesumptio habeatur contrahentes coram talibus ministris non intendere consensum praestare in vinculum perpetuum) omni diligentia et solertia investigandum erit, utrum conditio contraria perpetuitati et indissolubilitati vinculi conjugalitatis aliqua ratione, directe vel indirecte, explicite vel implicite, in pactum fuerit a contrahentibus deducta, seu utrum matrimonium fuerit contractum prava voluntate non consentiendi in vinculum perpetuum.*"⁸

⁶ A.A.S., 1915, VII, p. 299.

⁷ Some authors and official texts indicate that in a given case there may be two intentions, the one to contract marriage the other to contract a dissoluble union, and that the judicial investigation decides which of these two intentions predominates, e.g., Wernz-Vidal, *Jus Canonicum* V, §492; A.A.S., 1915, VII, p. 295; 1918, X, p. 217. It seems clearer and simpler, however, to retain the idea of error being in the intellect and consent in the will. It is hard to see how a person can, at the same time, have two opposite intentions, the one to include, the other to exclude, the indissoluble character of marriage. Is it not more correct to speak of the intention absorbing the error, as in the text quoted in III (a)? The intention to marry may absorb the error in a man's mind regarding the lawfulness of divorce; *vice versa*, the intention to contract a dissoluble union may absorb the erroneous conception that such a contract is a real marriage.

⁸ Gasparri, *Fontes*, IV, n. 1406, p. 373.

In the next section it will be shown that a positive act of the will, even when it is not reduced to a condition, suffices to invalidate the consent. But, for the moment, we shall confine our attention to a defective consent, which is positively at variance with true matrimonial consent, owing to a *condition or pact* providing for the dissolution of the marriage. The difference between a conditioned consent of this kind and the "error dans causam contractui" already considered is that, in the former case, the will of the contracting party, at the time of giving consent, is governed by the condition, whereas in the latter case it is not.

(a) The defective intention may often be clearly perceived from the words used in the marriage rite. An Instruction of the Holy Office, April 6, 1843,⁹ describes the rite of certain Calvinists in which the parties promise to observe a conditioned fidelity, in accordance with the heterodox interpretation of Matt. xix. 5, after it has been read to them by the minister. ". . . ubi adhibetur formula cum explicita vel implicita illa conditione, jam fieri nequit ut particularis error absorptus maneat a generali voluntate contrahendi matrimonium juxta institutionem Christi." Even when no such conditioned consent is explicitly formulated, it may be contained implicitly in the prayers and formulae used. A defective consent is deduced because the internal consent is presumed to be in accordance with the words pronounced.¹⁰ But this presumption has to yield to the truth. Even the use of a clearly defective rite is not absolutely conclusive of a defective internal intention. People who are bound by civil regulations to contract marriage before an heretical minister may, conceivably, have an internal intention unqualified by any condition. Catholics in this country were compelled, by the Marriage Act of 1836, to appear before a clergyman of the Church of England to secure civil recognition of their marriages, although, in this instance, the rite employed was free from any words levelled against the substance of marriage.

(b) An invalid intention may also be detected when both parties make a previous agreement to the effect that they intend to seek divorce, if necessary.¹¹ Even in these cases

⁹ Gasparri, *Fontes*, IV, n. 894, p. 171.

¹⁰ Can. 1086, §1.

¹¹ The case GOGUEL-GRAVIER contained such a pact, A.A.S., 1915, VII, p. 443.

it is just conceivable that the parties intend to reserve the right to seek merely a civil divorce, and the dissolution of the civil effects, leaving the vinculum untouched.¹³

(c) The contract is invalid even when one party alone gives a consent conditioned by the intention of seeking a divorce. The point is so evident as hardly to need comment, and it is applicable to all contracts. If an agreement, for example, concerning an automobile is made, in which one party intends to buy it and the other merely to let it out on hire, the transaction is clearly invalid. If the woman intends her marriage to be indissoluble and the man intends it to be dissoluble, there is no valid marriage, because in every contract both parties must come to an agreement concerning the essentials of the obligation contracted. "Altero modo conditio adiici potest contractui, quin deducatur in pactum; fieri nempe potest ut aliquis nupturiens ita contrahere sibi proponat, ut obligationes matrimonii essentielles, aut etiam unam ex illis expresse et positive reiiciat, quo in casu, etiam absque pactu, matrimonium nullum est."¹³

When the condition, of which we are speaking, is made advertently at the moment of the contract, and still more when it is externally expressed, an invalid consent can be established with certainty. But neither of these elements is strictly and absolutely required. It is clearly not essential for the invalidating condition to be made advertently, at the actual moment of the contract. A virtual intention suffices, as in all the Sacraments, namely, one that is previously formed with a view to modifying a contemplated contract, and having been formed, is still operative. Similarly, as in the conditional administration of the other Sacraments, a mental condition suffices because consent is an internal act of the will. On the other hand, no court of law can possibly take any account of a purely internal action, unless its existence can be certainly proved. "Essentia matrimonii est perpetuitas, quae si vel ab uno sponso, quamvis interno voluntatis actu, excluditur, matrimonium ipsum respuatur et nullum est. Intentio autem in mente retenta nil in humanis actibus operatur, hinc actus voluntatis debet exterius manifestari."¹⁴

¹³ Cf. *American Ecclesiastical Review*, 1924, p. 599 The distinction has an important application to the question of co-operating in divorce proceedings.

¹³ In Causa CHANCEREL-FLANDIN, A.A.S., 1917, IX, p. 33.

¹⁴ A.A.S., 1918, X, p. 216; Capello, *De Matrim.*, III, §627.

IV.

The positive will to exclude the indissolubility of marriage is not present in "error dans causam contractui." It may be present in the instances just given of a conditioned consent. The difference between a positive act of the will¹⁵ and a condition¹⁶ is so slight as to be almost negligible. But it will assist the mind in perceiving accurately the bare essentials of a defective intention if this rather subtle distinction is examined.

In certain official documents it seems to be laid down that it is necessary for the defective intention to be reduced to a pact or condition, and some authors define the question in this sense.¹⁷ But, from the nature of a defective consent, as well as from the positive terms of Can. 1086 §2, it is clear that an invalid consent depends radically on a positive act of the will, even when it is not expressed as a condition or pact, provided always that its existence can be proved in the external forum. If certain instructions of the Holy See are more exacting, it is simply because a condition or pact is a most useful means of proving the existence of a defective consent. A condition or pact is an almost indubitable proof of an invalid consent, not because it is a pact or condition, but because it clearly indicates a positive intention to exclude the indissolubility of marriage. But such an intention can exist, and can be proved to exist, even though it is not reduced to a pact or condition. The point has been repeatedly noted in official judgments of the Rota and is commonly held by the authors. "At conditio necessaria non est; sufficit ut contrahens, verbis aut signis, ante matrimonium demonstret se explicite et positive excludere indissolubilitatem."¹⁸

V.

The whole of the preceding doctrine is clearly and concisely expressed in the judgment given in the case GOGUEL-GRAVIER. "... omnes declarationes vel instructiones ab Ecclesia circa hanc materiam variis temporibus datae, ita prorsus intelligendae sunt, ut qui actu quodam

¹⁵ Can. 1086, §2.

¹⁶ Can. 1092, 2.

¹⁷ e.g. S.O., Feb. 4, 1891, Gasparri *Fontes*, IV, n. 1130, p. 457; Aertnys-Damen, *Theol. Moral*, II, §816.

¹⁸ A.A.S., 1918, X, p. 216; Cf. also 1913, V, p. 329; Capello, *op. cit.*, §599; Ferreres, *op. cit.*, §1057; Jus Pontificium, 1930, X, p. 57.

positivo voluntatis in matrimonii celebratione indissolubilitatem excludat, contractum irritum efficiat; sive hic voluntatis actus conditio sit vel propositum, sive in pactum deducatur, sive non, sive expressa vel tantum in mente retenta. Quoniam vero in foro externo omne factum recte factum praesumitur, donec contrarium probatum sit (et praeertim matrimonium, quod speciali gaudet favore juris), patet quod in foro externo nequeat declarari nullum, propter voluntatem in contrahentibus Sacramenti bono contrariam, nisi haec certa sit et probata."¹⁹

We must continue the enquiry to one last stage. Is it conceivable that a person, while accepting the obligation inherent in the indissoluble character of marriage, should at the same time intend not to regard himself as bound by the obligation? Can one intend to contract a marriage which is *de jure* indissoluble, while, at the same time, intending *de facto* to seek a divorce if necessary? This distinction is not so fantastic as it may appear to be, and really has a radical bearing on other aspects of the marriage contract. The contracting parties certainly can, and sometimes do, deliver to each other "jus in corpus . . . in ordine ad actus per se aptos ad generationem,"²⁰ while resolving not to use these rights. They can, and often do, deliver the same rights to each other, while also agreeing to use methods of contraception. A distinction of this kind is possible with regard to the primary purpose of marriage; it is possible to deliver mutual bodily rights, while intending not to use them, or to abuse them. But, provided these marriage rights are delivered, an intention to abuse them does not affect the validity of the contract. "Hoc enim potest contingere, ut contrahens ita sit animo comparatus, ut vere et serio velit contrahere et se obligare, et tamen praevidens matrimonii abusum, v.g. onanism, pravam habeat voluntatem hoc delictum permittendi, aut etiam committendi, et ita suas obligationes violandi. Hoc in casu matrimonium validum est, quia matrimonii essentia non dependet ab eius usu."²¹ A discussion concerning the birth-control intention, as affecting matrimonial consent, would take us far beyond the terms of this article. It is sufficient to notice

¹⁹ A.A.S., 1915, VII, p. 452.

²⁰ Can. 1081, §2.

²¹ A.A.S., 1917, IX, p. 33.

that the distinction cannot possibly be applied to the indissolubility of marriage; to bind oneself to an indissoluble union, while reserving the right to seek a dissolution, is a contradiction in terms.

What might appear to be an application of the distinction is, in reality, something quite different. It is the case of a person who contracts a valid marriage, yet intends to avail himself of the civil law in order to facilitate what he knows to be, in his conscience, an adulterous union and no real second marriage. But an intention of reserving the right to seek a divorce, meaning thereby the dissolution of the bond of the first marriage and freedom to contract a second, is an intention which excludes the indissoluble character of marriage. The refusal to regard oneself as bound by the obligation of an indissoluble marriage is exactly the equivalent of excluding the obligation itself. This is the teaching of St. Thomas noted in recent decisions. "*Sedulo tamen animadvertendum est, non omnes obligationes quae ex matrimoniali contractu oriuntur, seu melius, non omnia eius bona eiusdem esse naturae, ita ut in ipsis obligatio ab eius adimplemento secerni queat, seu ius ab eius usu. In indissolubilitate namque, seu in bono sacramenti, enunciata distinctio locum non habet. . . . Consequitur, quoties de alicuius matrimonii validitate quaestio fiat ob vinculi perpetuitatis exclusionem, ad matrimonium ipsum dirimendum sufficere quod constet eandem vinculi perpetuitatem fuisse positivo voluntatis actu exclusum, quin aliud investigetur.*"²²

It has been no part of the purpose of the present article to offer a reasoned defence of nullity decrees. But, perhaps, a clearer appreciation of one rather common form of invalid consent may be of some use in defending the decisions of our ecclesiastical courts from attacks that are made more through ignorance than prejudice. It is precisely because the marriage contract includes the grave obligation of indissolubility, which no human power can set aside, that the Church requires perfect consent on the part of those who marry, and is always prepared, for grave and adequate reasons, to declare the contract invalid, if it is evident that the obligation has been positively excluded by one or other of the parties.

²² A.A.S., 1927, XIX, p. 219. Cf. 1915, VII, pp. 294, 452; 1913, V, p. 329; S. Thomas, IV, Dist. 31, q. 1, art. 3, Parma VII, p. 955.

A HIERARCHY THAT FAILED—1531

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THESE is one generation of English Catholic bishops that, in popular estimation, has for its sole claim to remembrance this terrible fact, that in the greatest crisis of the country's religious history, it failed to do its duty and surrendered without a fight. The bishops are those who in the reign of Henry VIII., on February 11, 1531, just four hundred years ago, assented in Convocation to the new doctrine that the English King was "*singularem protectorem unicum et supremum dominum, et, quantum per Christi legem licet, etiam supremum caput,*" of the English Church. In this reluctant and qualified submission all the bishops, personally or by proxy, had their share. The scene in Convocation when the Archbishop proposed this, the final formula acceptable to the King, is well known. Silence, the silence of genuine terror induced by Wolsey's recent disastrous end, held the assembly until Warham spoke. "*Qui tacet consentire videtur, ad quod dictum quidam respondebat 'Itaque tacemus omnes.'*" So the dry official record, and both houses unanimously set their names to the address. History and Catholic tradition has judged these men severely. Here I wish neither to confirm nor to traverse that judgment, but merely to bring together a few facts about the bishops and their previous careers, to say who they were and to describe, as far as the published documents we possess allow, how they had come to the episcopate.

The Catholic Church in England at the end of the Middle Ages was organised in two ecclesiastical provinces ruled by two archbishops and their nineteen suffragans. At this first moment of crisis, three of the twenty-one sees were vacant, York and Winchester by the recent death of Cardinal Wolsey, and the see of Coventry and Lichfield by that of Geoffrey Blythe some months earlier. The Bishops of Salisbury and Worcester were non-resident Italians, so that, effectively there remain sixteen bishops to consider. This is the list of the bishops with their sees and the dates of their consecration: Canterbury, William Warham, 1501; Norwich, Richard Nyx, 1501; Rochester, Blessed John Fisher, 1504; Chichester, Robert Sherborne, 1505; Bangor, Thomas Skevington,

1509; Carlisle, John Kyte, 1513; Ely, Nicholas West, 1515; Hereford, Charles Booth, 1516; Llandaff, George de Athequa, 1517; St. Asaph, Henry Standish, 1518; Exeter, John Veysey, 1519; Lincoln, John Longland 1521; Durham, Cuthbert Tunstall, 1522; Bath and Wells, John Clerk, 1523; St. David's, Richard Rawlins, 1523; London, John Stokesley, 1530.

They were as a bench decidedly an elderly body—aged, even by the reckoning of our modern age when authority has learnt the art of survival. The Bishop of Norwich at eighty-three was the senior. Sherborne and Warham, at eighty, followed him closely. Five more had passed seventy, and two others closely approached that scripturally defined limit of human usefulness. Wolsey, consecrated at little more than forty, had even at his death been among the youngest. The junior was the Bishop of Baths and Wells, fifty years of age.

A modern historian of this "Eve of the Reformation" has declared that, speaking generally, the bishops of the hundred and fifty years before the change were men otherwise "quite undistinguished." Of the bench who actually faced the beginnings of change this is hardly true at all. But it is important to recall that whatever their individual talents, one and all they had long been overshadowed by the genius and the success of that one of their number, the shock of whose recent fall, and still more recent death—less than seven weeks before—all England still felt. Wolsey's mighty ghost keeps the stage through the whole scene of Henry VIII's schism, as in life his unique authority had straddled the English world, ecclesiastical and civil. Wherever that despotism cast its shade normal life had ceased, and the man who as Chancellor and the King's Minister held up in unprecedented fashion the course of the nation's political life, wrought on its religious life as strongly and as strangely. For, absolute as the capable minister in whose hands the King left well-nigh all political decision and the whole field of civil administration, Wolsey, through the amazing powers delegated to him by successive Popes, reigned for years despotically in spirituals too, little less in actual fact than a resident Pope. Little by little his legatine action had been felt in the internal life of one diocese after another. Even the Archbishop of Canterbury's primacy paled before this ampler splendour, and in successive contests and disputes with him, as with the

suffragan bishops, the legate's extraordinary faculties established the new jurisdiction. Cases of probate, visitations, ecclesiastical patronage, elections even in religious houses normally exempt, all fell within the wide scope of the legatine faculties, and the legate, be it remembered by us, as those bishops knew it well, was also, in practice, the civil ruler no less powerfully despotic. Such a concentration of power, and in such hands, was bound to provoke a discontent among the bishops that would end only with the end of the "Legacy," and when Wolsey so suddenly fell from his skiey chariot, he preferred to take his chance with the King rather than risk the mercy of his episcopal victims.

Of the many bad influences that flowed in reaction from Wolsey's years of glorious life we may note these—the lack of any tradition of corporate action in the hierarchy, and the diminution of the prestige of ordinary ecclesiastical authority. If the Legate continues his way, Warham had years before protested, the Primate "will be as a shadow and image of an archbishop and legate, voyd of authority and jurisdiction." There was in this protest something of prophecy, and when we come to consider the action of the bishops in the years that follow it must be a first consideration in our judgment, if we judge, that if bishops there had always been, the hierarchy had for nearly twenty years been suspended and out of action.

The bishops were now restored to their place, but the occasion of their restoration was no ecclesiastical triumph. It was the King who had gained most when, fifteen months earlier, Wolsey—bishop, cardinal and legate *a latere*—had appeared in the royal court and recognised its competence to try him, had acknowledged the force of the *Praemunire* statutes in his plea of guilty, and had thrown himself on the royal mercy. (And from Rome, be it noted, there had come no word of protest.) The mightiest ecclesiastical power within the kingdom had already fallen without a blow struck in defence. The *imperium* had won its greatest victory over the *sacerdotium* since the days of Henry II. and St. Thomas—over the *sacerdotium* organised it is true, in an abnormal institution and an unusual personality. The arm that had inflicted the defeat was now to be turned against the *sacerdotium* in its normal, ordinary organisation. What were the chances of its resistance?

The Archbishop of Canterbury, restored to his own by

events that so threatened the future, was Dr. William Warham. His career is worth setting out in some detail since it was characteristic of the best churchmanship of the day, the type of much else, and also because, in this way better than in any other, can we come to the heart of what a later Catholicism instinctively condemns as an evil system. He was of good family, born in the diocese of Winchester during the episcopate of William of Waynflete, a one-time Lord High Chancellor, and educated during Waynflete's lifetime at the two famous foundations of the diocese—Wykeham's school at Winchester and New College, Oxford. He was elected a fellow of his college and remained on in the University to make a name for himself in the study of Civil Law. He became principal of the School of Civil Law, and, his first venture into the world outside the University, began to practice in the ordinary court of the Archbishop of Canterbury—Cardinal Morton—in 1488. His expert professional knowledge of what was the international law of the day, and the political advancement of his friends after the revolution of 1485, joined to ensure for him, as he approached middle age, a rapid rise to the highest posts. He was given employment as a kind of counsellor in several foreign embassies, going to Rome in 1490 and the next year to the Low Countries, and then, a necessary preliminary if his career was to continue, at the age of forty-three he received the sub-diaconate at the hand of his friend William Smyth, Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield. Smyth was an old protégé of Lady Margaret, the King's mother, and one of the band whom the change of 1485 had "made." His promotion to Lincoln in 1496 meant for Warham patronage even more influential. Warham, meanwhile, had been named by Morton, Lord Chancellor as well as Primate, and now a man advanced in years, Master of the Rolls, an important appointment that made him, practically, the Chancellor's deputy in the judicial and administrative work of his office. He was now a figure to be reckoned with in the King's council, and the history of the next few years is filled with the evidence of his growing importance. He does much in the negotiations for the two great diplomatic marriages of the reign—with Spain and with Scotland—and, where his technical legal skill had perhaps greater scope, in the frequent commissions to arrange commercial disputes with foreign governments. So he goes to Spain,

to Flanders, and to the Emperor, and then, in 1501, this by now elderly lawyer and administrator is named Bishop of London. Two years later he becomes Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord High Chancellor. Thenceforward, until Wolsey's rocket-like rise in the new King's reign, he is the chief man in the kingdom.

He was known to all the scholars of the day—and it was the day of the revival of learning—as a lover of learning himself and a generous patron of learning in others. He was the friend of More and of Colet and Erasmus—a man of lawyer-like soberness of life and of a grave personal piety. But he remained all his life what he had been in the thirty years that lay between his academic career and his consecration—the careful lawyer and the trained administrator. As Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate he so organised and centralised his administration that appeals to Rome were, in practice, rendered impossible—an anticipation on a smaller scale of the disorder which, more blatant under Wolsey's régime, was to supply Henry VIII with more than one pattern in his schemes of church reform. The same tendency to extend his jurisdiction at the expense of his neighbours led to a great quarrel with his suffragans in which old patrons like Smyth and Fox of Winchester joined with Oldham of Exeter and Blessed John Fisher in strenuous opposition. When the famous divorce suit finally swung into ordered form Warham was named the chief of Catherine's counsel, and she lodged the complaint that he refused to advise her, declaring openly enough, "*Ira principis mors est.*" He was then an old man of seventy-nine, and surely it was the lawyer who spoke rather than the Archbishop?

Warham was only one of a little group of such lawyer-diplomats among the bishops. The others of the group were Tunstall, West and Clerk. Warham was almost the senior in age of the bench: Cuthbert Tunstall, Bishop of Durham, now in his prime, was almost the youngest—a whole generation younger than Warham, born in 1474. He had, too, the advantage of a more varied academic training, for he had not only studied at Oxford and Cambridge, but had won his doctor's degree in Civil Law at that University of Bologna which was the Civil Law's first home and chiefest sanctuary. More than in any other of the bishops, we may see in Tunstall the fine flower of the English Renaissance, and that nowhere more

than in his love of literature, in his acknowledged mastery of Hebrew and Greek. But primarily he was the lawyer, and it was through the law that he gained his first employment from Warham, now archbishop, whose Chancellor he became in 1511—the ordinary judge who presided in the bishop's place over the bishop's court. It was Warham, too, who brought him into touch with the court, and, with incompatible ecclesiastical preferments thick upon him after the universal fashion of the time, Tunstall was appointed in 1516 to his patron's old place of Master of the Rolls. Like Warham, he was speedily employed as the technical expert in diplomatic business, but over a wider range and more continuously. Like Warham, too, and indeed like the rest of the clerical diplomats, West and Clerk, he was late ordained, for he did not receive the subdiaconate until he was thirty-five. Finally in 1522 he was named Bishop of London and the following year to one of the highest offices of State—Keeper of the Great Seal. At London he remained until just before Wolsey's fall, when he was translated to Durham—abandoned by Wolsey for wealthier Winchester. Of the sixteen bishops he is the most distinguished figure, and after Blessed John Fisher perhaps the best known of them all.

Nicholas West, Bishop of Ely, was Tunstall's senior in age and by consecration, but while Tunstall rose independently of Wolsey, was to some extent his rival and played his part in opposing him. West and Clerk, though in different ways, were Wolsey's friends and clients, and it is easier to consider them in this order. West—born at Putney in 1461, educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge—was, like Warham and Tunstall, an adept at the Civil Law in which he graduated doctor. Unlike them he did not serve his apprenticeship in the courts of law. He taught, apparently, at Cambridge, as Warham had taught at Oxford, and came to court in Henry VII's time as one of the King's chaplains and a member of his council. Here in the royal household he had for colleagues besides Wolsey—then a very minor person indeed—Kyte, later of Carlisle, and Vesey, Bishop of Exeter to be. His preferments had begun many years before his ordination, and they rose steadily in number and value as his civil career developed. As Ambassador to France he helped to negotiate the marriage of the King's sister to Louis XII, and when a few

months later Louis died, he was one of the embassy appointed to bring back his widow. It was while at Paris on this business that he was named to the See of Ely, and we have his letters thanking Wolsey, now Archbishop of York and Lord High Chancellor, for the preferment. West was one of the leading diplomats of the day, and despite his prayers to Wolsey to leave him to the reform of his long-neglected diocese, he was continuously employed in the royal service at home and abroad for many years after his consecration. He was one of the six bishops named as counsel to Catherine of Aragon, and recently, along with Clerk, had been under arrest for his fidelity to her interests.

John Clerk, Bishop of Bath and Wells, was the youngest of the bishops, little more than forty when consecrated and in 1531 not yet fifty. Like West he was a Cambridge man, and like Tunstall he had gained his doctorate of Civil Law at Bologna. His first appearance in history is in the midst of a sensational ecclesiastical scandal—the morrow of the murder in Rome of the King's resident ambassador there, Cardinal Christopher Bainbridge, Archbishop of York. At Rome, whither Clerk had gone as the Cardinal's chaplain, there were then resident three English bishops: Bainbridge, the Cardinal Adrian de Castello—a one-time collector of Papal Taxes in England, to whom Henry VII had given Hereford and whom Henry VIII had promoted to Bath and Wells—and Sylvester de Giglis, the King's agent in Curia for the transaction of the routine business, Bishop of Worcester since 1498. Naturally there was jealousy among the three, and when one of his chaplains murdered Bainbridge, popular rumour—and a confession from the chaplain—named the Bishop of Worcester as the real author of the crime. Clerk did his utmost to press the case against de Giglis, so much so that Wolsey warned the bishop against him as "one of the most malignant conspirators against you." De Giglis and Wolsey were already allies and were to remain so as long as the bishop lived, yet, in some way that remains obscure, Clerk almost immediately passed into Wolsey's entourage as chaplain and secretary, and shared in much of Wolsey's confidential business with the King. He became Dean of the Chapel of the Household, and later Dean of Windsor. He acted as Wolsey's deputy in the Star Chamber, was appointed Master of the Rolls in 1521, and then, in

that same year, began his second Roman career as Ambassador Extraordinary to Leo X. It was on this occasion that, in a speech that boasted England's traditional loyalty to the Holy See, he presented to the Pope the King's famous book against Luther. He remained on in Rome, and during the conclave that followed the death of Leo X, acted as Wolsey's agent. Upon his return to England he was named to the See of Bath and Wells, held by Wolsey since 1518, conjointly with his Archbishopric of York, and abandoned to a subordinate now that the Cardinal was free to take Durham. The Bishop-elect left once more for Rome and, Adrian VI dying in the September of 1523, it fell to Clerk once more to watch Wolsey's fortunes through a conclave. In Rome, where he was consecrated Bishop, he remained for nearly two years, and his unusual experience of Rome and his long acquaintance with the reigning Pope since the days when he was Cardinal Giulio de Medici, were no doubt his qualification for the further two years' mission in the matter of the divorce from which he had just returned. More lately, with Warham, Tunstall and West, he had been named one of Catherine's counsel. Like them he had written in her favour and, with West and Blessed John Fisher, he had recently been imprisoned for appealing to Rome against the Act restraining pluralities.

Another group of bishops owed their sees to more personal services at the court. Such a courtier-bishop was, for example, John Kyte, Bishop of Carlisle. At King's College he had been a contemporary of the Bishop of Ely, but he rose more slowly, for at Henry VII's funeral, when West was already well advanced in his diplomatic career, Kyte, forty-six years of age and a priest, was still no more than a clerk of the King's chapel. But he was one of Wolsey's personal friends: possibly he shared his social disposition, and had a character that fell in easily with the light-hearted, pleasure-loving side of the coming great man. Be that as it may, we find him, recently promoted sub-dean, prominent in the revels with which the new boy king drowned the recollection of his father's mean and austere economy; and in the accounts for 1511 there figures 46s. 8d. paid to the embroiderer who tailored the suit in which Kyte—then a man close on fifty—had appeared. "Mr. Sub-dean, now my Lord of Armykan . . . a garment of strange fashion, and a rolled cap like that

of a Baron of the Exchequer," to the making of which magnificence went sixteen yards of blue damask. A few days later it is "in greene saten" (nineteen and three-quarter yards) that he frisks before the court, and the suits are given him as a present. He was as well provided with benefices as a clerical courtier should be, and in October, 1513, was named Archbishop of Armagh—Armacana in the Curial Latin, whence the "Armykan" of the royal accounts. He arrived at his see in the course of the following year, and his letters are full of the strangeness of his new surroundings and of all the complaints which English administrators then, as through the next four centuries, sent home from that place of exile. They availed him a more or less permanent recall in 1516—Wolsey, his friend of court days, being now well-nigh omnipotent—and fairly constant employment in diplomatic work in Spain until his happy translation to Carlisle—less dignity but more pay—in 1521. Thenceforward he serves the King very usefully as his commissioner to treat with the King of Scotland in the disputes that arose of the everlasting border forays—the more usefully in that the Bishop of Durham had long been non-resident—for Ruthall (1509-23) was the King's secretary, and on his death the see was absorbed by Wolsey.

The Bishop of Exeter was John Vesey, born at Sutton Coldfield in Warwickshire, and in his later life a great benefactor to his native place, where indeed he generally lived, ruling his diocese through vicars-general and auxiliary bishops. He was one of seven contemporary bishops whom Magdalen, wealthiest of Oxford colleges, the super-seminary of the day, had produced, and not impossibly he owed his first introduction to court to the first of them, Richard Mayew. Mayew, who ended his career as Bishop of Hereford (1503-16), had been appointed President of Magdalen by its founder, the great Waynflete, in 1480. Five years later, with the final Lancastrian victory at Bosworth, came the beginning of his political influence, for he was called into the royal council, and named almoner to the new King. He remained president of the college until 1507, and it was during his rule that Vesey, Longland, Stokesley, and Wolsey himself began, as students of Magdalen, their ecclesiastical careers. Vesey was, too, something of a lawyer, for he graduated LL.D. in 1494, and in later life acted as Wolsey's deputy as a judge in the Star Chamber.

But his career proceeded chiefly through court favour from his first appointment, when a young man of twenty-four, to the household of the Queen, Elizabeth of York, the mother of Henry VIII. He served for a short time as Vicar-General in his native diocese, and meanwhile accumulated preferments so skilfully that at the date of his nomination to Exeter (1519) he held at least ten benefices, among them the four deaneries of Wolverhampton, Windsor, Exeter, and the Chapel Royal. His probable course of action in any coming trouble between Church and State might have been foretold from his part in the famous controversy of 1515 between the rival jurisdictions. Here Vesey, not yet a bishop, was but an advisor. The chief protagonist was another of the bishops-to-be, Dr. Henry Standish, "*quodam Fratre Minore*," runs a note in the Rolls of Parliament, "*nomine Standishe, omnium malorum ministro ac stimulatore*."

The occasion of this conflict, which raised in its most serious form the fundamental question of the legality of the Church's temporal jurisdiction in England, was the committal for trial in the King's Bench on a coroner's warrant of the Bishop of London's chancellor. He was committed as accomplice in the alleged murder of a suspected heretic found dead one day in his cell in the bishop's prison as he lay there awaiting trial. The proceedings at the inquest, and the action of the bishop, who, before the inquest was concluded, had the corpse tried for the dead man's heresy, condemned, and burnt, aroused popular interest in the case to fever heat, and a sermon preached, at the Bishop of London's invitation, while the inquest still dragged on, brought matters to a head. The preacher was the Abbot of Winchcombe, and from the pulpit at St. Paul's cross he set forth uncompromisingly the church's traditional claim of complete immunity for her clerics from all lay jurisdiction as much in criminal cases as in others. The first fruit of the sermon was a conference at Blackfriars, where canonists and theologians of the King's choosing argued the case with canonists and theologians from the clergy before the judges and the King's lawyers.

Dr. Henry Standish was one of the King's Theologians. He was a Franciscan of the strict observance, and he was at the moment the superior of the friary at Greenwich which Henry VII had founded, and which had ever since stood in intimate relation with the court. Standish par-

ticularly was well known to the King, and whenever the court was in residence at Greenwich he was frequently in demand as the King's special preacher. At the conference he spoke against the clerical interest, and denied the binding force in England of the Papal Bulls quoted against him since they had never been "received" in the English courts. Later (in a series of public lectures) he developed his theories, and when Convocation re-assembled was summoned to explain his position. He made his explanation and appealed to the King to protect him from the consequences. The bishops, reminding the King of his coronation oath, lodged a counter-appeal. Henry took counsel's advice, and Dr. Vesey, notably, advised him to ignore the Bishops, to make a stand for his temporal jurisdiction and to protect Standish. Once more there was a conference at Blackfriars, this time of the judges and King's counsel only. Standish's reply to Convocation was discussed, and the conference decided that all those present at his citation were guilty of *præmunire*. The whole affair, after a kind of apology from Convocation, ended in a compromise—the proceedings against Standish were dropped, and the Bishop of London's Chancellor released from prison. His career was over. He retired, after payment of a huge money fine, to provincial obscurity, while Standish was rewarded two years later with the see of St. Asaph.

John Stokesley, Bishop of London, was another scholar who had risen by the consecration of his talents to the service of the King's interests. At Oxford he had been a contemporary of Wolsey and his colleague as Fellow of Magdalen. Unlike Wolsey, whom he succeeded as bursar, his academic career had continued longer. He rose to rule the college as vice-president and to be a central figure in the tumults caused by the absenteeism of its president, Richard Mayew, now Bishop of Hereford. Stokesley stood by his old master, and it was possibly by Mayew's influence at court that in 1509 he was named chaplain to the King—for him, as for most of his fellows, the first step in an assured career. As his one-time college friend Wolsey mounted, so, once introduced into the magic circle, Stokesley rose too—though for long very slowly. We next hear of him as Wolsey's deputy deciding poor men's suits in the Star Chamber. His learning may, as was said, have outweighed judicial discretion, but to the reality and extent of that learning,

mainly humanist, different letters of Erasmus bear competent testimony, where Stokesley is classed with More and Linacre and Colet as one of the glories of Henry's academic court. But, despite his talent, Stokesley never really came into his own until, when he was a man turned fifty, the divorce suit was launched. The King was anxious to enlist in support of his case all the theological learning of the past as well as the best opinion of his own time, and Stokesley appears as the organiser of this gigantic commission of research. He went himself to France to enlist the aid of Francis I in the good work of persuading the French Universities, and later, with Cranmer as one of his subordinates, he was engaged on the same work in Italy. He instructed his learned agents what texts to seek out, and in what libraries they were most likely to find them, so that the State Papers of these two years (1529-30) are filled with the evidence of his erudite activity. It was while in Italy directing this work and, with Anne Boleyn's father, endeavouring to extort concessions from the Pope, that, in July, 1530, he was nominated to the vacant see of London. He was consecrated in the last days of the November following.

The last of these "court-bishops" is a friend of Stokesley and a life-long associate since the days when with Wolsey, the three had been Fellows of Magdalen, but a man of very different stamp, John Longland, Bishop of Lincoln, the King's confessor. Longland had remained on at Oxford to teach, proceeding Doctor of Theology in 1511 and acquiring the best of good names as much for his life as for his learning. Blessed Thomas More, who knew him well, praises him most warmly, "*alter ut eius laudes uno verbo complector Coletus, seu concionantem audias, seu vitæ spectes puritatem.*" No doubt he, like Stokesley, owed much in his early career to Bishop Mayew and, by the time this patron died Wolsey, the one-time class-fellow, had risen to his zenith. But it was Longland's learning and eloquence that won him the favour of the King, who chose him for his confessor in 1519 and named him almoner in 1521. All Henry VIII's almoners ended as bishops, and only a few months later Longland, succeeding yet another Magdalen bishop, William Atwater, was consecrated to the vacant see of Lincoln; an appointment whose suitability brought congratulations to Wolsey and the King from Campeggio in Italy and from the Pope himself. As Bishop of Lin-

coln Longland continued to be Wolsey's close friend, and he was his right hand in all the extensive business that accompanied the Cardinal's magnificent foundation at Oxford. Like a good theologian, he showed himself a stern repressor of Lutheranism, and might have seemed the very type of sound orthodox catholicity. Then came the divorce scheme, in which as the King's confessor he figured prominently from the first, and in this Longland was wholeheartedly for the King, as he was to be later in the debates on the Supremacy, though he never touched such pitiful depths as Stokesley and Tunstall, who did their best to overpersuade Blessed John Fisher as he lay in prison, or Gardiner who justified the martyr's execution.

Court chaplains, statesmen and politicians account for more than half of the bishops, but we might add to this section another bishop who, if he never saw service abroad, and lived most of his life away from London, owed his see none the less to long and capable service of the King in civil matters—Charles Bothe, Bishop of Hereford. He came of good family, for he was one of that great Lancashire clan the Bothes of Barton-on-Irwell. Of his great-uncles two had been Archbishops of York, and another near relative—who was perhaps a third great-uncle—had ruled the see of Exeter. He was educated at Cambridge, and, once again, it was in Law that the future bishop won his doctor's degree. His first patron was the young Bishop of Lichfield, William Smyth, another Lancashire man, who thus returned to Bothe something of the patronage he had himself received from the Archbishop Bothe of the previous generation. When Smyth was translated to Lincoln, Bothe followed him as his Vicar-General and in 1505 became Chancellor. But the Bishop of Lincoln's principal work lay far away from his diocese—in the troubled region of the Welsh border. With the accession of the half-Welsh house of Tudor, there began the first real attempt of the English crown to rule Wales systematically and with a regard for Welsh interests. A Council of Wales was set up, its work partly administrative, partly judicial, an itinerant body which, as the convenience of business demanded, held its sessions in one or another of the border towns, Ludlow, Leominster, Shrewsbury and Hereford. The Bishop of Lincoln was the council's first president, and Bothe as its Chancellor was, after Bishop Smyth, the main force in the main-

tenance of law and order in these out-of-the-way shires. But Bothe had another and even more influential patron in Fox, the Bishop of Winchester, who, Lord Privy Seal since 1487, was the most experienced of Henry VIII's ministers and until Wolsey's rise the most powerful of them all. Fox was of the same Cambridge College as Bothe, and he was, while Bishop of Winchester, and at this very time, its nominal president. Hence Bishop Smyth's premature death in 1514 did not mean for Bothe the end of his career, and when two years later, the Bishop of Hereford died, Bothe, so much of whose life had been spent in the diocese, and who was still Chancellor to the Council of Wales, was an obvious successor. Three days after Mayew's death he was named to the see. The best years of his life were over, he was already sixty, but he showed himself an active and vigilant bishop, a great administrator, and a good spiritual ruler too. When the great crisis of the reign drew on he was in the middle seventies and broken by long-continued ill-health. He sided with the King, despite an attachment to Catherine that went back to the far-off days when as Princess of Wales she kept her court at Ludlow, and through his proxies, Longland and Stokesley, he voted in Convocation the nullity of the marriage.

There was another prominent bishop who, like Bothe, had lived most of his life away from the court and the capital. This was Richard Nyx, Bishop of Norwich, now in his eighty-fourth year, the senior, by consecration too, of the whole bench, and of especial interest because, alone of all the bishops, his whole life had been devoted to the Church. His education had been a cosmopolitan affair, for, after some years at Oxford and at Cambridge, he went to Bologna, where he won his doctor's degree and once more—the fact has its own importance—in Law. Again he was one of the many for whom the Lancastrian victory in 1485 was the great chance, and we find him shortly after that event in the service of the new King's chief adviser, Bishop Fox. Fox had been given the see of Exeter in 1487, was translated to Bath and Wells in 1492, to Durham in 1494, and finally to Winchester—wealthiest see of all the twenty-one—in 1501. His first two dioceses he never saw, and Durham he only visited when matters of high diplomacy took him to the Scottish borders. In his absence the different archdeacons and vicars-general ruled, with an auxiliary bishop to ordain, confirm, and

perform the various other pontifical offices. It was through service to Fox in the administration of these three sees that Nyx rose to be himself a bishop. He was named Archdeacon of Exeter in the last months of Fox's tenure of the see, and when the bishop went later that year to Bath and Wells, Nyx went with him as his vicar-general. Three years later he followed Fox to Durham again as vicar-general. Then there follows an introduction to the court and a series of valuable court benefices conferred in rapid succession. He is named Canon of Windsor, elected registrar of the order by the Knights of the Garter, is made Dean of the King's Chapel, and finally, at the age of 54, in April, 1501, consecrated Bishop of Norwich.

The records of his episcopal activity which are known, show him to have been, like Bothe, a vigilant and energetic bishop, a reformer, and a great foe to the new heresies with which, indeed, his East Anglian diocese was vexed more than most. A Bishop one might say by profession, he fought Wolsey more vigorously than most to preserve his episcopal independence from the Legate's encroachments, resolutely pressing his case for restitution even after Wolsey's fall; "a devilish man," as the commissioners who had to treat with him complained. Towards the end of his life he lost his sight, but, vigorous to the end, refused to grow old, and the Ambassador at Rome amused Clement VII with the story "of his good heart . . . and how, being about four score years old, he would have a chamber devised near the ground, without any stairs, to lie in twenty years hence when he knew he should be somewhat feeble." He lived on for yet another eight years after this to die, almost ninety, in the year that saw the first martyrdoms of the few who remained faithful where he with so many others had failed.

Almost as old as Nyx, but by no means so vigorous a man, was the Bishop of Chichester, Robert Sherborne. He was born the same year as Warham, in the same county and diocese of Winchester. Together they went to Winchester and at Oxford to New College, and together they received their fellowships. There follows in Sherborne's life a period of which we know hardly anything and then, like Warham, he has profited from the Lancastrian associations of his youth, and is at court as Henry VII's secretary. As the King's secretary he went on a secret mission to the Pope—Alexander VI, and to

Scotland as well, sharing, like Warham, in the negotiations that brought about the marriage of the King's son and daughter to Catherine of Aragon and James IV of Scotland. Then in 1505 he became Bishop of St. Davids. Over this appointment hangs the shadow of a mysterious forging of the bulls appointing him—a forgery in which apparently Sherborne was implicated, and which moved Julius II to terrible threats of punishment. However, the King intervened, and so successfully that the matter ended there and the crime did not prevent Sherborne's translation three years later to Chichester. There he had lived for more than twenty years, in a style and state that contemporaries compared only with the pomp of Wolsey himself. With Wolsey indeed he managed to live on very good terms, and Henry VIII was as friendly to him as his father had been before him. Sherborne was an advocate of the divorce, and was one of the six bishops who in the July of 1530 signed the famous letter to the Pope asking him for reasons of State to grant the King's petition.

Three bishops remain, very old men all of them, but no one of them much more than a name to us. The first of these shadowy figures is the Bishop of St. Davids, Richard Rawlins. He was an Oxford man—B.D. 1492, D.D. 1495—Fellow of Merton, and from 1508 to 1521 its Warden. The see came to him, it is said, in compensation for the intrigue which deprived him of his wardenship. But since 1509 he had been almoner to the King, and this probably availed his prospects at least as much as any forces at play in the life of the University.

His obscurity is shared by the Bishop of Bangor, Thomas Skevington. Like two others of the bishops of Welsh sees, St. Asaph and Llandaff, he was a regular, and before his consecration was Abbot of the Cistercian Abbey of Waverley. As Bishop of Bangor he kept his abbey, and received also *in commendam*, the Abbey of Beaulieu in Hampshire. He was also the visitator for the English houses of his Order, and since he generally lived at Beaulieu, his diocese saw very little of him. He figures in a great quarrel with Wolsey over appointments to benefices, and over the visitation of his diocese by one of the Legate's more rascally commissioners, who, as he notes the possibilities of plunder for his master, describes the Bishop-Abbot as "the richest monk in all England." Towards the end of his life the thought of the long neglect of his diocese—from which he had been absent fourteen years—

seems to have troubled him, and he carried out, in amendment, great schemes of restoration to his cathedral and to the bishop's palace.

Finally, there is the Bishop of Llandaff, George de Athequa. He was a Dominican and a Spaniard, confessor to Catherine of Aragon, and on that account made Bishop of Llandaff in 1517. He earns a place in Erasmus' letters for his efforts to dissuade Catherine from using the great humanist's new translation of the New Testament, and, except for his recorded presence in attendance on the Queen on occasions of public festivity, this is almost all that can be traced of his life. In the divorce troubles he stood by her loyally, and in the Convocation which repudiated her marriage, with Clerk and Blessed John Fisher, he voted in the minority to defend her.

Of the Bishop of Rochester, Blessed John Fisher, I have purposely said nothing. In his life as in his death he stands out unique, different from his fellows, and yet the framework of his life was much the same as theirs. He was a Cambridge man, like West and Kyte and Clerk, his contemporaries there; he was a man whose early career was academic, as were the careers of Rawlins and Longland: like Longland he was a theologian first of all, and yet like Tunstall he has a distinguished place as patron of the humanistic revival: he was more intimately employed at court than any of the bishops who had risen from the Chapels-royal, and it was in fact a court appointment—confessor to the mother of Henry VII—that led to his nomination to Rochester. But above and beyond his faithful performance of his many heavy charges social, academic, episcopal, the Bishop of Rochester is always the spiritual man—*et vita et eruditione theologica*, said Erasmus of him—the holy man of his time, as the despatches of more than one foreign ambassador recognise admiringly. From the beginning of the troubles no one doubted that he would go a way of his own, the way of a conscience illuminated and strengthened by a lifetime of ascetic devotion.

And his colleagues? They were the practical men of the time, and it is only fair to see them for what they were, not so much ecclesiastics over-occupied with the King's business, as trained and competent civil servants who happened to be clerics, to whom, because they happened to be clerics, fell the distinctions, the honours, the wealth—and the sacrament—of the episcopate.

Their private lives were good. To none of them attaches anything of the unpicturesque scandal that disfigures so much of the high ecclesiastical life of the period. Wolsey, in this at least, seems to have had no rivals. They were learned too, with the best of the clerical learning of their time, and if their knowledge of Canon Law overshadowed what they knew of theology, they must have known enough of both to know how great an innovation the Royal Supremacy was. It can hardly be pleaded in their behalf that they were ignorant of the nature of the revolution at which they assisted. They were not heretics, not abettors or fautors of heresy in any fashion. None were so merciless, and conscientiously merciless, to the new doctrines as the bishops who played the chief part in erecting the new supremacy and in justifying it to the amazed and scandalized Christendom that looked on. And, if they all assisted at the beginning of change, few lived to see it through even the first few years of development. Only six years after the surrender of 1531, eleven out of the sixteen were dead. Warham went in 1532, protesting solemnly against all that had been done, West and Skevington the year after. Bothe and Standish died the year of the Bishop of Rochester's martyrdom, three more the year of the dissolution of the lesser monasteries. Kyte died in 1537, and that same year de Athequa, after much negotiation and an imprisonment, returned to his native land to end his days as the bishop of a Spanish see. By 1541 only Vesey, Longland and Tunstall were left, the first to suffer imprisonment under Edward VI and to die reconciled with Rome in Mary's reign, and Tunstall to live on until the first year of Elizabeth, and to make at 85 what amendment he could, fighting the revival of the supremacy he had once helped to create and dying a prisoner for his loyalty to Rome. Why did the Bishops fail in Henry VIII's reign? That we shall never fully know, but we may from the record of their previous careers hope to understand a little.

PLAINSONG PROGRESS

By THE REV. J. F. TURNER, M.A.

MANY attempts have been made to show how plainsong developed from Greek, Hebrew, or Syrian music, but none of them is convincing. Like the earliest Greek poetry, the earliest plainsong we know of appears as something perfect in its own order, and however interesting to scholars it may be, the inquiry into the genesis of plainsong has no practical use. One suggestion perhaps may be mentioned. It is that as music was the one art which the Greeks had not perfected and which, while not so thoroughly redolent of paganism as sculpture for instance, was also the most subtle and least material medium in which the soul could express itself, therefore it was at once developed and perfected in the Church as the best means for the utterance of the deep spiritual experiences and aspirations of Christianity. But whatever may have happened before St. Gregory's time, for us plainsong begins with his reform, and the Chant of the Church entered at once a Golden Age that lasted longer than those of the literatures and arts of ancient Greece and Rome.

Only in the eleventh century do the first traces appear of a falling off both in the composition of chants and in the manner of singing, and it is very significant that the departure from the traditional interpretation of the music began at the time when the signs given in the earlier manuscripts for the direction of the cantors were no longer reproduced in those that employed the musical staff invented in that century.

In the neumatic manuscripts of the early period the melody was indicated by the acute and the grave accent and by the combination of these into various groups. Written above the words they did not mark melodic intervals, but only rise and fall, being no more than an aid to the memory, and rhythmic and dynamic signs in the form of letters or strokes were frequently added to them to guide the singer in his interpretation of the music. With the truly great invention of the staff, on which we moderns have felt no call to improve except by adding a fifth line for our more extended melodies, the cantor ceased to be the marvel he had been. It used to take about ten years to make him; he carried all the chants in his head, and if anyone had the right to talk to a bishop, it was surely he. Not only was it now pos-

sible for the cantor to do what some educationists seem to be aiming at to-day, neglect the training of his memory, but after a time he could read at sight and make, not indeed always a perfect, but certainly a creditable show. And further, the Prior Scholæ, whose duty it was to teach the melodies to the cantors, was no longer so necessary, and his services could be dispensed with; a fact not without its economic attractions. But like most devices for saving time and labour, the staff had drawbacks. In the joy and exultation of being able to read and write accurately the melodic intervals, people failed to record not merely for distant posterity, but also for their immediate successors, the traditional signs, which had really been much more than the flourishes of a pen with which one might adorn a letter or disguise a poor hand.

One thing seems quite clear, that the notes were, essentially at least, of the same length. The signs could hardly have represented any mathematical proportion of long and short notes as in modern music, or in the secular music of the time; otherwise, the people of those days having the neumatic manuscripts before them and being perfectly familiar with the correct manner of singing the chant, must surely have reproduced these fundamental differences in their four-line notation.

But they did no such thing. The notes of the earlier manuscripts are all represented as equal in the diastematic, or staff notation, to the utter neglect of the signs. True, there are different shapes of notes, but a careful comparison shows the diamond, for instance, in the new writing, used to represent now an unadorned accent in the old, now one graced with an additional stroke or letter. Besides, a little acquaintance with a quill pen is sufficient to convince one that the peculiarities of shape are merely incidental to the writing. The Vatican edition preserves them, and if it were possible to print this edition on vellum, it would be quite at home among the best diastematic manuscripts, such as the thirteenth century Worcester Antiphonar, and the glorious Metz Pontifical in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge.

Stripped, then, of its proper dress and left to the mercy of singers who knew less and less about it, the chant was subjected to all kinds of maltreatment. It was like a dog with a bad name. First of all, the notes were hammered out one by one; rhythm fled, and with it all beauty.

Then the long vocalises, those exquisite modulations that were sung, for example, on the last syllable of Kyrie or Alleluia, lost both charm and meaning under the hammer system; and the song which had delighted the faithful for five centuries began to pall. And no wonder. The incessant beating of a drum were better and more soothing. Moreover, in its decadence the chant could no longer, as it had done in the past, compete with measured music, and only its necessary connection with the liturgy saved it from disappearing altogether.

As it had to stay, people felt that something ought to be done with it. What the chant needed was rhythm. Things were so bad, that the chant must have ousted the weather as a topic of conversation, and everyone must have kept saying to himself and to his neighbours, "What the chant needs is rhythm." We had a First Lord of the Admiralty whose slogan was, "Reiteration is the secret of success," and at last his words began to be taken in. The principle is an old one, older than "*Delenda est Carthago*," and it worked in the case of the chant. Unfortunately the only rhythm known or appreciated was that of measured music, and so the chant came to be subjected to measure of a kind. And was there not evidence in the manuscripts? Why, of course; the tailed note, the square and the diamond must be the long note, the short and the shorter. And forthwith the principles of measured music were foisted on the chant. Nothing could show more clearly how completely the tradition had been lost. It was like freeing a man from the treadmill to put him in the stocks.

The arbitrary Medicean edition of 1614-1615 adopted this artificial mensuralism, and, with slight modifications, it was perpetuated in others. Nor was that all. The Medicean editors took the liberty of cutting down vocalises, changing single notes into groups of varying elaborateness, improvising melodies, clipping the short penult of polysyllabic words, and altering the verbal text so that the word-accent should always coincide with the groups, whereas formerly the groups had very frequently carried the weaker syllables, while the accent was given to a single note. It was, in fact, a wholesale slaughter. The Ratisbon edition of 1871 was practically a reprint of the Medicean. Yet with all the "mensuralist" editions and with all the "mensuralist" theories, the chant was still almost universally spelled out note by note, even in Italy.

"*Hymnum cantate nobis de canticis Sion.*" "*Quomodo cantabimus canticum Domini?*" They might well have hung their instruments on the willows, for nobody knew any longer how to sing the song of Sion, and all the attempts to give it life had left it still more definitely a corpse. There it lay in the liturgical books, until, towards the middle of the last century, someone professed to see in it some traces of ancient beauty. The matter was investigated, with the result that the corpse was found to be spurious; the genuine one was enshrined in the Antiphonary of St. Gregory. But where was the autograph copy? Some thought it was at St. Gall, others at Montpellier. The European archæologists were all astir, the excitement was intense. Learned articles were written, facsimiles of some manuscripts were made, and even an edition of the rediscovered chant was published, about 1851, for the use of the dioceses of Rheims and Cambrai. Meanwhile, Dom Guéranger, founder of the Solesmes Benedictines, who was largely responsible for the disturbance, worked away quietly in his monastery, convinced of two things: first, that the original chant was not to be found in any one manuscript; and second, that until a careful collation had pieced it together, life might be infused into what they had by giving it a proper rhythm. Yes, the same cry, "What the chant needs is rhythm!" "Better the most faulty melodic text with the true rhythm," said the Abbot, "than the genuine text without it."

The method he taught his monks was not only something new; it was attractive. One of the many outsiders who succumbed to its charm, Canon Gontier of Mans, versed in mediæval writings on music, formulated some principles, the main contention being that the rhythm of plainsong was free, the same as, or similar to, that of speech. The Musical Congress of Paris in 1860 was very polite to him! Dom Pothier had frequently conferred with the Canon and, as he heard daily at Solesmes the good results of this revolutionary method, was not disposed to let the matter drop. In his famous *Mélodies Grégoriennes*, which appeared twenty years later, he developed fully, though not without considerable vagueness in details, the theory of word-rhythm. The book caused a *furor*, its teaching was adopted in many places, and it is used to this day.

But there was a young monk of Solesmes, a musician

to his finger tips, who was to cause still more disturbance. Dom Mocquereau was soon given charge of the choir, and Dom Pothier was content to sit at his feet and see difficulties he had left unsolved melt away under the lucid explanations of the superior genius of his former pupil. With the refrain, "What the chant needs is —," ever echoing in his head, Dom Mocquereau had flaws to find in the word-rhythm theory, and he saw that the rhythmical beat need not necessarily coincide with the accent of words, even in syllabic chants. Perhaps an illustration from metre will throw light on the theory. "*Iam lucis orto sidere*" is iambic, the word-accent coinciding everywhere with the metrical beat. In "*Rector potens, verax Deus*," iambic again and of the same scheme, the metrical beat occurs on the weak syllable throughout. In these two lines the rhythmical "steps" fall in the same places (the second half of each of the four feet), but the rhythm of the first is something quite different from that of the second. It has, if we may use the word, a distinct "personality." When the words are set to the same melody, as so often happens in the chant, the different relation of the accents to the rhythmical beat produces varieties of rhythm still more marked and beautiful.

This last theory has been followed now for fifty years at Solesmes and for twenty or thirty in many other places, and it is not likely to die. Its growth has been almost like that of a living organism. Dom Guéranger sowed the vague seed of free rhythm, Dom Pothier watered the ground, and there sprang up a definite thing, oratorical rhythm, which Dom Mocquereau used as a stock on which to graft his own theory and produce a fruit different from that of the stock whereon it was grafted, richer and fairer, but still fed with the sap of freedom.

Something ought to be said about modern mensuralism, which has flourished chiefly in this century. The rough-and-ready mensuralism of the mediæval theorists would no longer do in this enlightened age. But a satisfactory substitute has not been found, for the moderns are by no means united, and there are almost as many systems as there are mensuralists. Agreed in throwing general discredit on the old writers, they display a shrewd eclecticism in the excerpts from mediæval treatises with which they seek to support their individual theories. They draw on the laws of Greco-Roman metre, appeal to the characteristics of oriental music, or talk of neum-

times or neum-feet, and when they come across difficulties in the musical text, either take liberties with the text by introducing rests or long notes to make it square with their theories, or else modify their system with some approach to oratorical rhythm. So varied and, for the most part, so complicated are their theories that after working through them one can only exclaim with Dom Shebbeare (*Downside Review*, May, 1930), "And what can one do with the mensuralists' theories except study them?"

The question of rhythm is so important for our own progress in plainsong and for the success of our teaching, that, without claiming that any one school has discovered the traditional manner of singing the chant, we may profitably consider one or two points that stand out in this brief historical survey.

For the mensuralists the rhythm is fixed, and the proportional length of notes plays a principal part. The "oratorical" school has shaken off the tyranny of measure and submitted itself to that of the accent of word and phrase, though the accent often enjoys a little length, a length, however, that is indefinite and not according to any mathematical proportion.

But what have accent and length to do with the nature of metrical or musical rhythm? We do not remember, but from our later observations we know that in our infant days we must have called for our "mummy" with a pertinent accent on "mum" and a long note, or series of notes, on the unaccented final. Nobody ever accused us of false accent, whatever else they did. With a true instinct we completed our word at once, so that no one should doubt for whom we were calling, and put all our feelings into a "jubilus" (or wail, if you like—it varied with our humour) on the light or weak syllable. Why is it that, when we come to the use of reason, we often lose it and pretend that the jubilus must always be on "mum," with only a short note on "my"? Similarly with our songs. To take one example, with what gusto used we to sing, "Steady, boys, steady."



The fact that we sometimes lengthen an accent and sometimes shorten it is an "*argumentum libertatis*"; accent and length do not always go together.

As for the rhythmical beat and accent, if the two must necessarily coincide, we can only pity Vergil, Horace and their illustrious compatriots for their ignorance of the Latin tongue. Take "Arma vi- | rumque ca- | no Tro- | iae qui | primus ab | oris," where the main rhythmical beats fall on the first syllable of the first and fourth feet, with secondaries at the beginning of the other feet. No artist will accent all these rhythmical beats, any more than he will neglect the word-accent, and he will recite best, if he treats the word-accent not as something to be hammered home, but as the thistle-down that a child puffs lightly upwards. Nor is the non-quantitative (?) English metre, a very complicated thing, free from this delightful interplay of accent and rhythmic beat. Here is a line where one "merry" forms the rise, and the other the fall, of the trochaic foot:—

"Christmas | knows a | mérry merry | place
Where he | goes with | fondest | face."

Or what shall we do with an iambic line that begins, "The supreme love . . .," or with this from *Paradise Lost*, "Burnt after them to the bottomless pit"?

In music some familiar tunes show an appreciation of this independence. There is, for instance, the well-known "Stabat Mater" (Westminster Hymnal, No. 28), where lines like "In tanto supplicio," or "Dolentem cum Filio" begin with this conflict of accent and rhythmic beat. In English songs this conflict is usually avoided, but very interesting is "Hail, Queen of Heaven," to the traditional melody, correctly given in Westminster Hymnal, No. 101. In the lines beginning "Guide of," "Thrown on," and "Save us," the second word is given the "strong" musical beat. True, popular taste, or ignorance of the melody, has taken "Guide" and "Save" from the third beat of the bar and put them on the first of the next, but not "Thrown." This interference with the musician's melody is not for the better. It requires much more skill in the singer when a word like "of" falls on the strong musical beat, but the music gains in lightness and grace, and it is worth remembering that a musician does not write his works as people will sing them, but as he wants them to be sung. His lot is not a happy one.

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If we admit everywhere else the interactive character of accent and rhythmical beat, or down-beat, as it is called, why should we refuse it to the chant? It is the music that lends itself most readily to this well-balanced opposition. When accent and down-beat come together, the former reinforces the latter and gives the rhythm a spring or bound widely different from the sober undulation that is felt when they do not coincide. Hymns, especially those that are syllabic, where each syllable has no more than a single note, illustrate best a principle which has a wider application. Choose your melody and fix the notes which are to bear the rhythmic beat. This melody, with the rhythm you have chosen, is a kind of mould into which all the verses are to be fitted. Some word-accent will be on the up-beat, some on the down. Take the first lines of the verses of the hymn for Sext, which will all have the same melodic phrase.

Réc-	tor	pó-	tens	vé-	rax	Dé-	us
Ex-	stin-	gue	flám-	mas	lí-	ti-	um
Præ-	sta	Pá-	ter	pi-	is-	si-	me

It is impossible to rhythm the melody in such a way that the down-beat will fit the word-accent; there is not one point at which they all fall together. And you cannot alter the beat for each verse, or you will break the mould, and all proportion will be lost. The pernicious notion that the down-beat necessarily implies stress, or length, closes the entrance to that inner garden where the myriad beauties of rhythm in prose, in poetry, and in music, plainsong or measured, are revealed in all their richness to the initiated.

We are quite at liberty, however, to formulate our own theories, and there are many who advocate the bare text. But if men like Dr. Wagner and M. Gastoué, who both use, with differences, the "oratorical" method of interpretation, are not at all agreed as to the treatment of the "spaces" in the bare text, to mention one point only, it is easy to see what divergences of rendering there will be among those choirmasters who have little or no real acquaintance with any of the systems mentioned, and who follow practically nothing but their own taste. *Poeta nascitur*, not the orator, or the carpenter, or the theologian, or the interpreter of another man's music. Before we can condemn the system of an expert we must have mastered that system; and before we condemn any of the

methods of the Gregorian Chant, especially such as have best stood the test of time, we must take pains to understand them and not assume that they are fabrications of the inexperienced, or indulge the conceit that "they are all out of step but our Johnnie." Page 50 of Volume X of "Paléographie Musicale" gives a photographic reproduction of the first page of an "Ordinary of the Mass," edited by a stout supporter of the bare text. In the "Asperges me" he uses almost three times as many signs as another edition that is professedly rhythmic. We have the text and must interpret it somehow, and few of us are sufficiently trained in music and plainsong paleography to undertake the elaboration of systems of our own. It is a task better left to the expert.

But in one thing we have uniformity, the text. The conditions under which it was produced were by no means ideal, and both the Graduale (1908) and the Antiphonale (1912) suffer from the haste with which the work had to be done. Solesmes has sometimes been blamed for this, but it cannot be held responsible, for these two books were compiled and published without Dom Mocquereau, and it was only after the war that the editing of the official edition was given back to him. In spite of defects, however, the Vatican Edition is a marvellous piece of work; and it only remains for us to see that it is brought into general use. It is an obligation that has rested upon us since the Motu Proprio of Pius X, November, 1903, the precepts of which were strongly reiterated by our present Holy Father two years ago. There, while classical polyphony is ranked second only to plainsong, and is a thing to be restored, we read, "*Nominatim autem gregorianus cantus in populi usum restituendus curetur.*"

In mediæval times plainsong entered largely into the life of the people; they heard it week by week in the liturgy, and sang it, too; events were dated by the chant sung on a particular day; it accompanied clergy and laity, rich and poor, from cradle to grave. Now our heads are ringing with the music of the world, and seldom enough even yet in our churches is heard a music that does not smell of theatre, restaurant or pier. It is no use pretending that this kind of stuff is an aid to devotion. The fact that we have fallen to this level of spirituality does not justify the acceptance of our condition as something inevitable. It is to lift us out of the mire that plainsong is so strongly urged upon us by the Holy See. Gregorian

chant is the model of all liturgical music, precisely because it best fulfils the purpose of all church music, which is that "the feebler spirit may be borne aloft in pious affections by means of the charm afforded the ear," or, in the words of Pope Pius X, "*quo facilius inde fideles ad pietatem excitentur, meliusque animam disponant ad gratiæ fructus consequendos, qui a celebratis divinis Mysteriorum proveniunt*"; in a word, "*gloria Dei, sanctificatio exemplumque fidelium*." Would it not seem to be little short of an insult to the faithful, little short of a complete misunderstanding of God's work in the soul, to pretend that devotion can be fed by nothing but the theatrical music of the great composers, or by compositions so tawdry that they scarcely deserve the name of music? The truth is that at prayer our souls do not hunger for this sort of thing, though our ears may, and we are not called to save our ears. Let no one be unduly offended at this, or take it to imply that there are no exceptions, or that it is thought that those who do not take up plainsong necessarily indulge in the extremely operatic. Thank God, there are exceptions, their number is increasing, and a generous response to the invitations of the hierarchy is being amply rewarded. But what have we done? There was a rector of a quiet country mission, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, whose endurance was one day tried to its utmost by a roaring bass. He turned round from the sanctuary and with a homely reference to a neighbour's bull, famous for its bellowing, told the offender to "hold his noise." We may not approve of the choice of time or circumstances for the administration of this rebuke, but at least we can bear tribute to the good man's courage and his sense of responsibility.

In 1853, Adrien de la Fage, a musician of note, said that, if the plainchant melodies were restored in all their ancient perfection, it was sheer folly to dream of re-establishing them in popular use; it was simply "*tirer un cadavre de la tombe*"; and thirty years later an eminent abbé predicted with certainty that the editions according to the manuscripts would never have a lasting vogue. The cry is repeated to-day; the faithful will never be brought to sing the chant. No, of course not.

Two or three years ago the rector of a mission in an industrial area fell ill and died, and the clergy choir prepared to sing the Requiem. The bishop would not hear

of it: "The parishioners," he said, "will sing." And they, or rather their choir, consisting entirely of colliers, sang the whole of the music to the end of the Absolutions as it stands in the Vatican Gradual.

Again in a little parish close to St. Helens the choir-master felt he ought to be doing something about the chant, and knowing nothing about it sought instruction from a priest in the town who did. He found it all very bewildering, but he took the priest's suggestion and taught his choir and the congregation "O Salutaris" (chant *Verbum supernum*, tone 8), very much doubting the assurances he received that once the people learnt it they would want no other. But the priest was right; the people sang the same chant gladly Sunday after Sunday, to the improvement of their æsthetic sense and the increase of their devotion.

A dozen children about ten or eleven years old in one of our elementary schools were one day asked to sing for a visitor who had spent more than twenty-five years in studying and teaching the chant and had never thought he should live to see its widespread revival to-day. "And what will you sing for me? A little of Missa de Angelis?" A perky voice in offended tones declared they would sing the Proper of Maundy Thursday. With their hands at rest and no copies to read from they sang that Proper and another without a faulty note or word, and with an almost perfect rhythm from start to finish, a feat that might rouse the envy of a monastic choir.

"Quoth the raven, 'Never —!'" "Never will the faithful use or love the chant, if all that is done towards helping them is to repeat over and over again that they never will. But the few examples given out of many show that the wish of the Holy See is capable of attainment. What has happened in those places may well happen in others. All that is needed is that we should take up plainsong wholeheartedly. This does not mean wholesale, for the wholesale dealer often does great harm, and immoderate zeal is not infrequently as disastrous to the cause of plainsong as ignorance of its nature and proper rendering. But where plainsong is allowed to trickle in almost imperceptibly, its powerful influence has made itself felt in a remarkable manner. Nor is the chant altogether a stranger; without knowing it people have been singing it for years in one or other of the familiar plainsong settings of *Tantum Ergo*. By their

own sheer beauty the melodies have charmed the ear and nourished devotion. Such simple and beautiful themes abound in the chant books, and if we began by teaching the liturgical hymns, we should make an impression, and we should find therein a part solution of the problem for that vast majority of churches where Benediction services are held regularly, and Solemn Mass is a rarity. If copies were necessary they could be obtained without difficulty, but the melodies are easily picked up by ear, and the words are supplied by most of the popular prayer books. This was made a matter of law in the Concilium Plenarium of Sicily, held at Palermo in 1920, Canon 151 of which enjoins that the faithful be taught the main liturgical hymns in plain-song, e.g. *Pange Lingua, Te Deum, Veni Creator*, which they are to sing "communiter et accurate." Or should we begin with ourselves, as an earlier canon of the same council suggests? "*Curent sacerdotes bene addiscere et exsequi cantum gregorianum in sacris functionibus.*" Even the versicle, "*Panem de caelo,*" is susceptible of an unorthodox rendering. But if some of us are beyond taking up a new study or have not a moment to spare, we can, without loss of time or waste of energy, allow those to do it who are not under these disabilities. The ball has been set a-rolling, and we might just as well join in the fun; if we do not, it will go on without us, and we shall be as the children in the market-place who were piped to and would not dance.

Unquestionably difficulties of all kinds stand in the way, as our Holy Father realises, and not least is the fact that the idea of following the Liturgy and singing the music of the Church has often to be inculcated as a totally new idea of Christian worship. Shall we confess that we are unworthy of our ancestors?

"*Sis memor et te animo repetentem exempla tuorum*

Et pater Aeneas et avunculus excitet Hector."

They have left us all those glorious monuments of their genius and patient labour, because the sterling piety and liturgical spirit with which they were imbued would let no difficulty, however great, terrify or overcome them. The task before us is no mean one. It is not a matter of reintroducing an old style of music for the extraordinary cultural significance it has had through the ages since its beginning, nor for the purity and sublimity of its æsthetic appeal which defies analysis, but because it is first and foremost the music of prayer, the most perfect

music that has ever ennobled the Sacred Liturgy.

We have the example of the men of old, and if we need the encouragement of men of our own age, we have it in abundance. In England alone, though we were late in the field, great work has been done in recent years. One would like in passing to pay a tribute to the work of the Mediæval and Plainsong Society, and to the researches of men like the late Dr. Palmer and the present Bishop of Truro, who have displayed an enthusiasm and scholarship worthy of the highest praise. But there were Catholics, too, whose lives were devoted to the theory and practice of plainsong, the late Dom Gatard and his fellow monks of Farnborough, the Benedictine nuns of Stanbrook, and one or two "hermits" who were hardly known to exist. At last these voices, which cried too long in the wilderness, have made themselves heard, and in every county, though not yet in every town, the chant is studied and taught, and if the singing is still mostly done by choirs or school children, there are already some congregations taking their part. Numerous training colleges for teachers have taken up the work seriously, and so, too, with greater or less vigour, have our seminaries. Even the prisoners in Walton Gaol, Liverpool, who form a choir of unstable personnel, have sung plainsong for three years, and the unkind rumour that sentences of hard labour have in consequence been either mitigated or abolished is entirely without foundation. But undoubtedly the most important development has been the rise of the Society of St. Gregory. Founded in March, 1929, to carry out the wishes of the Church with regard to the Liturgy and its proper music, it has welded together units that were working in complete isolation, "strengthened the feeble knees," and provided the nucleus of what may become a mighty organisation. Under its ægis Study Circles and Classes have been formed in several centres; it holds graded examinations in the Solesmes method of plainsong for prospective instructors, awards certificates and diplomas, and already boasts over six hundred members. This may seem a small matter to be proud of, but it marks a vigorous growth for one year of life, and many of the members, as the energetic representatives of choirs and large communities, spread the influence of the Society over a far wider area than is suggested by the number of names on the roll.

Prior to this advance in England, the present Dean of University College, Dublin, began a revival of plain-song in Ireland by introducing it into the programmes of local musical festivals, and the success of the movement has attracted attention far beyond the British Isles.

But accounts of what is going on at home appear frequently in our Catholic papers. The following remarks about other countries are really much too brief, but perhaps they will be sufficient to give the lie to those prophets of the speedy disappearance of the restored chant who "spoke a vision of their own heart." The information is drawn from private correspondence and though no names are given the quotations are genuine.

The strategic positions are, or ought to be, the seminaries, and this seems to be clearly understood by the Vincentian missionaries, for in their "ecclesiastical colleges plain-song is taught during the whole course of six years," in spite of the fact that "Chinese are not blessed in general with nice voices." If St. Paul's Seminary at Ningpo, Chekiang, may be taken as a fair example, it is not their policy to do things by halves—which they leave to the Lord High Executioner—but thoroughly, for each week four classes are given to plain-song, and Sunday's Solemn Mass and Vespers are accompanied by no other music. As to method, that of Solesmes is used "of course." In sharp contrast is Cologne, where the theological students have "chant lessons from one of the fathers during their first term at Bonn, but when they enter the actual seminary at Cologne they learn only what a priest must sing and all the rest is forgotten." Allowing for possible exaggeration on the part of a writer who is devoted to plain-song, it does seem that in general the German seminaries treat the chant as "a side show." One is reminded of a practice once common enough in different countries, where the seminarists were divided into two groups; those who could sing and had an aptitude for music were set apart for choir work and devoted their time to harmonised music, while their less gifted fellows were told off for the chant. In most other countries the story of the seminaries is much more cheerful, but it is impossible to give an adequate account of the excellent work that is done, and there we must let the matter rest.

The primary importance of providing instruction in plain-song for laymen as well as clerics has been

thoroughly realised in many parts. At Rome the flourishing Pontifical School, which early adopted the Solesmes rhythmical editions, is perhaps mostly attended by the theological students who gather in the Eternal City from all over the world, but in the dioceses of Vincenza and Genoa there are diocesan schools to which the clergy are instructed "to send any suitable persons from their parishes to follow the courses." The teaching embraces "Liturgy, Plainsong, Theory of Music, and Harmonium. The full course lasts three years, and three-quarters of an hour's instruction in each subject is given every week from October to June or July. At the end of each year examinations are held," which "include both Theory and Practice of Plainsong, besides tests in the other subjects of the Course." Moreover, "there are some very able religious and lay people of Genoa who are doing splendid work among the children and young people, and although bristling with difficulties, the outlook is hopeful."

Similar organisations exist elsewhere. The Abbaye of Oosterhout in Holland is a centre, and one of the fathers has for three years given public lectures on chant and liturgy at Tillburg. The five dioceses of Holland have adopted the Solesmes rhythmical editions as the official text, though Mrs. Ward's method, which was demonstrated at Utrecht last year, is being adopted in some places. In Utrecht, however, "Fr. Huygens keeps to the Solesmes method in his classes for organists and choir-masters."

The Belgian record is very interesting. "Dans les villes et les villages il y a un peu partout des scholæ qui se forment." There is an interdiocesan school of chant at Malines, but each diocese has its organisation, those of Namur and Liège giving the best results. The seminary of Namur uses the Solesmes method, that of Liège does not, without, however, being opposed to it. "The trouble in Belgium is that too many different personal methods are followed." It is not the only country that suffers from the same cause.

In Germany "years of neglect have made the chant to most people an unknown world which can only be reconquered at the cost of much labour . . . Still, we must not overlook the work which has been done by many choirmasters, parish priests and choirs. . . . Many religious apart from the Benedictines are very zealous in the

use of the chant, for instance, the missionaries of Styl, the Pious Society of Missions, and the sons of St. Camillus . . .," while "the efforts made to teach the chant to the people have been so successful that 'in many parishes . . . the faithful are already able to take part in the singing of the Ordinary of the Mass.'"

Through the length and breadth of France chant has been sung in small churches and large for years. The styles are varied, and range from very good to bad, but efforts are being widely made to remedy the faults in the singing. Though, as one might expect, there is much opposition to the system of the Solesmes monks, yet these "prophets in their own country" have found many followers, and some parishes, like the little one of Souain, under the direction of M. l'Abbe Th. Laroche, have become well known for their chant.

At a college in Ceylon attended by a thousand boys lessons in chant are given three times a week by a priest (O.M.I.) who studied for years under the Sub-director of the Sistine Choir. "He has now joined the Society" (of St. Gregory). Of the great work of missionaries in Africa a most stimulating account appears in "Music and Liturgy" (April, 1930). Australia is not behind, and in Canada and the United States people are eagerly looking for a suitable book at a reasonable price, so that the growing interest may be kept alive. Books are many, but "Plain Song for Schools," first published at the end of August, 1930, seems to be particularly attractive both by its price (4½d., stiff paper covers), and by its contents, which consist of a wide selection of Masses from the Ordinary of the Vatican Gradual and numerous excellent chants of all kinds for Benediction services and various occasions. Throughout the book only the Gregorian notation is used, with the Solesmes signs, and though primarily intended for the Liverpool Archdiocese it has been eagerly purchased in all parts of the country, the sales of two and a half months reaching the high figure of ten thousand copies.

But enough has been said to indicate the difficulties that hinder progress in plainsong and the way in which they have been faced. Fidelity to the wishes of the Holy See has brought a rich reward, and those who have had the courage to persevere with the chant have already felt something of that spiritual beauty and mysterious charm which made Huysmans exclaim in

his "En Route," "Le véritable créateur de la musique plane, l'auteur inconnu qui a jeté dans le cerveau de l'homme la semence du plain chant, c'est le Saint Esprit." May He bless the work and hasten the day when this chant shall resound from pole to pole, and from the four quarters of the earth like the sound of many waters shall rise the song of "a great multitude that no man can number," crying out with one voice, "To Him that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb, benediction, and honour, and glory, and power, for ever and ever."

HOMILETICS

The purpose of the following pages is to give a simple exposition of the text of the Epistles and Gospels, which may be useful to priests in the preparation of their sermons.

BY THE REV. T. E. BIRD, D.D., Ph.D.,

Professor of Scripture at Oscott College.

Sunday after Circumcision. Feast of the Most Holy Name of Jesus.

The Lesson. (Acts iv. 8-12.)

The name of a person stands for his authority and influence. In the Old Testament the whole power and revelation of God was summed up in the sacred Name. So great was the reverence of the Jews for that Name that they refrained from uttering it, with the result that its original pronunciation is lost.¹

The third recorded sermon of St. Peter and his defence before the Sanhedrin (from which to-day's Lesson is taken) are concerned with the Holy Name of Jesus, and they imply that this Name, "which is above all names," has a significance equal to that of God in the Old Testament. This same teaching was to be developed later by St. Paul (Phil. ii. 9, 10; Ephes. i. 20, 21; Col. iii. 17) and by St. John (i. 12; I Epist. v. 13; Apoc. xix. 12).

The occasion of St. Peter's sermon and defence was the cure of a lame man (Acts iii.). In simple, picturesque, and vivid language St. Luke, the medical doctor, describes the miraculous cure. Just before three o'clock one afternoon, Peter, with the disciple, whom he (like his Master) loved the most, went up the road that led to the Temple. They carried no money (Matt. x. 9). The institution of a common fund (Acts ii. 44, 45) had not provided them with a private income. The object of their walk was to attend evening service; for, as yet, the Apostles had not given up taking part in the prayers at the Temple. Other persons were wending their way in the same direction; among them a group carrying a cripple. He had been lame from birth, and was now over forty years of age. All who frequented the Temple knew him. He was the lame beggar who sat every day at the Beautiful Gate begging alms—just like one of the many beggars that one sees at the doors of churches in Catholic countries to-day. When Peter and John drew near, the cripple solicited an alms. The Apostles halt, and Peter bade the man look attentively at them. Immediately he obeyed, hoping to receive a coin. After gaining the man's attention Peter again spoke: *Silver and gold I have none*—but something much more precious, namely, power to work miracles in the Name of Jesus (Mark xvi. 17, 18): *In the Name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, arise and walk.* At the invocation of the Holy Name, an instantaneous and complete cure took place. St. Luke, the physician, describes it exactly. The man's "soles and ankles" gained their natural strength; he "leaped up," "stood on his feet," "walked," "went into the Temple, walking and leaping and praising God," before a dumbfounded and astounded crowd

¹ "Jehovah" is wrong. "Yahwè" is probably right.

that had known the cripple for so many years. As this crowd increased and ran after the trio, St. Peter seized the opportunity to deliver the first sermon on the Holy Name of Jesus. It was preached on the very spot where, a few years before, the Jews attempted to stone Jesus—Solomon's Porch, the colonnade at the east side of the Temple, which became a meeting-place for the faithful (John x. 23; Acts v. 12). The sermon is given in Acts iii. 12-26. Before it was finished, Peter, John and the cured man were arrested and put into prison for the night. Next day they were brought before the Sanhedrin. A summary of the defence spoken by St. Peter is appointed by the Church to be read as the Lesson on the Feast of the Most Holy Name of Jesus.

The Gospel. (Luke ii. 21.)

The reason why we keep the Feast of the Holy Name on the day or the Sunday following the Circumcision is because the divine Child received His name, in accordance with Jewish custom, during the rite of circumcision. Except in the case of a sickly child, the rite had to be performed on the eighth day after birth. Our Lord began His life by submission to the law. So we read: *After eight days were accomplished that the Child should be circumcised.* In His days the ceremony took place at the child's home. Mary and Joseph were away from Nazareth, but had probably left the cave by this time: if so, the Circumcision was performed at some house in Bethlehem. They had not to think out a name for the Child: that had already been declared *by the angel before He was conceived in the womb.* Mary was told the Name at the Annunciation (Luke i. 31): later a similar announcement was made to Joseph (Matthew i. 21).

It was an essential part of the rite of circumcision that blood should flow. Never was this more significant than when the Infant shed the first drops of His blood, and they called Him "Jesus" Who was to "save" us by "washing us from our sins in His Blood" (Apoc. i. 5).

The Holy Name given at the Circumcision cannot be worthily pronounced with its fullest significance. "Jesus is Lord," *i.e.*, God, without grace from the Holy Spirit. On the other hand, there are many who blaspheme that Name, saying: "Anathema be Jesus" (I Cor. xii. 3). Reparation for these awful blasphemies is made on this Feast, when the "Divine Praises" should be said with more than ordinary fervour.

*First Sunday after Epiphany. Feast of the Holy Family.
The Epistle. (Colossians iii. 12-17.)*

With tender solicitude our Holy Mother the Church no sooner sees a danger threatening her children than she prescribes a spiritual antidote. An example of this is the extension throughout the whole Church of the Feast of the Holy Family and its observance on a Sunday, when the faithful, at divine worship, may be taught the sanctity of family life, which, in these days, is menaced by disruption.

Words can hardly describe the exquisite holiness of the house at Nazareth, where Joseph "the just" worked—and talked but little; where Mary was always "pondering these things in her heart," and where Jesus "grew in stature and wisdom, and in favour with God and man." His first teacher was His mother. In her lap, watching the movements of her sweet lips, He learnt the Shema': *Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God is one Lord. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart*, etc. (Deut. vi. 4, 5). From his infancy He would learn from her the Scriptures that she knew so well (cp. II Tim. i. 5; iii. 15). As he came in from play or school He would touch the *Mezuzah*, or sacred scroll, that was hung just inside the door, and then would kiss the finger that had come in contact with the Name of God (Shaddai). (It was not unlike our taking holy water.) He loved the beauty of nature—the open air, the fields, the hillside, the running water. There was no cult of athleticism in His Boyhood: the Jews remembered the evils that had accompanied this at the time of Antiochus Epiphanes. Every boy, whether rich or poor, was taught a trade. Jesus would work with His foster-father, who was a carpenter, or, possibly, a builder. At some time, we do not know when. His cousins (called in the Gospel His "brothers and sisters") with their mother, came to live with the Holy Family. On the Sabbath they would all go to the Synagogue for the three services—morning, afternoon and evening. We can picture the wonderful and comely Boy listening earnestly to the recitation of the Law and Prophets, and singing the same Psalms that we use to-day. The Hidden Life was to occupy thirty of His thirty-three years on earth, and during that time He was with Mary His Mother, and obedient to her.

For the Epistle of this Feast the Church turns to a passage in Colossians that fittingly sums up the virtues that should adorn every Christian home modelled on the holy house at Nazareth. She would have us, as true Christians, *the elect of God, holy and beloved*, cultivate in our homes the virtues of compassion, kindness, humility, meekness and patience. Differences of opinion, little irritations, even just complaints may threaten at times the peace of the family. So, *be bearing with one another and forgiving one another, if any hath a complaint against another*—forgiving, because *the Lord hath forgiven you*. But the soul clothed in the virtues mentioned above must "put over all these"—as an outer garment or "overall"—the virtue of charity, which is *the bond* that holds together all that makes for perfection—just as the outer garment holds the others in place. Then, should danger of discord arise in the home, let *the peace of Christ in your hearts* "act as referee": thereby the unity of the one body will remain unimpaired. *And be ye thankful to God for the blessing of a good Catholic home*. Let Christian principles dwell in rich abundance with you, so that *in all wisdom you may be teaching and admonishing one another: and in psalms, hymns, and spiritual canticles sing in your hearts*

¹ D.V. "rejoice" and Vulg. "exultet" are indefensible.

to God by His grace. In a word, let the household be governed by devotion to the Holy Name (last Sunday's Feast): *All whatsoever you do in word or in work, do all in the Name of the Lord Jesus Christ, giving thanks to God and the Father by Him.*

St. Paul goes on to give explicit advice to the members of the family—wives, husbands, children, servants. The passage should be read (iii. 18-iv. 2). If our Catholic home-life is based on his teaching, it will reflect the holiness of Nazareth; and all attempts of modern paganism to destroy it will be futile.

The Gospel. (Luke ii. 41-52.)

The Gospel, which is the same for the first Sunday after Epiphany as for the Feast of the Holy Family, breaks the silence of the Hidden Life, and presents us with a mysterious attitude of Christ towards His holy Mother and St. Joseph, to whom He was otherwise subject for many years.

And his parents went every year to Jerusalem, at the solemn day of the Pasch. Mary and Joseph religiously observed the precept, given in the Law, of going up to Jerusalem for the great Paschal celebration. Women were not obliged to make the pilgrimage; but Mary, like Anna her prototype, accompanied her husband. Boys were exempt (according to the strict school of Shammai) until they could be carried on their fathers' shoulders, or (according to the lenient school of Hillel) until they were able to walk up the Temple Hill holding their fathers' hands; but we cannot imagine that Mary and Joseph left the Child behind at Nazareth even in infancy. The Holy Family would leave Nazareth three or four days before the fourteenth Nisan. They would join other pilgrims to form a caravan. On the journey they would sing with holy joy what we know as the "Gradual Psalms" (Psalms cxix.-cxxxiii.), that is, psalms for pilgrims on the way up to Jerusalem. The first care, on arrival at the Holy City, would be to find lodgings. (Did Mary and Joseph sometimes repeat their experience at Bethlehem?) On the evening of the fourteenth Nisan, in a group of not less than ten and not more than twenty persons, they would begin the Feast by the eating of the paschal lamb. The next day, "the great day of the Pasch," they would assist at the solemn sacrifice offered in the Temple to the accompaniment of music and singing. On the sixteenth Nisan they would be found in the crowds of pilgrims attended the 'Omer ceremony. A sheaf of barley, the first to be cut that year, was threshed, and the grain parched, ground, mixed with oil, incensed, and "waved" before the Lord. After this ceremony pilgrims were free to return home; and, probably, this is meant in the Gospel where we read: *And having fulfilled the days they returned.* Pilgrims who stayed behind took part in the *Moed Qaton*, or Lesser Feast, which lasted until the octave day, and during which the Rabbis gave instructions to the people.

When Mary and Joseph left the city, *the Child Jesus remained in Jerusalem; and his parents knew it not.* The travelling party or caravan (D.V. "company"), to which they attached

themselves was large, so they thought He was coming along with some of *their kinsfolk* (perhaps His cousins) and *acquaintance*. He was now twelve years old, and His perfect mother did not restrict His liberty. But at night-fall, when the whole caravan congregated at the first halting-place (probably el-Bireh, about ten miles from Jerusalem), it was discovered that Jesus was nowhere in the party. Then began that agonizing search. What a night our Lady must have spent! Tired and worn by the bustle and confusion of the journey with the caravan, she at once began to retrace her steps. Night fell. It was the dark night of her soul. Lanes, ditches, fields, houses, stragglers with no information to give—but no Jesus. Why had He not just told them? This Son, perfectly obedient for twelve years and to remain so for eighteen years more, why had He not said a word to save the piercing of a tender mother's heart? We do not know, except that the sword of sorrow was part of the price of her Motherhood. *She* was to cry out that dark night: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me!"

The sun rose and set; but her Sun of Justice did not appear. Another night of agony and suspense! The next day He is found: but in what mysterious surroundings! Seated on the ground, facing a semi-circle of learned Rabbis, who were giving the *Moed Qaton* instructions, this wonderful Child listened, asked questions, and by His remarks, amazed all who heard Him. Surely the Messianic expectation, uppermost in the minds of the Jews at that time, was the subject under discussion. When Mary and Joseph appeared on the scene they were "astounded"—not because they did not know His divine mission as the Son of God (His reply to His mother supposes that she knew this), but because they were totally unprepared to see Him at that age discoursing in public. Then, as joy began to melt the heart frozen with sorrow, her trembling lips spoke: *Son, why hast thou done so to us? Behold thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing.* And He, taking the word "father," made it the point of His reply: "My Father's business." *How is it that you sought me? Did you not know that I must be about my Father's business?* It would seem that He had told them beforehand that He would never leave them except to do His Father's business. This incident in the Temple was the prelude to the Public Ministry.

Mary and Joseph did not then see the full meaning of His reply. They were consoled, however, by His immediate return with them to Nazareth. There He was subject to them. Joseph died, probably a few years later; but as *Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men*, the holy mother of joy and sorrow kept all these words in her heart.

Second Sunday after Epiphany.

The Epistle. (Romans xii. 6-16.)

The first three Sundays after the Epiphany take up the whole twelfth chapter of *Romans* for their "epistles" at Mass. This letter to the Church at Rome was written by St. Paul from

Corinth in the year A.D. 56. At that date he could say that the faith of the Church at Rome was renowned throughout the world (i. 8). He himself had not yet visited Rome. Who, then, had first preached the faith and founded a well-organised church there (cc. xii.; xvi.)? There seems only one answer—St. Peter. St. Luke, who is usually so exact in his topography, hides the name of St. Peter's destination when he escaped from Agrippa's prison in A.D. 42. He says cryptically that Peter went "to another place" (Acts xii. 17). And there is strong independent evidence elsewhere to show that St. Peter was in Rome that year.¹

St. Paul's letter is taken up mainly with his great thesis, that to be received into the Christian Church no gentile need be circumcised or submit to the yoke of the Jewish Law. He had written an impassioned letter on this subject some years before, when the controversy was red-hot—the *Epistle to the Galatians*. To Rome he now writes a calmer treatise; for the fire of controversy was almost extinguished.

After spending eleven chapters on the main theme, St. Paul turns to exhortations, a section of which gives us the epistle for to-day. He has been insisting, as so often in his writings, on the unity of the Church. Just as one human body has several members each functioning differently, so in the one Church there are many members *having different gifts, according to the grace that is given us*. These gifts must be rightly used for the benefit of the one body—the Church. They are what we call to-day "*gratiae gratis datae*," i.e., gifts for the benefit of the Church rather than for the personal advantage of those who possess them. Some of these gifts exist to-day: others were necessary only in the Church's early days. To the latter class belongs *prophecy*—the gift of speaking either of future events or of divine truths not known to others. This gift, says St. Paul, must be used *according to the rule of faith*; that is, the prophet must keep within the limits of the Faith, and not introduce his own ideas into what the Holy Spirit has moved him to say. He that is a good administrator, should devote himself to *ministering*. He that is a good teacher (a gift third only to that of apostles and prophets, I Cor. xii. 28), should be intent on teaching. Another may have the gift of *exhorting*, that is, of encouraging those in sorrow or dejection: let him use this gift. Another member may be able to give of his temporal goods for the benefit of the poor and of the Church: let him do so *with simplicity*, that is, with singleness of purpose and not for ostentation's sake; not, in order to see his name on the subscription list—as Père Lagrange aptly suggests. By *he that ruleth* is meant he that is in charge of collecting and distributing alms. This office is to be exercised with prudent zeal. Finally, there is the person with the gift of kindness towards the sick and poor. This demands *cheerfulness*. No gloominess in hospital and slum work.

Here there is a pause in the text. What follows applies to

¹ See Edmundson: *Church in Rome in First Century*—an important book.

every Christian without exception. First, sincere and unaffected charity. Hate what is evil in a person; but hold on to what is good in him, thereby, encouraging him to better things. All true Christians are children of God, and brothers one with another. Between them there must be a strong family affection of brotherly love, the fruit of which will be that each will consider the others worthier than himself, *i.e., with honour preventing one another* (cp. Phil. ii. 1-7). Zeal must never tire; on the contrary we must be *fervent in spirit*—somewhat like Apollo (Acts xviii. 25), and unlike the lukewarm Bishop of Laodicea (Apoc. iii. 15)—for we are servants of the Lord. Hope should be full of joy at the thought of eternal life; and this will give perseverance in times of affliction. We must pray always (cp. Luke xviii. 1). If fellow Christians are in need we must share what we have with them. Hospitality should be eagerly rendered. *Bless them that persecute you*, as Christ taught (Matt. v. 44). *Rejoice with them that rejoice*—sincere congratulations, without admixture of envy, to those who win success. That is sometimes hard; but it is not so difficult to *weep with them that weep*. The whole is summed up in that unity of spirit, *being of one mind one towards another*, which is the bond of peace.

The last words of the epistle need to be driven home to-day, even in some Catholic parishes: *Not minding high things*, in the social scale, *but consenting to the humble persons*, or tasks.

The Gospel. (St. John ii. 1-11.)

When certain Fathers speak of St. John's Gospel as the "spiritual" Gospel, they mean that whereas Matthew, Mark, and Luke give the plain historical life of our Lord, St. John chooses out other historical events that have deeper spiritual teaching underlying them. The first three Evangelists wrote for the elementary course of catechetical instruction; St. John wrote for the higher or secondary course. Bearing this in mind we will be prepared to find greater spiritual meaning in the incident at Cana of Galilee than appears on the surface.

The sequel to *this beginning of miracles*, whereby He manifested His glory, was that the disciples, who already recognized Him as the Messiah (i. 41-51), now believed in His divinity. But does the deep significance of the narrative end there?

St. John alone records that just before our Lord bowed His sacred head and gave up the ghost, something strangely significant took place. To the disciple whom Jesus loved—who represented all whom Jesus would especially love till the end of time—was given Mary, the Mother of Christ (xix. 26, 27). We must not forget this incident when we turn to the early part of the Gospel and read that *there was a marriage in Cana of Galilee, and the mother of Jesus was there*. She stands in the prominent place. The beloved disciple wishes to teach all Christians a great spiritual truth respecting her. This teaching is that the first miracle was wrought with lavish generosity owing to Mary's intercession; and that after Christ had redeemed the

world and risen to glory, her petitions would be most efficacious.

The wine failing, the mother of Jesus saith to him: They have no wine. We give no credence to the fictitious miracles invented by the apocryphal gospels on the infancy of our Lord, and we hold with St. Thomas Aquinas¹ that the miracle at Cana was the first performed by Christ—in the sense that this was the first “sign” for the manifestation of His glory to the world. But, from the immediate request made by our Lady as soon as she saw the deficiency of wine, it would seem that she knew from experience at home that her Son could supply what was needed.

Woman was a title of respect: we should translate “Lady.” *What is to me and thee* is an expression often found in Scripture.² It may be harsh or gentle according to the tone in which it is spoken. Here, obviously, the reply is gentle, for the request is more than granted. An examination of all the texts, where the expression is found, shows that it implies influence of one person on another. We might translate: “Lady, what influence are you bringing to bear on Me?” Our Lord then explains His query by adding: *Not yet is My hour come.* The emphasis is on the first word in the Greek text: *Not yet.* It implies that when His “hour” is come, she may ask whatever she will, and it shall be granted. What then is meant by *My hour*? This “hour” is part of the plan of St. John’s Gospel. It draws nearer and nearer, until it is completed by His “passing out of this world to the Father.”³ When that “hour” was nearing its end, He fulfilled His promise: *Behold thy mother.* And from that hour, the disciple took her to his own (xix. 27). This is the interpretation of the great St. Augustine and of other famous commentators. It is also that of Cardinal Newman, who writes: “In saying the hour was not yet come, He implied that the hour would come when He would have to ‘do with her,’ and she might ask and obtain. . . . Thus, by marking out the beginning and end of the period of exception, during which she could not exercise her influence upon Him, He signifies more clearly, by the contrast, that her presence with Him, and her power, was to be the rule of His kingdom.” (*Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans*, Note III., n. 6.) But although at Cana she interceded before His hour gave her her intercessory power, yet so great was His love for her, that He could not refuse her petition. And how lavishly He answered it! She had asked for wine for the feast. He answered by giving a wedding gift of wine for a whole year—about 120 to 150 gallons!

Third Sunday after Epiphany.
The Epistle. (Romans xii. 16-21.)

This is a continuation of the passage read last Sunday. After warning us against social pride, the Apostle cautions us against

¹ *Summa Theol.*, pars 3a, q. 43, art. 38.

² Judges xi. 12; 2 K. xvi. 10; xix. 22; 3 K. xvii. 18; 4 K. iii. 13; 2 Par. xxxv. 21; Matt. viii. 29; xxvii. 19; Mark i. 24; v. 7; Lk. viii. 28.

³ Cp. vii. 30; viii. 20; xiii. 1; also Matt. xxvi. 45; Mark xiv. 35, 41; Luke xxii. 14, etc.

intellectual pride. He quotes from the Book of Proverbs (iii. 7) : *Be not wise in your own conceits*—a sentence that recalls our Lady's words (Lk. i. 51). Then he tells us how we must act towards those who are not of the household of the Faith. No "ley talionis" : *To no man rendering evil for evil*; but, as the same chapter of Proverbs teaches (verse 4), *providing good things in the sight of all men*. By "good things" is meant irreproachable conduct.

Sometimes it will be impossible to please the enemies of the Christian Faith; but, *if it be possible, as much as is in you, have peace with all men*. If these enemies persecute you, *revenge not yourselves, my dearly beloved; but give place unto wrath*. Leave the matter in God's hands, for : *Revenge is mine, I will repay saith the Lord*, in Deuteronomy xxxii. 35. On the contrary, exercise great charity towards your enemies, as the Book of Proverbs again teaches (xxv. 21). *For, doing this, thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head*: in other words, he will feel burning pangs of remorse and will be touched to repentance, when he sees how you return good for evil. Thus you will gain the victory over your enemy *by overcoming evil by good*.

The Gospel. (Matthew viii. 1-13.)

Two miracles are narrated in to-day's Gospel, the cure of the leper, and the healing of the centurion's servant. A few words about each.

The Leper. Two long chapters of the Book of Leviticus (xiii., xiv.) might profitably be read in preparation for to-day's sermon. They contain the laws for lepers and their cleansing.

St. Luke tells us that this particular leper was "full of leprosy." He approached to Jesus, knelt down, prostrated with his face to the ground, and, from the depths of this soul, addressed Jesus, the wonder-worker of Galilee : *Lord, if Thou wilt, Thou canst make me clean*. The heart of Jesus was moved to pity. Stretching forth His hand, He actually touched the "unclean" one, and said : *I will. Be thou made clean*. Immediately there was a complete cure. Not desiring a public commotion, our Lord bade the man : *See thou tell no man*—an instruction which was soon disobeyed, with the result that Jesus had to retire into the desert (Mk. i. 45; Lk. v. 16). The man was further instructed to observe the Law of Moses, that is, to show himself to the priest and offer the sacrifice of thanksgiving for recovery from leprosy (Lev. xiv. 2). The words *for a testimony unto them*, the priests, mean that the miracle would witness to the priests that the great Prophet was come (cp. 4 King, v. 8), and that He respected the Law of Moses. The text is hardly suitable for a sermon on Confession.

The Centurion. There was at Capernaum a garrison for the troops of Herod Antipas. The officer in command of 100 soldiers there was the centurion. He had a servant very dear to him, who was dying of a painful illness. Hearing that Jesus was on His way to the city, the centurion, himself a pagan, sent some of the leading Jews of the place to ask Him to heal his servant.

These Jews plead before Jesus that the officer, although a pagan, "loveth our nation; and he hath built us a synagogue" (Lk. vii. 5). Jesus at once replies: *I will come and heal him.*

It would appear that some of the petitioners hurried ahead to tell the officer that Jesus was coming to the house. Whereupon the centurion, alarmed at his own unworthiness to have such a distinguished Person in his house, sent back the messengers with the request: *Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldst enter under my roof: but only say the word and my servant shall be healed.* These words of a (pagan) military officer are immortalized by insertion into the most sublime Act that takes place on this earth—the Holy Mass. His further words may be paraphrased thus: "I am a centurion, a non-commissioned officer under authority: yet I have only to give the word of command to those under me for my orders to be instantly obeyed. How much more canst Thou, having no one over and above Thee, and in possession of supernatural powers, give one word of command, and my servant shall be healed!" At this manifestation of faith Jesus marvelled, and said to them that followed Him: *Amen, I say to you, I have not found so great faith in Israel.* i.e. among the Jews. He takes the occasion to speak of His Church of the future. Many will come from all parts of the world, and recline at the Banquet of the Lamb of God, as the true children of Abraham. The feast will be brilliant with the light of the glory of God (see Apoc. xxi. 23, 24). Outside will be gloom and darkness, into which the reprobate shall be cast. (*Cp.* Matt. xxii. 13; xxv. 30; Pss. Sol. xiv. 6; xv. 11.)

NOTES ON RECENT WORK

I. RECENT WORK IN THEOLOGY.

BY THE RT. REV. MGR. CANON MYERS, M.A.

In the recently published fascicules, XCI and XCII of the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, the Editor, M. l'Abbé Amann, Professor at the University of Strasburg, completes his account of Nestorius. He treats successively of the epilogue of the Nestorian crisis, the conflict of the followers of St. Cyril with the old Antiochian teachers, the Monophysite current, and then proceeds to a careful analysis of the ideas of Nestorius. We learn what his opponents, both orthodox and monophysite, thought of him; we then see him as his friends knew him. In working out his Christological teaching according to his own writings M. Amann draws very largely on the Book of Heraclides, in spite of the queries as to its authenticity: he was not an adoptionist; he did not teach the condemned doctrine of "the two sons"; given the lack of precision in the theological terminology of his time, it is difficult to say that he *explicitly* taught the heresy of "two persons or of two hypostases"—taking the words in the sense in which we now understand them—whatever may be said of the impossibility he found in conceiving a nature which had not its hypostasis. But when all is said his teaching will not fit in with the teaching of the Church. The story of Nestorius is followed (col. 157-323) by a long and exhaustive account of the history of the Nestorian Church through the Ages and of its literature.

The substantial article on *Newman* is the work of Fathers Tristram and Bacchus, of the Birmingham Oratory (col. 327-398). The *Life* sets out the Anglican Period of Newman's Youth and early days at Oxford; the Tractarian Movement; the First Shocks and the Final Bow. The Catholic period treats of his life in Rome; the English Oratory; Anglican controversy; the Work in Ireland (*The Rambler*); the University Question; Papal Infallibility; After the Council; the Crowning Honour. Under *Works* and *Teaching* we are given an analysis of the writings of the Anglican period and of the Catholic period, which will serve as a guide to their reading and an explanation of the circumstances in which they were written. A special study (col. 385-391) is devoted to *The Grammar of Assent*: it is an important piece of work: analysing, emphasising, explaining what exactly Newman has in his mind, what precise difficulty he was endeavouring to face.

In the account of the first Council of *Nicaea*, Gelasius of Cyzicus is relegated to the insignificant position from which Loeschke has tried to raise him: so that the traditional sources of Nicæan history still remain our sole sources. The latter part of the fascicule is chiefly biographical, devoted to six Nicéphorus, five Nicholas (Popes), and some forty-nine other Nicholas. In the account of *Nicéphorus Gregoras* Père Laurent makes something of an *amende honorable* for the very severe strictures he made on R. Guillard's book in the *Echos de l'Orient* of July, 1939.

The first volume (A to Bartholomär) of the new German

Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche has recently appeared under the editorship of Bishop Buchberger. It is to be completed in ten volumes, and takes the place of Buchberger's valuable *Kirchlichen Handlexikon* in two volumes, and the more extensive *Kirchenlexikon* of Wetzer and Welte. The most competent Catholic scholarship in Germany has been organised under some thirty-five specialists to produce an up-to-date summary of reliable information with the latest bibliographical indications available. The articles are marvels of compression—and few of the longest articles occupy more than a couple of pages. Where Braun is treating of Liturgy, Grabmann of Scholastic Philosophy, W. Schmidt of Ethnology, readers will know what to expect. In the first volume the articles on Antioch, Alexandria, Acquileia, Old Armenia are particularly rich. The article on Agnosticism has no reference to Huxley's invention of the term in 1869. Under "Albi," Archbishop Mignot is referred to as "Cardinal." The article on Anglicanism, with its reference to the "Established Church or High Church," suggests that it would be well to ask an Englishman to glance over the pages relating to England. The statistics of the Old Catholics of Utrecht give them: 28 parishes, 32 ecclesiastics, 12,000 adherents. There are excellent articles by Paulus on Indulgences by Baur on the Descent of Man, by Sauer on Early Christian Art, by Eisenhofer on the Resurrection, by Hünemann on the Beatific Vision.

In de la Taille's *The Mystery of Faith* (Sheed & Ward) we have an English rendering of the sketch published in French in 1924 for the benefit of readers who wish to have a brief statement of the main thesis of the author's great Latin work.

The second volume of Cayré's *Précis de Patrologie* (Desclée) completes as perfect a handbook to ecclesiastical literature as could be wished for. The first volume brought the work down to St. Augustine. The second volume treats of the great Christological controversies and the later Fathers of the Church, their continuators in the Middle Ages, the Thomistic Synthesis, down to the great writers of the Renaissance period Suarez, St. Theresa and St. Francis of Sales. Side by side with dogmatic teaching we see the expansion of moral and ascetical doctrine: the author has utilised the best work of the last thirty years and has provided students of theology with a handbook which ought never to be far away from them.

Father Joseph Tahon's *The First Instruction of Children and Beginners*, "an enquiry into the Catechetical tradition of the Church" (Sheed & Ward, 3s. 6d. pp. 115), gives a very interesting historical account of the various methods used in the past to impart religious knowledge and of the origin of Catechisms. The significance of the facts is underlined in the introduction by Father F. H. Drinkwater.

Het Hedendaagsche Anglicanisme (Vol. I, pp. 6 and 232), by the Rev. Al. Janssens, Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the Louvain House of Studies of the Scheut Fathers, is a very pleasing piece of work. The writer has taken considerable pains

to study and understand the modern Anglican position: he is clearly in touch with Anglican thinkers of different schools of thought and he has tried hard to look at their problems from their standpoint. After a chapter on Anglican mentality, he faces the very difficult problem of stating what Anglicanism is, and explains the lines of party-division. A long Chapter (iv) is devoted to the history and development of the High Church party, Chapter v to the Low Church, Chapter vi to the Broad Church modernistic theologians. A supplement prints out the 1922 Memorial to the Archbishop of Canterbury and his answer; the Declaration of Faith sent in 1922 to the Patriarch of Constantinople; Dr. Darwell Stone's 1918 Letter to *The Times* on the unsound teaching of Dr. Hensley Henson; Bishop Barnes' second open Letter (October 21st, 1921) to Archbishop Davidson; Dr. Major's Modernist Creed (1927). The book is a sound piece of objective well-documented criticism, and Flemish readers are to be congratulated on the provision of such a key to English religious opinion. We hope that a French version may soon be available.

Mysterium Christi (Longmans, 15s.) is composed of twelve Christological studies by British and German theologians, edited by Dr. Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, and Professor Adolf Deissmann. The studies are the outcome of a week's theological conference, held in August, 1928. Each contributor speaks for himself only and is responsible for his own contribution alone. The Editors tell us: "We send the book out with the aim and hope that it may be a small contribution to the elucidation of the greatest question which has been offered to the consideration of Christendom—'What think ye of Christ?'" It is very difficult to see what can justify such a hope: the writers have no philosophical principles in common, their terminology is vague, there is no agreement on truth or certainty, knowledge, feeling or sentiment. In *A Modern Approach to Christology*, by Professor Nathaniel Micklem of Kingston, Ontario, Canada, we are told that "the creeds are . . . venerable symbols like the tattered flags that hang upon the walls of national churches; but for the present warfare of the Church in Asia, in Africa, in Europe and America, the creeds when they are understood are about as serviceable as a battle-axe or an arquebus in the hands of a modern soldier" (p. 143). "The Chalcedonian confessions, formally and categorically, if not intentionally contradicts both the Nicene confession and the surest religious intuition of the modern Christian, namely, that it is in the *man* Jesus that we approach God—'Jesus divinest when thou most art man'" (p. 144). "But for the modern mind there are two grave objections to the treatment of this dogma [of the Incarnation] as anything more than a poetical conception of reality. In the first place, the idea that God, the Author and sustainer of the World, laid aside certain of his attributes and was born as a baby belongs to the world of mythology, not of philosophy or imaginable fact. In the second place, it jeopardises a conviction rooted alike in history and vital for

religion that Jesus Christ walked by faith and prayer, as we also are called to do" (p. 145). "The theory that Jesus of Nazareth never existed as a historic person is not to be taken seriously. That He 'was crucified under Pontius Pilate' is as certain as any other well-ascertained fact of history. But beyond that what can be proved of Him? What common ground is there even among Christian scholars?" (p. 150). He may well ask: "But is there for the modern Christian any genuine Christological problem at all? Are special categories needed to express the Person and work of Jesus Christ? Jesus was called divine in virtue of the redemption which He accomplished; but this redemption as described in older theologies seems to many illusory or even hysterical as an experience and entirely fanciful as a hope. With the break-up of the old-fashioned orthodox theologies what is left to be explained? Or to put the question more constructively, what are the moral realities that remain when mythological thought-forms have been abandoned and psychology has performed its perfect work?" (p. 154). "Is He then man or God or both, or something between the two? To call Him a god is inconsistent with monotheism; to identify Him with God is repugnant alike to orthodoxy and common sense; to call Him the God-man is the euthanasia of thought. . . ." (p. 156).

Many more passages of a similar trend might be cited. Micklem rejects all traditional Christian teaching, makes unto himself a "Christ" of his own, and plays with the terms "Redemption," "Saviour," "Redeemer," "the Christian Church," which he has emptied of meaning.

All the essays are not of an equally destructive character. That of Canon J. K. Mozley is in fact at the very antipodes of Micklem's work but all alike leave the Catholic reader with the quite definite impression that the writers have no clearly thought-out philosophical position, no sound criteriological basis for their most definite statements, no clear conception of the value of the terms they use. The worship of "the modern mind," "the modern man," the awe-stricken references to "the advance of modern science," make one realise how far men are drifting from the realisation of the importance of revealed teaching. The volume is useful as an epitome of present-day non-Catholic opinion, and as such it has its value, but we cannot take it seriously as an answer to "What think ye of Christ?" But it does serve to emphasise the character of the age-long struggle of the Church for the exclusive use of her own sacred terms—which are ever being used in a different sense by those who oppose her teaching.

II. RECENT WORK IN PHILOSOPHY.

BY THE REV. R. P. PHILLIPS, D.D., M.A.

THE death of Lord Balfour has removed one who throughout the whole course of a long life was a strenuous supporter of Theism, as affording the only acceptable view of the universe. He incurred a somewhat undeserved reputation for philosophical scepticism;

and though it is true that he did not, in the same way as the Scholastics do, admit the self-evidence of the first principles, he never doubted that they were "true or on the way to truth." Observing that our fundamental beliefs, such as that we live in an extended and changing universe, "occupy a position which, from a philosophical point of view, is eminently unsatisfactory," he argues that if we are still to hold them to be true, as, in fact, we do, and must, we can only do so on the ground that reason is not a mere product of evolution, but also its guide, and so above it, or transcendent. For if they have merely a survival value, as the contrary view would imply, how can we take them as a solidly true basis of any knowledge, including the contrary view itself? To deny that reason is transcendent is to deprive it of the warrant that it gives us truth, and so to stultify this very denial, since this has itself been excogitated by reason, and professes to be true. We are thus inevitably led to admit a Transcendent Reason, which dominates and inspires the process of evolution, and in particular, the human reason, being both cause and guide. This argument, and the parallel ones from the absolute value of beauty and goodness, was composed under the pressure of nineteenth century materialism, but the problem discussed by it is the one which has been perhaps more prominent than any other in recent philosophy: viz., the interpretation which is to be put on our new scientific knowledge. Sir Oliver Lodge used to regard the statements of scientists as neither more nor less than statements about reality—what Eddington calls "reality (loud cheers)"—and though he has to some extent modified this attitude, nevertheless in his "Beyond Physics," he seeks for something which will be a permanent basis for life and mind, in the entities of the physicists. This, he thinks, must be the guide of matter though not itself material, for according to Lodge's spiritualistic presuppositions, it must be capable of acting through some all-embracing material medium, the ether, and yet be immortal. He finds what he is looking for in Schrödinger's psi-waves, groups of waves which form the material particle and determine its motion, but which cannot be said to be of the same nature as electro-magnetic waves. He confesses, however, that though from this point of view these waves may be said to be not material, yet he is unable to see how purpose and freedom can be introduced by their means. Another attempt to estimate the metaphysical outcome of Physics has been made by Sir James Jeans in his Rede Lecture on the Mysterious Universe, where he concludes that science is pointing to a non-mechanical view of reality, so that the universe is a universe of thought, whose thinker can be least inadequately described by us, in the present state of our knowledge, as a mathematical one.

The most thorough-going attempt, however, to give an interpretation of all our present knowledge of the world, whether derived from science, or any other source, is to be found in Whitehead's Gifford Lectures on "Process and Reality." No doubt the contention of the "philosophia perennis" that the ultimate nature of reality must be of the character of mind, is preserved

in this scheme as much as in the suggestions of Jeans, though this mind, which Whitehead calls God, is of a much less simple, and indeed intelligible, character than Jeans' mathematician. We are told that the "nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature, and a consequent nature. The consequent nature of God is conscious; and it is the realization of the actual world, in the unity of his nature The primordial nature is conceptual, the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts." Thus we are also told that "it is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God." So at least it seems clear that the kind of differentiation between God and the world demanded by traditional theism is altogether abandoned in this scheme of Metaphysics. The reason seems to lie in Whitehead's view of the nature of individual substance. Even in "Science and the Modern World," he seemed to be working to a view of nature in which there would be no differentiation of thing from thing. His rejection of the predicate—subject form of judgment, as far back as his "Concept of Nature," has now issued in a philosophy from which differentiation seems to be entirely absent.

It appears, then, that the clue to the whole matter is to be found in his criticism of individual substances. (Part II, chaps. 1 and 7). It would be impossible to discuss it here, but it is summed up in the denial of Aristotle's definition of primary substance, in so far as this asserts that a substance is not present in a subject. For Whitehead "every actual entity is present in every other actual entity"; and so it seems impossible that there should be gaps of any kind in nature. Though this result is not one which would be accepted by a Catholic philosopher, nevertheless the criticism of substance in this book is worthy of consideration by Thomists, since the notion of individual substance is one of the leading ideas of their system. In this connection it is interesting to notice that while Whitehead attacks first substance for being too individual, others have recently attacked it for not being individual enough. So in a review of Fr. D'Arcy's book on S. Thomas; the writer in rejecting S. Thomas' opinion as to the principle of individuation, says that it is his belief that every object has its individual, as distinct from its generic, essence. That two pins should be distinguished as individuals only by matter "without any addition of meaning" in one over the other seems to this writer impossible.

These opposite criticisms of the Aristotelian notion of substance indicate the main point on which Thomism has lately been assailed, for along with a rejection of the view put forward by S. Thomas of the nature of the individual will naturally go a rejection of his view as to the kind of knowledge which we have of it; and also, no doubt, of his whole theory of knowledge. Consequently, M. Jolivet has done a work of fundamental importance in tracing the history of the notion of substance from the time of Aristotle down to our own day. His book, "La Notion de Substance," is, however, not a mere catalogue of the opinions on this important subject, but also contains an acute criticism of

them, shewing the deformations which the notion of substance has received, and the difficulties to which other views of substance, than the Thomistic, are exposed. The exposition of these other views naturally gives the author the opportunity of answering the difficulties which have been raised to S. Thomas's own view, so that the whole forms an admirable defence and exposition of this central section of Thomistic philosophy. A valuable paper on the same subject was read by Miss Stebbing before the Aristotelian Society in June of this year.

Another book on Thomistic philosophy which cannot be overpraised, either for its matter or its manner, is Fr. D'Arcy's work, "Thomas Aquinas," mentioned above. If there is one feature of it which is more excellent than another it is the admirably clear way in which the unity and great structural lines of the philosophy of S. Thomas are exhibited. Though the size of the book did not allow of detailed examination of special problems, yet such remarks as the author does permit himself are admirably just, as, e.g. when he says of substance that it "does not remain unaffected by accidents like the sleeping princess," or when he points out that S. Thomas' denial of direct knowledge of singulars is a corollary of his doctrine of the essential unity of man; or insists that, however difficult it may be, St. Thomas' doctrine of the principle of individuality is an integral part of his system. Fr. D'Arcy has fully succeeded in his design of presenting this philosophy "in its unity in the light of its fundamental principles."

Without endorsing the opinion that its subject is indeed a philosophical one, mention may be made of the impressive essay by Fr. O'Mahony on "The Desire of God." The subject has lately been a centre of theological interest, and has been ably treated by Fr. Gardeil in his book "La Structure de l' Ame" (1927), and last year in a lucid article in the "Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques," to mention two writers out of many. In his book Fr. O'Mahony carries forward the movement which has been noticeable for some time past, particularly at Louvain, to emphasise the dynamic element in the cognitive process. The author argues that our natural knowledge of God's existence necessarily implies, according to S. Thomas, a natural desire to know also God's essence, as it is in itself. To the objection that this would destroy the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, he replies by discriminating the natural from the final end of man. Whether this distinction will bear the weight which is laid on it, and so provide a satisfactory solution of this thorny problem, as well as the subsidiary question, whether this solution is on authentic Thomistic lines, seems somewhat doubtful; but, at least this book will do valuable service as being the first work in English to throw light on what has, till lately, been a neglected aspect of the psychology of S. Thomas.

A work which has recently appeared in America, "The Intelligible World," by Prof. W. M. Urban, will be of interest to those who maintain the validity of traditional philosophy, the "philosophia perennis." A certain reaction against Thomistic philo-

sophy has recently been observable in Catholic circles, based perhaps on the excessive claims made by some Thomists for their master. If this is its cause, it is clearly as irrational as is the position of those who would argue rather from the authority of S. Thomas than from reason. Prof. Urban's book is an attempt to restate in modern terms what he considers to be irrefutable in traditional philosophy. His criterion for distinguishing between this and what he calls "philosophical modernism" is whether or no the philosophy in question recognises the inseparability of reality and value, "*bonum et ens convertuntur.*" Though some may be surprised to find S. Thomas and Hegel named together as upholders of the same tradition, and may think the author's criterion insufficient, yet that they did both recognise the truth of this principle, and were both convinced of the intelligibility and ideal character of reality can hardly be doubted. The author, however, advocates a much more thoroughgoing idealism than that of S. Thomas, and so finds himself in some difficulty when he comes to the question how value, which for him is reality, is to be reconciled with existence. Since, however, he recognises a hierarchical scale of being, culminating in the "*ens realissimum*," it does not seem impossible that he might avoid the dilemma of granting either that value is to be reduced to existence, which would destroy value, or existence to value, by holding that existence in finite beings, derived from the highest reality, is limited in them by their degrees of value, and so distinct from these degrees, though in the *ens realissimum* it is identical with infinite value. However this may be, there is no doubt that the viewing of the main tenets of traditional philosophy from a new standpoint, as exhibited in this book, gives them a freshness which is most welcome and useful.

Two books which give general surveys of modern philosophy may be mentioned. The first is Prof. Lovejoy's "*The Revolt Against Dualism.*" He maintains that the attempt to get away from epistemological dualism, of thought and thing, and from psychophysical dualism, of mind and matter, has failed; and to do so, he traces the history of dualism from the time of Descartes onwards; giving detailed consideration especially to Whitehead's denial of simple location, and his protests against the bifurcation of nature, and to Russell's neutral monism; in both of which he finds positions inconsistent with a repudiation of dualism. From America also have arrived two volumes of essays by various writers under the title of "*Contemporary American Philosophy.*" There is no one general tendency of thought to be observed in them, unless it be a dissatisfaction with the Idealism which was current at the end of last century. Pragmatism also has lost its prominence; and Behaviourism does not get many votes. It is remarkable that many of the writers see a close connection between philosophy and religion, though the meaning of the latter term at least, is highly nebulous.

For Logicians several works have lately appeared, one of which should be of much practical use as explaining recent additions to logical theory, both as to the development of symbolic

Logic, which has hitherto only been available in large and costly works, and as to the criticisms directed against Aristotelian Logic. This is a book called "A Modern Introduction to Logic," by L. S. Stebbing, and contains discussions of questions belonging not only to Formal but also to Material Logic. Among the former may be mentioned as particularly illuminating the analysis of descriptions, classes, and general propositions in Chap. IX; and among the latter the author deals with the method of the sciences in two chapters; of which the second is devoted to the method of the Natural Sciences, and the nature of scientific theories. This question is one which demands an answer before we go on to use scientific knowledge in the formulation of theories of philosophy. The traditional Scholastic view seems to be a kind of Naïve Realism applied to the pronouncements of scientists, regarding all the entities of which they speak as existing in the way of which they are conceived. From this idea to the opposite extreme which confines scientific knowledge to "pointer-readings," there may be many gradations, among which it is probable that the true solution is to be found. To the consideration of this problem Scholastics are gradually turning their attention, though they are well advised to proceed with caution, and not to accept hurriedly theories offered to them by scientists, however competent; even though these seem to harmonise with the tenets of their own philosophy. The acceptance by philosophers of a mechanical view of nature under the influence of Descartes ought to be sufficient warning.

III. RECENT WORK IN SCIENCE.

BY THE REV. T. E. FLYNN, PH.D., M.A.

THE British Association meeting is often the occasion of some startling scientific pronouncement. Sometimes it is a new theory which calls for the readjustment of views, sometimes it is merely the authoritative statement of a familiar hypothesis with fresh corroborative evidence. The scope of the Association is very wide, and most priests can find in the reports of its sectional meetings some matter of interest. The dogmatic theologian, the cosmologist, the psychologist will almost always discover something to fit into their scheme of things or something to call for criticism; and those who are so deeply immersed in the labours of the mission as to have little time for recondite professional study will be glad to see what the scientist has to say on such practical topics as Education, Housing or Wages. A perusal of the Handbook "Advancement of Science" (paper covers, 5/-), which records the presidential addresses of this year's meeting, reveals little that is startling, but a good deal that is interesting.

Before coming to questions of physical science, I will notice a most interesting and suggestive paper on "Rationalisation and Technological Unemployment" by Professor T. E. Gregory, D.Sc. Rationalisation is the conscious process of organisation "involving both the structure of industry and the methods of production." It aims at economizing the amount of labour *directly*

required per unit of output and also at a net reduction in the amount of labour required to place a unit of output in the hands of the final consumer. Considering how patiently we have heard the monotonous chanting of the magic word "Rationalisation" as the cure for all our present ills it is interesting, if somewhat disheartening, to see that the convincing analysis of this remedy as presented by Professor Gregory.

An increasing productivity is one of the immediate causes of unemployment. Supposing one result of rationalisation to be an increase of monetary purchasing power in the hands of the consumer, what use are consumers going to make of this margin? If they apply it to the satisfaction of new wants, *in the long run* rationalisation will not involve unemployment. But if it is hoarded, if it goes into save-deposits and War Loan Certificates, it will increase the difficulty of absorbing labour. "Rationalisation reduces costs, but, until the lower costs have helped the industries in question to regain their market, *and expand it*, unemployment will remain. But unemployment resulting from rationalisation is a lesser evil than unemployment resulting from relative inefficiency."

Perhaps the most notable event of the meeting was Dr. Dirac's paper concerning the ultimate structure of matter. This does not appear in "Advancement of Science," and we have nothing at hand to draw upon but brief newspaper reports and a special article in the *Observer* of September 14 from the able pen of Sir James Jeans. Before attempting to understand, however vaguely, Dr. Dirac's contribution, it is necessary to have some knowledge of recent advance in the science of the atom. For this purpose I would venture to recommend three books, all cheap, all popular, all fascinating in their various ways.

Of these the most significant, as it is the latest and cheapest, is Sir James Jeans' "Mysterious Universe" (Cambridge University Press, November, 1930, 3/6). If the subject of atomic physics has won much popular attention of late, it is due not only to the entrancing nature of the subject but to the literary skill of such exponents as Sir James Jeans, who can present the abstract results of abstruse mathematical operations in a concrete and comprehensible form. This book has caused a sensation largely because of the last chapter, "Into the Deep Waters." The world is agog because a man of such scientific eminence confesses his belief in a Creator but wants to reduce that Creator to the dimensions of a "pure mathematician." This must be very gratifying to the author, who writes in his Preface: "This chapter merely contains the interpretations which I, a stranger in the realms of philosophic thought, feel inclined to place on the scientific facts and hypotheses discussed in the main part of the book. Many will disagree with it—it was written to this end."

For my part, I am not disposed to swim through the "deep waters" in the author's track. I prefer to watch his progress and admire his constancy from a coign of vantage safe behind the windows of the ark. It is "the facts and hypotheses" of the scientist that concern me. The first chapter, "The Dying Sun,"

is designed to impress on us the accidental-seeming character of human (or any) life in the terrifying magnitude of the universe of space, in which our home is like "a millionth part of a grain of sand out of all the sea sand in the world." Duly impressed as we are by the facts, we shall not accept the anti-vitalist conclusion or relinquish our conviction that man is the noblest work of material creation and the dearest to the Creator. The second chapter records the growth of modern physics from the mechanical concepts enunciated by Newton, through the nineteenth century, which was the age of the engineer-scientist, to the revolutionary mathematical theories of the present day which have cast out the obsession of engineering mechanics with its pompous and misleading models.

The unsophisticated person who can read the next chapter on "Matter and Radiation" without feeling mental vertigo and a thrill akin to terror had better take "Dracula" for a bedside book. Mere quotations could give no idea of its enthralling interest, but for an ulterior reason I will mention one very significant conclusion of a "somewhat precarious" argument. "... Matter is really being annihilated, or rather transformed into radiation. . . . The conservation of matter disappears from science, while the conservation of mass and of energy become identical" (p. 73). Obviously the philosopher will have something to say about this; but that is not our business here and now. The fourth chapter, "Relativity and the Ether," gives one of the best popular expositions of Einstein's theory that I have yet seen. At the end of it ether seems to have gone the way of the conservation of mass. That famous entity on whose reality, in spite of its amazingly contradictory properties, we depended so absolutely, has been dissipated into a "frame of reference." Really it was never more than "the nominative of the verb 'to undulate'"; now it is the objective after the verb "to refer to."

For a more detailed study of the atomic elements, the proton and the electron, I would recommend Dr. E. N. da C. Andrade's *Mechanism of Nature* (Bell, 6s.). This "can be read in an hour or two by a reader unversed in the study." Dr. Andrade shows us that electricity is granular in structure, its "atom" being the electron, which is "the key to modern physics." Similarly, according to Planck's Quantum Theory, radiant energy is dealt with in "grains" or "atoms," the unit being called a quantum, or, in the case of light, a photon. But, whereas the electron is a constant quantity, the quantum of energy varies with the frequency of the radiations. The quantum theory rules the possible tracks and speeds of the electrons in their orbits. As a result of experimental methods discovered by Rutherford and C. T. R. Wilson we have now got a picture of an atom as a sort of planetary system of electrons revolving about a central sun, called the nucleus, which bears a positive electric charge. This nucleus magnified a million million times would be "about the size of a small pea." The space determined by the orbits of the electrons, which may be as many as ninety

in number, would if similarly magnified be about a hundred yards across. The electrons form a "patrol," protecting the nucleus from the incursions of other small particles. Alpha-particles (of the mass of an atom of Helium with two positive charges) sometimes elude the vigilance of the patrol, and it is their striking of the nucleus which has "provided the clue to the atomic mystery."

It is accepted that the nucleus is itself a complex mass of positive and negative charges, protons and electrons, with the protons in such numerical excess as to balance the number of planetary electrons in a neutral atom. "Breaking the atom" means breaking up the nucleus, and the experimental realization of this disruption is one of the great aims of modern physics. But the very heavy nuclei of the radio-active bodies break up very readily of themselves, and in so doing liberate enormous energy. Here we were, then, with two units of electricity, a positive and a negative, proton and electron. As we have seen, a neutral atom is one whose nuclear proton (positive) charges are exactly neutralized by an equal number of nuclear and orbital electron (negative) charges. If one of the electrons is broken off in any of the ways known to science, the atom becomes positively charged, though this charge is a mere lack of the negative charge, which has rushed off into space.

Now Dr. Dirac's suggestion is that all positive electricity is of this nature, what we should call in scholastic language a "privation" of negative electricity. So we may consider that the normal thing is to have an electron situated in a definite place, "on a rung of a ladder," with a possibility of its leaving that rung to occupy another rung or to fly away altogether into space. To apply Sir James Jeans' homely image, the electron must sit in a chair or be out of it altogether, and it cannot rest anywhere but in a chair; if it has left one it moves with enormous speed until it finds another. Then we can have three possibilities: (1) an electron in its "chair"; (2) an electron out of its chair; (3) and (as a result of 2) an empty chair. Electrons on the move may shoot out of the sphere of the atom altogether and wander about in space. "These have positive energy, and constitute the ordinary electrons of our experience." But the empty chairs move, too; and these are the protons. When an electron which has been wandering returns to one of its possible situations and rests there, it gives up the positive energy which it had as a wanderer, and both electron and proton are annihilated as far as our consciousness goes. (Hence the "annihilation of matter," referred to above.)

The theory accounts for the puzzling fact that the formula for electron waves indicates a frequent alternation of negative and positive energy. But while it solves some problems this newest contribution to the knowledge of the atom is itself apparently full of difficulties. And, of course, we must always remember that when in these matters we relinquish the precision of scientific (or even mathematical) terms we are making a picture

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with little resemblance to reality. Of any such illustration we may say in the classic phrase: *omne exemplum claudicat, sed hoc ambobus pedibus*.

The third of the books I mentioned is by Professor Kendall. He makes the chemical approach, and in his *At Home Among the Atoms* (Bell, 7s. 6d.) he has produced a bright and very readable book for people "who wish to get the latest news about the atom at a single sitting in words of one syllable." While it is definitely not written for experts, even those who have some knowledge of science will find pleasure in this clear and popular exposition of some of the latest advances in our knowledge of atomic structure. But the book was written in 1929, and as I have indicated it is no longer "the latest news"; the attack on the atom is developing so rapidly that the "latest news" must be supplemented by "extra specials."

ROMAN DOCUMENTS

BY THE REV. A. BENTLEY, PH.D., M.A.

SEMINARIES.

No less than eight colleges were built, or at least begun, in Rome during the year of the Holy Father's Jubilee. The Encyclical of December 23rd, 1929, gives the following list: a house of studies for the Servites, and another for the Minims; the new Lombard college, and the Russian, Czecho-Slovak, Ethiopian, Ruthenian and Brazilian seminaries.

The reorganization of seminary studies and academic degrees has been entrusted to a Commission representing the teaching staffs of colleges and universities in Rome. During the nine months, from May, 1929, to January, 1930, sixteen sessions were held, and in February the Holy Father addressed a special letter to Cardinal Bisleti, commending the composition and labours of the Commission. The representatives convened by the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Studies include four Monsignori, two Dominican Fathers, two Franciscans, two Jesuits, one Benedictine and one Redemptorist.

A letter of the Congregation of Seminaries and Studies, dated August 28th, 1929, was published in March, 1930. In order to give effect to the Encyclical "*Rerum Orientalium*" (September 8th, 1928), the Sacred Congregation decrees that special attention should henceforth be given in the theological course to questions which in any way concern the Eastern Churches or peoples. Therefore, in all large training centres a special course or chair of Oriental Theology should be established; while lesser seminaries should see that at least some of the students receive this special training: *congruum est tamen ac paene necessarium, ut in ceteris quoque clericorum Seminariis . . . id minime negligatur ut instructi paratique prodeant nonnulli saltem ad eam quoque Ecclesiae portionem excolendam, in qua primum christianum nomen exortum, fidei grandioribus factis inclaruit atque ad reliquum terrarum orbem fama, virtute ac praedicatione processit.*

The task of furthering these studies, the Letter continues, falls particularly upon the professors of sacred theology, church history and sacred liturgy. The questions to be treated will be such as the following: the objections raised by Orientals against the primacy and infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity (the Filioque controversy), the Immaculate Conception, Purgatory; or again difficulties concerning the Sacraments, *e.g.*, Baptism, the Holy Eucharist (the "*Epiklesis*"). In Liturgy, the diversity of Catholic rites should receive detailed and reverent treatment. In History, particular stress should be laid on the first seven ecumenical councils and such later councils as those of Lyons and Florence; and also on the efforts of recent Pontiffs, from Pius IX at the opening of the Vatican Council to Leo XIII and the reigning Pontiff, Pius XI. The Letter goes on to declare that local Ordinaries may be assured of this, that they could do nothing more acceptable to the Sacred

Heart of our Christ King, or more pleasing to our Holy Father the Pope, than to send on to the Oriental Institute in Rome any student who shows exceptional ability and gives promise of being at some future date of service to Orientals.

Occasion is taken in the same Letter to repeat the appeal of September 8th, 1926, for regular catechetical courses in Seminaries—"apud alumnos theologiae praesertim." Higher studies must not obscure the vital importance of this work, "totius veluti sacerdotalis ministerii fundamentum . . . eiusdemque fructuum et progressionum causam praecipuam."

CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTION.

A new *Officium* of the Congregation of the Council was established in 1923 to direct the work of catechetical instruction throughout the world. A Commission was set up, and at its entreaty the Holy Father has granted the following privileges by Apostolic Letter of March 12th, 1930, at the same time withdrawing the indulgences of Paul V and Clement XII. First, all who teach or learn Christian Doctrine for half an hour, or at least twenty minutes, not less than twice a month, may gain a Plenary Indulgence twice a month, on condition that they go to Confession and Holy Communion, visit a church or public oratory, and there pray for the Pope's intention. Secondly, all who at least are contrite may gain a partial indulgence of one hundred days each time they teach or learn Christian Doctrine for half an hour or so, as above.

Reference has already been made to catechetical work in Seminaries. For Religious Congregations of Men and Women, special decrees are promulgated in an Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, dated November 25th, 1929, and published in January, 1930.

(a) Christian Doctrine must be thoroughly studied during the period of probation or noviciate. Each candidate must not only know the text by heart, but also be able to explain it; and adequate knowledge must be shown in an examination, as a condition for admission to vows.

(b) After the year of probation, all who are to teach in public or private schools, must receive sufficient training, both in the catechism and in the method of teaching it, to be able to undergo an examination before the Ordinary or his delegate.

(c) The syllabus of the Roman Vicariate may serve as the basis of this examination.

(d) Those who are to teach Christian Doctrine not in school, but in a parish, should obtain a certificate from the episcopal Cura.

In accordance with the recent Concordat, the Sacred Congregation of the Council issued a circular letter on June 21st, 1930, to the Diocesan Ordinaries of Italy, on the subject of religious instruction to be given in all "Middle" schools for classical, scientific, pedagogic, technical or artistic training.

Such instruction is to be compulsory : exemptions will be granted only at the written request of parents, renewed at the beginning of each scholastic year. The time allotted is one hour each week, or two hours in the advanced courses. One teacher may accept appointments to several schools, provided he does not exceed a weekly total of eighteen periods. The teacher of religion must also be recognized as one of the regular staff, on an equal footing with the other teachers in the school. The approval of teachers—usually ecclesiastics or religious—rests with the Ordinary. The text of these Regulations is arranged in nine sections, each containing several articles. Four appendices follow : first, a classification of schools; next, a syllabus for each group; thirdly, a detailed development of each section of the syllabus; fourthly, a list of text-books temporarily approved.

PLENARY INDULGENCES, *toties quoties*.

A recent response of the Sacred Penitentiary has been made the basis of a general ruling for all plenary *toties quoties* indulgences *which involve a visit to a church*. It will cover, therefore, not only the plenary indulgences of August 2nd and November 2nd, but also such particular privileges as those of Jesuit or Vincentian houses on the Feast of St. Ignatius or St. Vincent.

On January 13th, 1930, the Sacred Penitentiary declared that the same person can gain the Portiuncula indulgence on August 2nd in one church, and again on the following Sunday in another, provided that the Sunday has been substituted in the second church in accordance with the decree of July 10th, 1924; moreover, the prayers mentioned in the same decree, *saltem sexies Pater, Ave et Gloria*, are strictly prescribed, in such a way that the substitution of equivalent prayers does not suffice for the gaining of the indulgence.

A further decree of July 5th, 1930, now authentically declares the recitation of six Pater, Ave and Gloria, at each visit, to be both necessary and sufficient for the gaining of *any* plenary *toties quoties* indulgence for which a visit to a church is prescribed.

Another class of *toties quoties* indulgences, those attached to crucifixes, was recently the subject of a declaration by the same Tribunal (June 23rd, 1929). Priests who have the power of attaching such indulgences are reminded that, no matter what form the original concession took, their faculty is limited by the decree of the Holy Office, June 10th, 1914. The indulgence is intended for the dying only. No priest, therefore, should presume to bless a crucifix with the intention that *anyone* may gain a plenary indulgence by kissing the crucifix. The declaration goes on to quote the decree: *Facultas . . . ita et non aliter est intelligenda, ut quicumque christifidelis, in articulo mortis constitutus, aliquem ex huiusmodi Crucifixis benedictis, etiamsi illi non pertineat, osculatus fuerit, vel quomodocunque tetigerit, dummodo confessus ac sacra Communionem refectus.*

vel si id facere nequiverit, saltem contritus, Ssmum Iesu nomen ore, si potuerit, sin minus corde devote invocaverit, et mortem tamquam peccati stipendium, de manu Domini patienter susceperit, plenariam Indulgentiam acquirere valeat.

RUSSIA.

In the Consistory of June 30th, 1930, the Holy Father commanded that from now onwards the *Prayers after Mass*, prescribed by Pope Leo XIII, should be offered for Russia. Bishops and clergy are to be careful to warn the people of this intention, and frequently to recall it to their memory.

The over-burdened Congregation for the Oriental Church and its President, Cardinal Sincero, have now been relieved of the responsibility for the *Commission for Russia*, founded in 1925. By Motu Proprio, of April 6th, 1930, the Commission becomes entirely *sui juris*, under the presidency of its former *Relator*, Bishop d'Herbigny.

Saint Teresa of the Child Jesus, who, along with Saint Francis Xavier, is the special patron of missionaries, is the titular of the *Russian Seminary*, which owes its existence largely to a magnificent donation from a client of the Saint. It adjoins the Oriental Institute in Piazza S. Maria Maggiore. Both share kindred interests, and both are placed under the direction of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus. The seminary is intended for Russians, and for others who adopt the Slavico-Byantine rite and dedicate themselves to restoring the Russian peoples to the one fold of Christ. In the Apostolic Constitution of August 15th, 1929, the Holy Father expresses the hope that it will be as fruitful in results as the Venerable English College and the Pontifical German-Hungarian College have been.

To encourage prayer to Saint Teresa for Russia an indulgence of 300 days is granted to all who recite a special prayer which begins "Sainte aimable et compatissante." A Plenary Indulgence may be gained if the prayer is recited daily for a month. (S. Penit. August 19th, 1929.)

ORIENTALS IN AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA.

To eliminate some of the difficulties of Orientals who settle abroad—particularly in America or Australia—the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church has issued the following decrees:

A decree of January 7th, 1930, is directed against unauthorized mendicants who pose as Oriental clerics, whereas many of them are "neither clerics, nor Orientals, nor Catholics." Bishops *everywhere* are asked to bring it to the notice of the clergy, and even, where necessary, of the laity, that: (a) no Oriental cleric, no matter what his rank may be, is allowed to collect either alms or Mass stipends without the permission of the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church; (b) a general permission for all places and causes will never be given; (c) if permission is given for an extraordinary cause, it will

be restricted to a particular place; and even then no collection may be made without the consent also of the Ordinary; (d) nor may any Ordinary grant such permission, except after notice from the Holy See. Similarly no Bishop or Rector may hand on Mass stipends to Orientals.

A decree of January 7th, 1930, is directed against who go to serve Orientals of their own rite in North, Central or South America, or in Australia. Latin Ordinaries are urged to welcome Orientals, to encourage them to continue in their own rite, and to help them to build churches and schools. Wherever a settlement of Orientals is in need of a priest, the local Ordinary, or an eastern Ordinary, or the faithful themselves, should inform the Sacred Congregation either through the Nuncio or Apostolic Delegate, or even directly. Neither faculties nor permission to say Mass may be granted except to such Oriental priests as have been authorized by the Sacred Congregation. This authorization of a particular priest for a particular diocese will be clearly stated in a Rescript sent to the Ordinary, and in the copy given to the priest. Only those who are celibate (or, under certain conditions, widowers) will be admitted. There must be no unnecessary delay *en route*. The Oriental priest henceforth remains under the jurisdiction of the local Ordinary. The Bishop must withhold permission for Mass and other faculties *until he has received the Rescript*. No other recommendation suffices. A report from the Oriental priest, signed by the Ordinary, must be sent each year to the Sacred Congregation. Ruthenians in Canada and the United States must follow the special legislation laid down for them. Elsewhere Ruthenians are bound by this decree.

A further decree of January 7th, 1929, requires Oriental clerics who go to America or Australia for other reasons, or for a short visit, to obtain permission from the Sacred Congregation. In applying for this permission, the cleric must state the reason and the period of his intended stay, and the names of persons, places and houses he intends to visit. The Rescript of the Sacred Congregation will quote all necessary details.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Vatican Council: The story told from inside in Bishop Ullathorne's Letters. By Dom Cuthbert Butler. 2 Vols—Vol I, pp. xix, 300;—Vol. II, pp. 309.—Longmans, Green and Co.—258.

REVIEWED BY THE RT. REV. MGR. CANON GEORGE, D.D.

STUDENTS of modern Church history have felt the want of an adequate history of the important Council of the Vatican. Writers hostile to the Council have practically had the field to themselves; the case for the Council has gone by default, at any rate in England, and as Dom Butler remarks, English public opinion has hitherto been formed wholly on translations of the notorious works of Janus, Quirinus and Pomponius Leto, and on the letters of Acton and Mozley. It was therefore a fortunate day when Dom Butler, in preparing his *Life of Bishop Ullathorne*, came across a long series of letters written by the Bishop during his stay at the Council, and conceived the idea of making them the groundwork of a new history of the Council. That History is now before us. These letters and the writer of them, as also the genesis and scope of the present work, are best described in Dom Butler's own words:—

"Dr. Ullathorne, Bishop of Birmingham, was a letter-writer of the old school, who loved writing letters and wrote them well. Week by week he wrote to friends in England, telling them what news of the Council and of Rome he was at liberty to impart. In those letters we have his impressions, almost from day to day, of the course of events, his estimation of men and movements, his hopes and fears at every turn, told with great actuality: in all, a living picture of the Council from inside, such as, to the best of my knowledge, has nowhere else been given us. Readers of the '*Life of Bishop Ullathorne*' will know him as a plain straightforward Yorkshire man, of high character, with wide experience of men and affairs, shrewd and intelligent. At the Council he took up and maintained a 'moderate' or middle position, holding aloof from all movements, all intrigues outside the Council Chamber, refusing to act with any party, or to sign any petition, protest, or other document whatever; yet closely in touch with leading bishops on both sides. Thus we have in him probably a witness as well informed, and as independent, impartial, and objective, as could well be found."

"The series of Bishop Ullathorne's letters suggested to me this History of the Vatican Council, and they are its backbone. But I have gone much further afield, and have laid myself out, by a survey of the documents and literature of the Council, to present a history, authentic and adequate, and of a size that may reasonably be offered to the public likely to be interested in the subject. So far as I know, no such history of the Council exists in any language; the two histories, of Friedrich and Granderath, are of great length, running each to over two thousand pages. . . . The present work is the first attempt in English to present an account of the Vatican Council based on the Acta and other authentic

documents, interpreted, it is hoped, with such objectivity and impartiality as may be possible in one who has clear and strong convictions."

Around these letters Dom Butler builds up a History of the Council which will be found to be a masterpiece of clear exposition, sound judgment, and comprehensive grasp of every detail. I have space for only the briefest outline of the wealth of material contained in these volumes.

He opens with a list of sources, not the too common undigested list of works consulted, but a classified list with a reasoned appreciation of each author. This appreciation is amplified as occasion offers in later pages. For example, Döllinger is dealt with at length, in Vol. I as Janus, pp. 106, etc., and as Quirinus, pp. 256, etc. The verdict on Salmon is worth citing:—"It seemed well at this point to make it clear that Salmon's picture of the Council, the one best known in English circles, is a travesty of the facts. As has been said, it is wholly based on Quirinus." Dom Butler then devotes two long sections to matters preliminary to the Council. The first section, pp. 3-78, deals with the background of the Council and accounts for the heated atmosphere in which the Council met. There were two sources of friction.

First, there was a prevailing fear that the Council would revive on behalf of the Pope the claims to temporal sovereignty which obtained in the Middle Ages, with the old bugbear of the deposing power. This fear was accentuated by the publication in 1864 of the Syllabus, which was regarded as an attack on the modern State. Dom Butler shows how idle were those fears; he explains the temporal power exercised by Popes Gregory VII, Innocent III, and Boniface VIII; discusses the theories on which it was based, and places the Syllabus in its proper perspective. He describes in Chapter VII the attitude of non-intervention adopted by the Governments, and in Chapter XVII narrates the attempt made by the Döllinger faction to induce Gladstone to intervene, an attempt as contemptible as it was nearly successful. In the event the Council broke up before the relations of Church and State were due for discussion.

The second cause of friction was the rise of a new theological school which Dom Butler calls Neo-Ultramontanism and which he contrasts at length with Gallicanism and the current Ultramontanism. It pushed papal claims to extravagant extremes, and revelled in violent and provocative language; as leaders he notes Veuillot, Ward, and the Roman *Civiltà*.

The second Section, pp. 81-153, deals with two important preliminaries to the Council:—1st, the question of personnel: who were to be summoned to the Council; 2nd, the procedure to be adopted.

In view of subsequent hostile criticism of the action of the Pope, viz., that the Council was packed, and that the Pope deprived the bishops of their right to introduce matter for discussion, this section is of great importance. As Dom Butler points out, the best reply to these attacks and the strongest justification of the procedure adopted lies in the fact that it was almost

entirely inspired by Hefele, a leading Minority bishop. Dom Butler returns to matters of procedure in Chapters XIII and XIV, and defends them exhaustively in reply to the criticism of Quirinus.

With Chapter IX Dom Butler embarks on the actual proceedings of the Council, the professed object of which was to deal with modern errors. The subjects to be dealt with had been classified under five heads, and according to the rules of procedure the Council had to elect five deputations or committees to draw up the material for discussion under each head. It was well known that the topic which dominated all minds was that of Papal Infallibility and that the Fathers were sharply divided on the question. The Majority were in favour of the definition; but there was a strong Minority opposed to the definition as inopportune. They were chiefly bishops of countries in contact with heresy or infidelity, who feared that the definition would raise a further obstacle to conversion; and, above all, they dreaded a definition on the lines of Neo-Ultramontaniam. Hence the constitution of the deputation *De Fide* was a matter of vital importance. The Pope expressly wished it to be representative of both Majority and Minority parties; in the event the Majority succeeded in excluding the Minority entirely from the deputation; they had not a single representative. It seems that Manning was responsible for this ruthless action. Dom Butler remarks:—"After going through the proceedings of the entire Council, I have to say that this appears to me as the one serious blot on its doings." It made the Minority a definite opposition labouring under a sense of unfair treatment. The subsequent appeals for round-table conferences would not have been necessary had the Minority been represented on the deputation *De Fide*. And in the event all the business actually completed by the Council was proposed by this deputation.

The actual achievement of the Council consists of two dogmatic constitutions:—*De Fide Catholica*, and *De Ecclesia Christi*. On December 28, 1869, the schema *De Fide Catholica* prepared by a commission of theologians was introduced for discussion by the deputation *De Fide*, and it was not till April 24 that the constitution was finally passed unanimously by the Fathers. The debate is described in detail in Chapters X and XV. So keen was the criticism that the schema was sent back to the deputation to be entirely recast. Dom Butler sums up the debate in these words: I. p. 187:—"It may safely be averred that perhaps never in the history of the world has any legislative act been subjected to a discussion more free, or a sifting more thorough, or a criticism more searching, or a weighing of objections more painstaking, or a transformation more complete, than found place in this Vatican Constitution on the Catholic Faith."

It was intended to proceed next, and in order, to the discussion of the schema *De Ecclesia*, arriving ultimately at the schema *De Romano Pontifice*; but the vast majority of the Fathers were eager to deal with the Infallibility question, and in deference to numerous petitions the Pope decided that the schema *De Romano Pontifice* should be brought in immediately. It was formally

introduced by the deputation De Fide on May 123. Dom Butler writes: II, p. 46:—"The general debate on the schema as a whole began the next day and went on for fifteen days; it was really the decisive debate, for it turned principally on the crucial question of the opportuneness of defining the infallibility." After sixty-five bishops had spoken, thirty-nine in favour of the definition and twenty-six against, the debate was closed, the solitary use of the closure during the whole Council. Dom Butler decides that the closure was justified: he remarks on this debate:—"Anyone who reads the speeches at this debate, the most controversial and crucial of all, cannot fail to be impressed by the high level that was maintained; the dignity and courtesy, and temper and restraint, and also the learning displayed; above all, the patience of the Fathers and the forbearance of the Presidents."

The closure of the previous debate occurred on June 3rd; on June 6th discussion began on the text of the schema *De Romano Pontifice*. This consisted of four chapters: three on the Primacy, and a fourth on the Infallibility. The debate on the Primacy ended on June 14th; the only point calling for notice being the suspicion with which the Fathers regarded the terms *ordinaria et immediata* as applied to the universal jurisdiction of the Pope. As if the force of the terms was to deny that the jurisdiction of a bishop in his own diocese was also ordinary and immediate.

On June 15th the debate began on Chapter 4, and it lasted till July 4th, when owing to the great heat the outstanding speakers were induced by their friends to withdraw. Amongst the amendments proposed three are given prominence by Dom Butler: 1st, a change in the title of the chapter, from *De Infallibilitate Romani Pontificis* to *De infallibili Magisterio Rom. Pont.*; 2nd, a proposal to guard against rashness on the part of the Pope by inserting the phrase of St. Antoninus "using the counsel and seeking the help of the universal Church"; 3rd, an entirely new formula proposed by Cardinal Cullen. I must direct the reader's attention to the extremely valuable Chapter XXII, in which Dom Butler, with great acumen, describes the discussions amongst the members of the deputation De Fide on the text of the schema, both before and after the debate. And equally invaluable is the Chapter XXVII, in which the author gives an exhaustive interpretation of the decrees. Of the amendments enumerated above the deputation accepted the first and the third, and rejected the second.

On July 11th the new formula first expounded by Cardinal Cullen but actually composed by Cardinal Bilio, was brought forward on behalf of the deputation by Bishop Gasser. Dom Butler devotes Chapter XXIII to an analysis of his speech, and one wonders if any Council ever heard its equal: it is lucid, exhaustive, magisterial, and eminently conciliatory. But the Minority stood out for the second amendment, and if, as seems to be the case, Dom Butler sympathises with their attitude, I feel compelled for the first and only time to demur. The deputation rejected the formula of St. Antoninus as vague, and surely they were right. As Dom Butler remarks: p. 145:—"But the

deputation objected that it was vague and uncertain in its application, and might lead to uncertainties and controversies as to whether in any given case the Pope had sufficiently sought the counsel of the Church." The final formula was surely a triumph of moderation; one is inclined to lose patience with the Minority, who never seem to have recovered from their initial panic. The final stages are well described in Chapter XXIV, especially the solemn scene of July 18th.

The concluding chapters complete and round off the History of the Council. I have already mentioned the important Chapter XXVII. Chapter XXV describes the reception of the decrees, the adhesion of the Minority, and the sad fate of Döllinger and his friends; Chapter XXVI defends the liberty of the Council; and in the final chapter, XXVIII, Dom Butler gives us some valuable impressions and reflections.

I have given a mere outline of the events described in these volumes; there is much more to which I can only briefly allude. Scattered throughout the work, and notably in Chapter VIII, are vivid pen-pictures of the protagonists, which with an excellent series of portraits enable the reader to establish closer contact with the events. Dom Butler describes frankly the action of the Pope throughout; holds the scales evenly between Majority and Minority parties; and in the heated atmosphere engendered by a crossfire of pamphlets—Bishop Ullathorne confesses to have received as many as eighty—he preserves a sane sense of proportion. Even "this ugly word intrigue" does not disturb his calm. "After all, 'intrigue' is the recognised word by which we all designate diplomatic action displeasing to us." (p. 168 N.)

The old myth that the Council was a kind of bear-garden cannot survive these pages. Bishop Ullathorne's description of the atmosphere of Rome, both inside and outside the Council, must surely be accepted as authentic:—"Within the Council itself, we say that it unites order with reverence; dignity with apostolic freedom; and the keenest sense of responsibility with an untiring patience and charity." (I, p. 255.) "For it is not so much the interior of the Council as the outside of it that is such a little world, bringing out the ways of many and different natures; all, however, in earnest, all feeling a deep sense of responsibility, but some, one thinks, trying to manage their neighbours perhaps a little too much. Still the general character of the episcopate is high-mindedness, straightforwardness, and a deep conscientiousness." (I, p. 209.)

And in spite of the extremists on both sides, and of all the varied attempts to stampede the Council from without, the result was a triumph for the sound and solid mass of bishops who write few pamphlets, are rarely seen in the rostrum, but are content calmly and prayerfully under the guidance of the Holy Spirit to guard the deposit committed to the Saints. We conclude with the concluding words of Dom Butler's Preface:—"I believe that the impression left, as the outcome of it all, is one at which the Catholic Church has no cause to blush."

I lay aside these volumes which have been my close companions for many weeks with great reluctance and with the conviction that for objectivity, calm impartiality, clear ordering of facts, and lucid exposition, I do not know their equal.

Thomas Aquinas. By the Rev. M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., M.A.—Ernest Benn, Ltd.—Pp. 292+ix.—12s. 6d.

REVIEWED BY THE REV. T. E. FLYNN, PH.D., M.A.

This book should be effective in bringing the philosophy of St. Thomas to the notice of English students of philosophy, and if it does it will do more to bridge the intellectual gap between us and our thoughtful fellow-countrymen than many tomes of apologetic writing. Our theological system is so wedded to Scholastic philosophy, and that philosophy is so foreign to the thought of Englishmen, that every Catholic technical work is handicapped from the start.

Many books designed to introduce St. Thomas to modern minds or to present synthetically the cardinal principles of his philosophy have appeared on the continent, and two or three have been translated into English; but so far as we know this is the first of its kind that has been written by an Englishman. It appears in a series of dignified monographs on "Leaders of Philosophy" under the general editorship of Professor J. L. Stocks.

In his brief Introduction Fr. D'Arcy indicates some of the reasons for the fact, to us astounding, that St. Thomas has been neglected by philosophers outside the Church; and in the course of his work he disposes of the objections which, in justification of this neglect, are alleged against the greatest of mediæval philosophers.

The book is cast in three parts. Part I is historical. The first section shows how France came to take the lead in European culture in the time of St. Louis, and how the mendicant orders won pride of place in the University of Paris. The Aristotelian St. Thomas broke away from the Augustinian tradition with its dependence on Plato when "to contradict St. Augustine was an act of impiety." The violent entry of Aristotelianism into the stream of Christian thought and its decisive victory over the conservative opposition makes a dramatic story. "Scholasticism . . . emerged after a time into a system which, whatever its relation with the Christian faith, had a basis of pure reason." St. Thomas "cared with his whole soul for the faith and its message of union with God, and, nevertheless, he loved truth also and would not accept anything his reason could not approve." He "would prefer to be read as a Christian philosopher, but he is prepared to stand the test on his philosophy alone." Thus Fr. D'Arcy in this chapter answers the first two objections, that St. Thomas was more an apologist than a philosopher and that he was a mere disciple of Aristotle without any individual originality.

An interesting sketch of the Life, Character and Mind of St.

Thomas prepares the way for the description of his philosophy, the outstanding features of which are his concern with order and system rather than the analysis of isolated truths, his intellectualism, his metaphysical bias, his theocentricism.

Part II synthesizes the whole subject-matter of scholastic philosophy according to the divisions familiar in the text-books. All is grouped about the Nature of God. Beginning very naturally with the Principles of Knowledge and passing to Ontology, Fr. D'Arcy proceeds thence to establish the Existence and Nature of God. Then he deals with the works of God in the sections "God and the Universe," "Nature and Man"; and he completes the account with a study of man's conduct in "Ethics." Fr. D'Arcy fastens upon and expounds the key positions which present so much difficulty to beginners. Thus he quickly tackles Immanence. "St. Thomas looks upon knowledge as a form of life. Life is an immanent reality with various degrees of realisation. . . . At a certain level of life consciousness proper or knowledge supervenes, and to St. Thomas it is nothing else than the perfection natural to an activity at a certain stage of immanence. The subject ceases to be wholly taken up with its work; its mark of immanence in that it has gained itself. It is so much of a self that it can recognize its own handiwork, so self-possessed that it can distinguish other things from itself and itself from other things. . . . Knowledge has for its content the whole world in so far as it is intelligible; the intelligible being understood is the act of knowing. *Intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu.*"

In "The Nature of Reality" he establishes at once and very effectively the fundamental truth of Metaphysics that "being is the alpha and omega of all that is or can be." This leads to the distinction of act and potency. "Being frowns down upon us like a mountain shrouded in mist. It is one and it is all that is. Undeterred by this, St. Thomas examines its appearance more closely. He finds that there is change, and this must mean that what is is not in some strange way. But pure nothingness is unthinkable, so the change must be due to some principle which is neither act nor nothing, to a potency to be."

And so Fr. D'Arcy goes on to discuss Matter and Form, Essence and Existence, Substance, the One and the Many, Causes, and the Principle of Individuation. Nothing daunts him, and he exposes the recesses of the Angelical's metaphysical thought dispassionately, objectively, but with many a bright image and illuminating phrase. He insists on the Thomistic doctrine of the unity of human nature, in which "body and soul together constitute one human being in the manner of matter and form" (a truth which cannot be too frequently reiterated), but where the form is immaterial because it has the power of self-reflection. "This power of holding oneself at arm's length, of standing outside oneself, involves a principle which is immaterial. The form has freed itself from the particularity of the matter it determines; if it is still localised it is also infinite in power. . . . Like the fish in the Sea of

Salamis it can leap above the waters to greet the rising sun. . . ."

In the next chapter on the Existence and Nature of God we have the discussion of the *Quinque Viae* and the divine attributes. Brief as such a treatment must be it bears the hall-mark of thoroughness, the reluctance to shirk or slur over difficulties.

We are next led "to see that the poetic insight shown in such language as 'every common bush aflame with God' has more than its sober equivalent in the doctrine of creation, without the inconvenience of pantheism." God's goodness is at the root of the doctrine: *Bonum est diffusivum sui*. With creation are linked the doctrines of conservance and providence. In discussing these, Fr. D'Arcy deals with the knowledge of God. Lack of space prevents his entering into the old dispute of *Scientia Media* and Predetermination. He takes no sides.

The chapter on Nature and Man is particularly interesting, and perhaps its best section is that on psychology. The true Thomistic doctrine of the soul and its mode of union with the body, which is so frequently misapprehended, is well drawn out. Many a reader whose familiarity with such phrases as *intellectus agens* and *intellectus possibilis* cloaks a large potentiality of exact knowledge will be grateful for the clear and fresh exposition of a doctrine which he once took pains to master.

In Part III we have three short sections: Later History of Thomism, Influence of St. Thomas, Modern Thomism. The Philosophy of St. Thomas was fiercely attacked in his own age, especially in England; rival schools flourished. The fourteenth century was an age of small men, and there was widespread ignorance of Thomism at the onset of the Reformation. The reverence shown by the Council of Trent for the *Summa Theologica* instigated a revival, and then appeared the conflicting Dominican and Jesuit schools. But the revival, failing to keep pace with the scientific progress of the age of Newton and Descartes, was short-lived. It was due to the lead and encouragement of Pius IX and Leo XIII that St. Thomas came into his own again.

After the Reformation "the philosophy of St. Thomas came to be treated as the *Times Literary Supplement* treats a religious tract." He was written down as a theologian whose writings were overloaded with metaphysics and divorced from reality. How short of the full truth that verdict was Fr. D'Arcy has shown. And the very real progress of Modern Thomism in all the schools is showing more clearly every day that Thomistic philosophy is no spent force, but a living system capable of assimilating and synthesizing all the results of human intellectual endeavour, and full promise for the future.

Fr. D'Arcy has performed his great task admirably. He has written a book which no English student of St. Thomas can afford to neglect. We do not want to suggest that it is everybody's book: it contains much stiff reading. But any priest

who wishes to refresh his memory will find here the philosophy of St. Thomas in a brief synthesis written with much greater charm than he might have thought possible for such a subject.

A Monument to St. Augustine.—Sheed & Ward.—12s. 6d.

REVIEWED BY REV. J. CARTMELL, D.D., M.A.

St. Augustine is too vast a subject to be comprehensively embraced in a single survey. The compiler, therefore, chose for his Monument those aspects of him which furnished a connected treatment and at the same time evaluated his general influence in Western thought and culture. A glance through the contents indicates the line of approach. Mr. Christopher Dawson contributes two able and thoughtful papers: (i) on St. Augustine's relation to his own age, and (ii) on his general view of world history in "The City of God" and consequent influence in framing our Western ideals of freedom and progress. Fr. Martindale, S.J., follows with an impressionist sketch *more suo* of the Saint's life and character. Mr. Watkin discusses his mysticism, and Fr. Reeves, O.P., in a pleasing article, his humanism. M. Maritain vigorously portrays the leading characteristic of his genius in contrast with that of St. Thomas: "the essential difference between St. Augustine's teaching and St. Thomas's is a difference of perspective and point of view. With St. Thomas, it is theological wisdom in the strict sense of the word; with St. Augustine, it is infused wisdom." But St. Thomas's "fidelity to the wisdom of St. Augustine is far more perfect than his mastery of Aristotle's technic. He corrected Aristotle; he honoured Augustine as a son honours his father. . . ."

P. Roland-Gosselin writes an expert's article on St. Augustine's System of Morals. The remaining four articles deal with Augustinian philosophy. Fr. D'Arcy, S.J., outlines it, *fides quaerens intellectum*, with neo-Platonism as its instrument. Fr. Przywara, S.J. ("St. Augustine and the Modern World"), traces false Augustinianism from Descartes who originated it down to Kierkegaard and Hegel, who enunciates its fundamental axiom as "the self-indwelling of the intellect"; the true *Augustinus redevivus*, is, he maintains, Newman. M. E. Gilson ("The Future of Augustinian Metaphysics") and M. M. Blondel ("The Latent Resources of St. Augustine's Thought") give us the glad assurance that authentic Augustinianism is not a dead philosophy of mere historical or antiquarian value; it is still alive and still needed, as in a way supplementary to Thomism, which is insufficiently interested in the psychological approach to reality.

It will be seen from this brief analysis that the Monument is a worthy literary tribute to St. Augustine, and we associate ourselves with the encomiums that the Press at large has bestowed on it. But it is very stiff reading, and will appeal most to those who have decided philosophical interests and

enjoy profound and sustained thinking. Nor does our praise of the volume as a whole include the article on St. Augustine's mysticism. This article is in general unsatisfactory in matter and treatment; it opens with crude general statements that need extensive modification; it ends with a paragraph which, as it stands, yields a most unwholesome flavour of subjectivism, especially in the sentence: "If St. Augustine is a churchman, it is because he has learned by experience the need for an objective institution to explain, fructify, and render permanent in substance, though not in consciousness, his intuitions of Divine Union." Such a remark ignores one half of Augustine—the man of tradition, who revered the Church as the great mistress of truth and practically created the theology "*de Ecclesia*."

REVIEW OF REVIEWS

(1) GREGORIANUM for September, 1930: *Martyres Angli et S. Bellarminus*, by H. Van Laak. The Saint was born in 1542 and died in 1621, so that his active life coincided with the work of the Seminary Priests almost to the end of the reign of James I. The article shows how he helped them by the Notes of his Louvain Lectures, which were used at Douay as early as 1577, by his Roman Lectures on "The Controversies," attended by not a few of the Martyrs themselves, and used by them in England, and finally by his controversy with James I. He knew the students at the English College, and fully realised the life and death awaiting them in England. In a most interesting series of quotations we see S. Bellarmine tireless in defending the true-Martyr character alike of the Henrician, Elizabethan and Jacobean Martyrs, and drawing strength and consolation for his own spiritual life from their triumphs. The article sheds a vivid light on the clearness of the Continental Catholic appreciation of what was happening in England.

(2) ETUDES for December 5, 1930 (15, rue Monsieur, Paris VI., 75 francs a year), has three articles likely to be of interest to English-speaking clergy. *La Conférence de Lambeth*, by Christian Burdo, gives a very sympathetic analysis of the Lambeth documents; but, of course, manifests great distress at the lapse of the 15th Resolution on Birth-Control. Pierre Delattre writes on the German Elections and National-Socialism, and gives a very good account of the origin, growth and aims of the Hitler party in a defeated, revolutionized and over-taxed country, in which few people have much to lose whatever happens. *Tableau des Partis en France*, by Henri du Passage, analyses critically Siegfried's book bearing the same title. The groupings and re-groupings of French politicians are seen in new relation to the history of France and the temperament of the people.

The number for October 20th has an article by René Brouillard on *Le Mensonge*. The author retains the traditional Augustinian and Thomistic definition of lying, while recognising that it has been, to some extent, rejected by some modern authors, who seek a more scientific definition with a view to justifying the occasional necessity of concealing the truth. His discussion is enriched with many interesting and apposite illustrations and literary allusions. He rejects the use of mental restrictions, but allows a liberal use of equivocations. If a person is faced with the grave necessity of concealing the truth, which cannot be met by equivocal language, he must then utter words that are at variance with the concept in his mind. The lie is then a psychological not a moral deformity, for words have the purpose of making social life possible as well as being an expression of the mind; in a conflict between these two purposes the lesser must yield. The author's system is a judicious blending of *nova et vetera*. It may please neither the traditional nor the modern school, but, in the absence of any final conclusive theory, it is to be commended as offering a reasonable harmony of both.

(3) We have to thank *L'Unité de l'Eglise* (5, rue Bayard, Paris VIII, 9 francs a year) for giving us in the October, 1930, number, a fair statement of the English Catholic position with reference to the Malines Conversations. The article is written by Leon Vineuve and illustrated by numerous High-Church photographs. The December number has a useful study on *The Mystical Body* as giving a point of contact with Oriental dissidents; the persecution of the Catholics of the Byzantine Rite in Greece; and the problems facing the Church in Yugoslavia.

(4) *THOUGHT*, a quarterly of the Sciences and Letters (329, West 108th Street, New York 5 dol. a year) is full of interesting matter: *Enid Dennis* pleads for a revision of the conclusions drawn from the Nun of Kent's last speech. *Montgomery Carmichael* shows what is implied in the new critical edition of the works of St. John of the Cross and the extraordinary way in which earlier editors have tampered with the text. Fr. Benedict Zimmerman has already (1916) brought Lewis's classical translation of the *Dark Night of the Soul* into harmony with the new critical text. *Father J. H. Ledit* tells how *Russia denies her ancient Faith* in the Immaculate Conception under the influence of her hatred of things Latin. *Our Secularized Public Schools*, by Burton Confrey, gives us the historical background of the School Question as it presents itself to American Catholics.

(5) *ETUDES FRANCISCAINES*, published by the French Capuchins (4, rue Cassette, Paris VI, 45 frs.), contains in its December, 1930, number an article on Father Benedict Canfield (1562-1611). William Fytche, an Essex man, born at Canfield, and who, after his conversion, joined the Paris Capuchins, took the name of Benedict, spent three years in prison in England for the Faith, and wrote *The Rule of Perfection*, one of the classics of French spiritual as M. Bremond has shown us. The article dispels any idea of quietism attaching to his name. The Rule was translated into English by the author and published at Rouen in 1609. Père A. Teetaert gives a very full bulletin of Moral Theology (from October, 1928—October, 1929), comprising 13 items.

(6) *COLLATIONES BRUGENSES* for October, 1930 (Grand Séminaire, Bruges, 35 frs. a year), has a very important treatment *De tempore ageneseos*, by V. Coucke: he draws attention to the work of Dr. Knaus (in the *Münchener Medizinische Wochenschrift*, July 12th, 1929), asserting the existence of such periods on scientific grounds which he outlines. We shall do well to await patiently the results of the Specialists who are at work, but the importance of such a conclusion will be at once apparent. In the same number A. Dondeyne treats *De simplicitate Dei*, and *de Creationis notione*.

(7) *COLLATIONES NAMURCENSES*. (Grand Séminaire, Namur, 25 frs. a year.) *De reali immutatione Christi in Sacrificio Missae*, by A. Collart: discusses the teaching of Suarez, St. Bellarmine,

de Lugo, Franzelin and Lamiroy, and sums up against them. (September, 1930.) In the November number E. Ranwez gives a good treatment of the case of legitimate defence.

(8) COLLATIONES DIOECESIS TORNACENSIS (Secretariat de l'Evêché, Tournai, 25 frs. a year), in December, 1930, explains and establishes the efficacy of Perfect Contrition.

(9) NOUVELLE REVUE THEOLOGIQUE. (11, rue des Récollets, Louvain. 6 sh. a year.) The November, 1930, number has an interesting historical account of the Maurist Edition of St. Augustine, by Fr. J. Ghellinck. A short but clear note by Canon Joseph Van der Meersch sets out the precise meaning of devotion to the Sacred Heart, and applies the principles to devotion to the Eucharistic Heart of Jesus and to the Apostolic Heart of Jesus. The December number has a careful study by Fr. A. Vermeersch, S. J. Professor of Moral Theology at the Gregorian University, Rome, of the Lambeth Fifteenth Resolution on Birth Control.

(10) The December (1930) IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD contains quite a useful application by Dr. P. O'Neill of Waffelaert's principles to the practical question of *Co-operation with Non-Catholics* in entertainments, bazaars for Church renovations, etc. Dr. Kinnane makes it quite clear that *legal* consent on the part of a Superior is sufficient for custom.

(11) The Elenchus Bibliographicus of the EPHEMERIDES THEOLOGICAE LOVANIENSES (C. Beyaert, 6, rue Notre Dame, Bruges, 80 francs a year), covering as it does every three months the whole field of Dogma, Moral and Canon Law both in books and articles, ought to be within the reach of every studious priest. It follows worthily in the footsteps of its senior the REVUE D'HISTOIRE ECCLESIASTIQUE (Louvain, 40, rue de Namur, 150 francs a year), the bibliography of which no historical student can afford to overlook.

CORRESPONDENCE

LEGAL ADOPTION AND BAPTISMAL REGISTRATION.

"PAROCHUS" writes:—The recent Act of Parliament on the Adoption of Children makes the name of the adopting parents the legal name of the child. I understand, but am not quite sure of it, that on adoption according to the Act the Registrar General alters the child's name in his records.

My difficulty is in regard to the correct Registration of such children in the *Baptismal* Register. I quote two cases that I have had, in both of which the adopting parents demanded that the name of the child should be theirs in the Register.

(1) An illegitimate child, aged one year, already baptized in non-Catholic church, brought to me by Catholic man and wife for conditional Baptism. They had legally adopted it.

(2) An illegitimate child, ten weeks old, not baptized, brought to me for baptism by Catholic man and wife. In this case they declined to give the real name of the child, saying they did not know it. They asked that the child be registered in their own name as, in the course of a week or so, the preliminaries being gone through, the child would be theirs legally.

How should such children be entered in the Baptismal Register? Also, in what way are Baptismal Certificates to be issued for these children, later on, in the case of marriage, etc. ?

REPLY

BY THE RIGHT REV. MGR. CANON CRONIN, D.D., V.G.

Canon 777 of the Code of Canon Law prescribes as follows :

"Parochi debent nomina baptizatorum, mentione facta de ministro, parentibus ac patrinis, de loco ac die collati baptismi, in baptismali libro sedulo et sine ulla mora referre." The parish-priest then is ordered by the Canon Law to register carefully and without delay the names not only of the person baptized, but also of the minister, the *parents* and the sponsors. The law obviously attaches much importance to the recording of these particulars; the reason being that it is necessary to be able to furnish legal proof of the baptism and of the identity of the person baptized; and these particulars constitute important and very often necessary, evidence of this identity. I am assuming that the person baptized was born in lawful wedlock, as this paragraph of the Canon also assumes. Supposing that such a person has been legally adopted before the baptism takes place, the first duty of the parish-priest, it seems to me, is to obey the Canon Law, which has imposed upon him the grave obligation of registering the baptism, and has given him detailed instructions how to do this. I cannot see that the fact of a legal adoption can dispense the parish-priest from the obligation of carrying out the prescriptions of the Canon Law.

Nevertheless, legal adoption is an important fact for the individual adopted, for the family of adoption and for civil society. This fact also, therefore, ought to be put on record. The Church, as is clear from Canons 1059 and 1080, recognizes adoption according to the civil law, by which is now meant not the Roman

law, but the modern laws of the various nations. Moreover, the person legally adopted changes his legal surname, taking now that of the family into which he is received. This is henceforth the only name to which he is legally entitled. Obviously then this name should be entered in the baptismal register.

It follows therefore, that this should be done by adding a paragraph to the original record, in much the same way as marriage is now entered in the baptismal register. I would suggest some such form as this: "*Ipse (Joannes) die . . . mensis . . . anni . . . adoptatus est ad normam legis civilis a . . . , atque in ejus familiam receptus, et nomen ejusdem familiae adeptus est.*"

But the second paragraph of Canon 777 instructs the parish-priest that if the person baptized is illegitimate, the names of the parents are to be entered in the register only if the fact of their parenthood is a matter of public knowledge or if they ask that their names be recorded; and all danger of defamation must be avoided. In such a case, at any rate as a rule, the evidence of origin or of ancestral relations has not the same importance; and it is sufficient to be able to prove the identity of the person baptized. If then such a person has been legally adopted before baptism, there appears to be no reason why the baptismal register should not read: "*. . . baptizatus est Joannes Morton, filius adoptivus (ad normam legis civilis) Jacobi Morton, etc.*"

In the second case stated above the adoption of the child had not yet been legally completed. Strictly speaking, therefore, the child ought not to be entered in the register as the *filius adoptivus* of a couple about to adopt it. In my opinion, the priest should register the child as of unknown parents ("*filius parentum ignotorum*"), and later, when the adoption has been legally effected ("*in the course of a week or two*"), record the fact as an addition to the register.

The above is merely a private opinion given with all due submission. Really these appear to be cases in which the direction of the Ordinary should be sought. Indeed, the question might be considered important enough to warrant its submission to the Holy See for definite solution.

The second question presents no difficulty. The Baptismal Certificate should be an exact copy of the entry in the register.

PERMISSU SUPERIORUM

BOOKS RECEIVED

THE HISTORY OF THE CREEDS, by F. J. Badcock (S.P.C.K., pp. xiv, 293, 12s. 6d.).

THE MYSTERY OF FAITH: AN OUTLINE. By Rev. Maurice De La Taille, S.J. (Sheed & Ward, 2s. 6d., pp. 37.)

THE FIRST INSTRUCTION OF CHILDREN AND BEGINNERS. An Enquiry into the Catechetical Tradition of the Church by Rev. Joseph Tahon. Edited with a Preface by Rev. F. H. Drinkwater. (Sheed & Ward. 3s. 6d. pp. 115.)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GOOD LIFE. By The Rt. Rev. Charles Gore, D.D. (Murray, 10s. 6d.)

THE NATURAL MORAL LAW According to St. Thomas and Suarez, by Rev. William Farrell, O.P., S.T.Lr. A Thesis being an examination into the two chief Christian Theories of Law and a determination of the value of each, presented to the Faculty of Theology of the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, to obtain the degree of Doctor. (St. Dominic's Press, Ditchling, Sussex. 10s. 6d. Limited edition. pp. XII, and 162.)

LITURGIA, Encyclopédie Populaire des Connaissances Liturgiques. Publiée sous la Direction de l'Abbé R. Aigrain. Préface de S.G. Mgr. Harscouët, Evêque de Chartres. (Bloud & Gay, 3 rue Garancière, Paris. 57 frs. pp. xv, 1141.)

LES DONs DU SAINT-ESPRIT, Dons, Charismes, Fruits, Beatitudes. D'Après St. Thomas d'Aquin et les Epîtres de St. Paul, par l'Abbe Joseph Biard, du Diocese de Grenoble. (Aubanel Fils Aine, 15 Place des Etudes, Avignon. 22 frs. pp. 206.)

BAPTISM AND CONFIRMATION, by M. L'Abbé Adhemar D'Ales, Professor of the Catholic Institute, Paris, translated by the Rev. Joseph H. Howard. (Sands. "Catholic Library of Religious Knowledge." Vol I. pp. viii and 203. 3s. 6d.)

THE MORAL LAW OF THE FAMILY, by Abbé Meline. Translated by the Rev. Patrick Browne, Professor at Maynooth. (Sands. "Catholic Library of Religious Knowledge." Vol. vi. pp. xxiii and 201. 3s. 6d.)

PASTORS AND PEOPLE, by the Very Rev. Canon Magnin, translated by the Rev. J. D. Scanlan. (Sands. "Catholic Library of Religious Knowledge." Vol. VIII. pp. 212. 3s. 6d.)

THE CONGREGATIONS OF PRIESTS from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century, by Père Pisani, Dean of the Chapter of Notre Dame of Paris. A Free Translation by Mother Mary Reginald, O.P. (Sands. "Catholic Library of Religious Knowledge." Vol. XIV. pp. 195. 3s. 6d.)

COMMENTARIUM IN CODICEM JURIS CANONICI ad Usum Scholarum. Liber iv. De Processibus. By Rev. Dr. G. Cocchi, C.M. (Marietti, Via Legnano, 23, Turin, 18. Italy. pp. viii. and 666. Lire 20.)

EPITOME MORALE-ASCETICUM DE SACRAMENTI POENITENTIAE MINISTERIO, by the Rev. Sebastian Uccello. (Marietti, Turin. pp. vii and 512. Lire 15.)

DE ROSARIO B.M. VIRGINE. Historia-Legislatio-Exercitia, by the Rev. L. I. Fanfani, O.P. (Marietti, Turin. pp. xii and 215. Lire 10.)

(Other books will be recorded in the next issue.)

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